FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE RUNNING SANDS

By Edward M. House

"The sands are running out, and unless some strong hand can even now clutch Europe and rescue her from the slope down which she is slipping, the catastrophe of the peace may yet become far greater than that of the Great War."—GENERAL SMUTS.

IT IS difficult for an American of today to realize that less than twenty-five years ago the United States was not taken seriously as a world power. The change came when Dewey won his easy but spectacular triumph at Manila Bay. A victorious war with a European power, the acquisition of the Philippines, our new and commanding position in the Caribbean, forced Europe to recognize that the days of our isolation were past. Roosevelt pushed us still further from our isolated corner when he became mediator between Russia and Japan; again when he took action in the Algeciras Conference and when he decided to send our fleet around the world. Roosevelt lacked nothing in audacity or courage, and what he did to mark our growing power in the world arena met with the approval of his countrymen. But our real baptism came with the advent of the Great War. It was not until then that we emerged a full fledged international giant.

Let us remember that circumstances have had much to do with the commanding position we hold today—even though we have chosen, for the moment, not to use it. Previous to 1914 there were seven powers of the first class, but before the war closed it became reasonably clear that there would be but two outstanding nations left. By reason of her position, her population, her natural resources and her wealth, the United States was certain to be one of these, and Germany or Great Britain was certain to be the other. If Russia had not been broken by revolution she would have more than held her pre-war eminence, and, holding it, would also have held France in the front rank. If a strong Imperial Russia had survived the havoc of war and

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had continued her relations with France, together they could have dominated Continental Europe and the greater part of Asia. In this event, the United States would not have been the commanding figure she is today. Therefore, it may be said that by accident of circumstances rather than by design we find ourselves the world Colossus.

In thinking of Europe's problems, which have inevitably become our problems, the people of the United States should bear in mind the responsibility which our position has forced upon us. The view taken by many of our citizens that Europe should be left to work out her own salvation in her own way would be tenable if we were discussing Europe prior to 1914. Unhappily, a shattered Europe confronts us. With three of the Great Continental Powers disintegrated, our importance and responsibility are vastly augmented. We must face the facts as we find them, not as we may wish them.

The question arises, now that we have the power, what shall we do with it? Our isolationists believe it should be used solely for our own protection, and that we should go our way, leaving the rest of the world to go theirs. There is a certain appeal in such a programme, which many would like to follow if it were possible. Fortunately, or unfortunately, as the view may be, it cannot be done. In this Year of Our Lord, 1923, we can no more ignore other nations than one ward in a city can ignore other wards of that same community. The first ward may say that the second ward is unsanitary and deserves the cholera and typhus which has come to it, and that it will do nothing to help. But when cholera and typhus spread into the first ward, then it must in self-protection lend its aid.

That is the position of the United States today. We are staying our powerful hand, declaring that a devastated and disease-stricken Europe must save itself.

The drifting of our government in the direction of complete isolation illustrates certain peculiar phenomena of politics When President Wilson returned home from Paris with the Treaty of Versailles perhaps eighty per cent of our people were heartily in favor of the League of Nations in some form. A wealth of evidence supports this statement. If we go back to the late summer and autumn of 1919 we find the churches and social organizations throughout the United States urging ratification of the Treaty, and largely because of the League. A

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special committee of the American Bar Association urged unqualified ratification of the Peace Treaty at the annual convention at Boston, September 4, 1919. The Massachusetts Republican Convention in session at Boston, October 4, 1919, unanimously passed a resolution favoring: "Prompt ratification of the treaty of peace, without amendment, but with such unequivocal and effective reservation as will make clear the unconditional right of the United States to withdraw from the League upon due notice; as will provide that the United States shall assume no obligations to employ American soldiers and sailors until Congress shall, by a resolution, so direct; as will make it clear that no domestic questions, such as the tariff and immigration, will be taken from the control of the United States, and that the United States shall be the sole judge as to the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. There must be no abridgment of the sovereignty of the nation, of the control of its own domestic affairs, or of the maintenance of its national policies." Labor and commercial organizations in all parts of the country followed. Never was greater pressure brought to bear upon a legislative body than was brought to bear upon the United States Senate to pass the Treaty in some form.

Then came the irreconcilable conflict between the legislative and executive branches of our government. The President was determined to have his way, and the Senate were equally determined to have theirs. Unfortunately, the Senate had the power to compel the President to yield or lose confirmation of the Treaty, and equally unfortunately, he refused to give way. As far as his approach to the Senate was concerned, in my judgment, the President's purpose was impeccable but his manner unfortunate.

Once in politics, the League became its football. It was kicked hither and thither, the public mind became confused and all sense of justice and proportion was lost. The fears of women and the cupidity of men were played upon in the electorial campaign and the worst apprehensions of those who desired to keep such a question out of politics were realized. Nevertheless, the League was not the determining factor in the campaign. The Paris Peace Conference, its prelude and its aftermath, which had aroused the nationalistic susceptibilities of Germans, Irish, Italians, and Greeks in Europe, affected those of the same race in this country and they voted *en masse* against the Democratic

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nominees. The reasons for this are obvious, but that their judgment was hasty and mistaken is becoming every day more certain. The high cost of living and the inevitable complaints of post-war conditions combined to give the Republicans a record-breaking majority.

So easily does misunderstanding and prejudice grow that although the League is but an infant a few years old, already two phantom Leagues, figments of the imagination, have been created, the one submerging nationalities and dominating them as a super-state, the other a spineless, ineffectual society which fails to intervene when necessary and refuses to do the impossible. Meanwhile the real Association of fifty-two nations is functioning at Geneva, moulding public opinion toward the ways of peace and striking at the heart of social and hygienic evils which have become a menace to the general welfare.

Some two years ago in *La Revue de Genève* I wrote: "If war had not come in 1914 in fierce and exaggerated form, the idea of an association of nations would probably have remained dormant, for great reforms seldom materialize except during great human upheavals. The world has grown but slowly into its present partially civilized condition. It took a long time to overcome the belief that might was right, but it is now conceded that the physically strong must not oppress those weaker than themselves. The more advanced nations have laws recognizing the sanctity of property and the protection of person, but international laws and ethics have not kept pace with intra-national laws and ethics. It is no longer possible to kill the individual man and appropriate his property without being liable to immediate and drastic punishment. It is this intra-state code of laws and morals that the League of Nations is seeking to apply to the international situation. If law and order are good within states, there can be no reason why they should not be good between states. Nations were driven to adopt restrictive and restraining laws in order that their people might live and enjoy the benefits of industry, and the Great War has forced them for the same reasons to band together for mutual help and preservation. If this is not done we must perish, and, necessity being the mother of invention, we shall find the way. If the Covenant is weak in places it must be strengthened as time goes on and as the exigencies of the occasion demand, but it must never cease to function if civilization is to advance and not disappear."

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Had Governor Cox been elected President in 1920 the French would not be in the Ruhr in 1923, and enlightened Germans are now beginning to realize this. With a President committed to a policy of keeping our hands on the plough until the furrow had been run, we could have been as powerful in winning the peace as we were in winning the war. The League of Nations has done its best toward stabilizing Europe, and could have succeeded plus our help; and that we refused. In consequence our moral prestige has fallen throughout the world.

The Versailles Treaty *per se* is no better or worse than treaties framed under like circumstances usually are. It is quite possible to conceive a much better treaty, but it is doubtful whether it would have been possible for the American President to make it better fighting single-handed as he did and under adverse conditions. Let it be remembered that his political party had lost control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives and that the treaty-making power was only partially in his hands. It is unfortunate, on the one hand, that he did not realize this more completely; on the other it is unfortunate that the opposition party did not take a broader and more patriotic view of the situation.

The views held by the Americans at Paris were quite frankly different from those held by their European colleagues, and, being different, the European representatives took courage and comfort from cabled despatches and articles coming from the United States, stating that President Wilson need no longer be taken seriously since he had lost the power to enforce his decisions.

At the beginning, and during the first half of the war, the Governments of France and Great Britain were manned by liberals, and if they had been around the peace table they would have seen eye to eye with Wilson. But when the war closed these liberals had mostly been shaken out of both governments and their places taken by virile conservatives under the able leadership of Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Advanced liberals in every country hoped until the last moment that Wilson would insist upon a righteous peace, and, failing that, would return home without giving his sanction to a treaty of another sort. But if he had done this he would have left the world in greater confusion than it now is, and he would have had but little support from our people and less from the Senate. He might have been

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a little less yielding at Paris and a little more yielding at Washington if he had realized that the situation was no longer wholly in his hands. George and Clemenceau did not sense the real situation any more than Wilson, and he might have safely forced them further toward his point of view. On the other hand the result would probably have been the same, for the Senate were plainly waiting to deal him a mortal blow, and chose the Covenant as the most convenient spot to strike.

Nevertheless, taking the Treaty as it is, it could have been made a workable and efficient instrument for peace had we done our part. Among those who know there is absolute agreement that the crux of most of the trouble that has arisen since the armistice was signed is France's fear of Germany, not immediate, but eventual. Failure to pay reparations has been the apparent cause of the controversy, but the real cause is the fear of Frenchmen that when Germany is in condition to pay she will also be in condition to discontinue payment and, should it suit her plans, to invade France again.

That was the situation which confronted the American delegates in Paris and that is the situation today. There is but one solution and that is to guarantee France, and accompany the guarantee by a demand that a just sum shall be fixed for reparations, a sum which Germany can pay. Clemenceau, Wilson and George agreed upon the sensible and the reasonable plan to accomplish this result, and the Anglo-French and the Franco-American Treaties were formulated and signed. The mere existence of a treaty of guarantee would in itself be sufficient to keep Germany from embarking on another adventure like that of 1914; Great Britain and the United States would never be called upon to fulfill their guarantees. Had the Senate ratified both Treaties placed before it, with the League of Nations in force to modify and adjust unfair provisions of the Versailles Treaty, a different world might exist today.

The United States, after having risen to heights of courage and idealism in its entry and prosecution of the war, has gone to the other extreme in the making of peace. For taking this course history will probably be even less sparing of us than our present-day critics.

Therefore, until tomorrow, when we shall again lend a guiding and helping hand, Europe must work out its own salvation. The problems are acute, but they are not insoluble, even without

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our aid. The French adventure in the Ruhr may not be wholly bad in its consequences. The Germans are now realizing the bitterness of defeat, and the French are not accomplishing what they sought. This may lead both to a maximum effort toward mutual accommodation. When each side reaches such a frame of mind an agreement can be brought about. Germany must be willing to accept France's fear as a fact not an illusion, and must offer to meet it in any reasonable way. This might be done by creating a zone of ample proportions along the Rhine in which Germany would agree to dismantle fortifications already there and build no new ones; she might also agree neither to maintain nor recruit troops within that area. Such a zone is already partially warranted by the Treaty of Versailles in Part V, Chapter IV, Article 180, which reads: "All fortified works, fortresses and field works situated in German territory to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled." In addition, France might obtain an especial guarantee from both Great Britain and Italy, similar to that offered at Paris by Lloyd George and Wilson.

The Irish Free State has now made application for membership in the League and undoubtedly will be admitted at the September meeting. The League is a God-sent haven for such states as Ireland. While many of her differences with Great Britain have been settled by treaty, there are still matters to be threshed out between them. They may be able to arrange these unsettled problems privately, but if they cannot Ireland has sought the only forum open to her where it can be done.

Germany, too, will doubtless soon seek the same sanctuary. In the League a hearing before all the nations of the world may be had, and if not the power of the League then surely the power of public opinion may be invoked. When Ireland and Germany are once members of the League there is certain to be a desire on their part for the United States also to join, for what other nation is there whose interests are more detached than ours?

Germany should be permitted League membership, and the League should undertake to see that Germany lived up to her obligations in the restricted zone. Once secured from unwarranted invasion, France should, and doubtless would, be reasonable as to the sum Germany must pay for reparations. This sum and the time and manner of its payment should be determined by a commission to be agreed upon by France and

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Germany. This commission should also present a plan for the stabilization of the mark and for specifying the nature of security Germany should give that her obligations would be met as they became due. Once the entire problem was in course of settlement, American and European bankers would probably cooperate to make the plan a success. These measures should have been taken as soon as the United States stepped from under the responsibilities of peace-making.

But while the United States of today is not the United States of yesterday there are unmistakable indications that she is also not the United States of tomorrow. The courage and selflessness which were the compelling influences that brought us into the war are but latent, and will leap forth under proper leadership. After 1917-18 Europe will scarcely make the mistake of thinking that we are as timid and selfish as our present attitude would indicate. Our people, native and foreign-born, cherish the belief that this Republic was created to become an instrument for the betterment of man, and not merely a pleasant and safe abiding place. They will not be content until the United States has again assumed the leadership and responsibilities in world affairs commensurate with her moral, economic and political position.

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THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

By B.

IN ITS simplest terms, the question of the Far East, from the viewpoint of the United States, is one of relations with Japan. It is, however, a misleading assumption—although one all too frequently made—that the relationships between the United States and Japan are determined by any of the questions directly at issue between them. Such questions of direct controversy as now exist, or have existed during the past quarter of a century, are of minor importance—not negligible, indeed, because of their power for evil in the irritation of feeling between the two countries, but certainly not vital or fundamental to the interests of either party to the controversy.

The real issues which have from time to time troubled the relations of the two countries lie deeper than the questions of Japanese immigration into the United States and the status of those Japanese who are lawfully resident here; they arise out of Japan's position and attitude towards the mainland of Asia, and more particularly towards the potential wealth and manpower of China. Japanese statesmen have for centuries dreamed dreams of Japanese domination on the continent. The recent industrialization of Japan has made it a condition of their life as a self-supporting people that they should have access to the near-by sources of raw materials for the maintenance of their newly developed economic system; Japan's growth into an enviable political position as a great power has attracted the rivalry of other nations, and compelled her in defense of her interests to vindicate against China, Russia and Germany in turn her claim to an uncontested position in her own orbit in the Far East. It is not a matter for wonder that many Japanese—especially under the temptation offered by the World War, during which the Far East was ignored by the powers which had theretofore constituted a balance of forces to restrain particularistic action on the part of any one nation or group—fell into the error of seeking to develop that defensive policy into one of positive and aggressive imperialism at the cost of their weaker neighbors on the continent. To those so inspired it was only natural to aspire further to a hegemony of Eastern Asia, which would make it possible for Japan not only to mould the destinies

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of the Far East but to exercise such power as would make her will supreme in the basin of the Pacific. And it was no less natural that those who conceived this grandiose dream, and who in fact made certain tentative steps towards its realization during the abnormal situation created by the war, should have been not only intolerant towards the rights and interests of other peoples, but jealously sensitive and suspicious towards the policies and activities of other nations, notably of the United States, which might in any way stand athwart the road of imperial destiny.

There was, as has been intimated above, a time, roughly coincident with the four years of the war, when those who cherished this dream of Asiatic hegemony were in a position to influence (not always, but very often, decisively) not only the course of Japanese international action, but the current of Japanese popular opinion. And when the war ended with the unbelievable issue of victory for the Allies, instead of a stalemate after years of mutually exhaustive war among the nations of the west—when victory had been assured obviously through the turning of the scale by the intervention of America, whose military potentialities had always been despised and discounted by the imperialistic elements in Japanese politics—when Germany, the object of their respect and emulation, had been defeated and humiliated and her militant imperialism had been thus discredited—the reaction was to make the militarist elements in Japan still more jealous of their imperial dreams. These elements became eager to shore up their weakened prestige among their own people by creating the belief that their designs were in fact merely defensive and necessary for the protection of Japan's legitimate political and economic position against the dangerous pretensions of the United States. So docile is the untutored opinion of the Japanese masses, and so responsive to any appeal to their national and racial loyalty, that within six months after the armistice there had been created in Japan a feeling of such suspicion and bitterness towards the United States as would doubtless have supported any action which the controlling military influences might have proclaimed as necessary. Sober-minded Japanese opinion was perturbed by the consciousness that a state of feeling existed in which anything was possible; but perhaps because of the conviction inherent in the Japanese of all classes that the Chinese are a degenerate and helpless people who

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for their own good stand in need of Japan's guidance, there was singularly little appreciation of the causes which had led up to this situation. Those who interested themselves in maintaining good relations with the United States redoubled their efforts to reach a solution of the question of "racial equality" (as it was at the time customary to designate the group of questions connected with the immigration and the status of Japanese in our Pacific Coast states) and to arrange for interchanges of visits by prominent men who might directly or indirectly convey to the American people a conviction of Japan's friendly disposition towards us. But this preoccupation with the incidental and unessential phases of American-Japanese relationships was not only ineffectual in that it incurred in the minds of our people the odium of propaganda; it diverted some of the more friendly groups of Japanese thought from the exercise of any real effort to meet the actual issue and to influence their own government to adopt in China a course of political action less aggressive and less antagonistic to American sentiment. There was thus a minimum of restraining influence upon the dangerous policy of the imperialists who, while not wishing to precipitate what they realized must be a ruinous war with the United States, nevertheless found it advantageous to keep Japanese public opinion heated to a degree just short of the explosion point.

It is easy for us Americans—who not only accept the growth of our continental possessions as a natural and amoral phenomenon of history, but who have forgotten how we came to annex our Samoan and Hawaiian islands, who think of our acquisition of the Philippines as a benevolent assumption of responsibilities to a politically helpless people, and who pride ourselves upon the disinterestedness of our action in Cuba as a unique example in practical international politics—it is easy for us to regard the general feeling of the Japanese people towards us as unwarranted and fantastic, or to misinterpret that feeling as insincere or unreal. Fantastic it may have been; but it is none the less true that in the average Japanese mind there was a real feeling of suspicion and anxiety lest the United States should be preparing to force an issue with Japan for the purpose of establishing mastery in the Western Pacific. It was this apprehension that gave currency in Japan to the idea summed up in the catch-word, "a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East," despite the confusion of thought involved in applying the name of a

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policy intended solely for protection against political encroachment upon the Western Hemisphere, to a set of circumstances involving not only protection from outside encroachment but a positive claim to dominance and exclusive control over the political, military and economic development of Eastern Asia.

There had in the meanwhile grown up in the United States a corresponding feeling of distrust and uneasiness in regard to Japan. For several reasons this apprehension was less keen than the Japanese anxiety in regard to us. Japan's insular and dependent position compels her to consider foreign relations with an earnestness such as we dwellers in a bountiful land can attain only in times of international crisis; and whereas the Japanese are conscious that war with us would mean life or death to them, we at least believe that such a war would be at the worst a painful incident for us. As a result every thinking Japanese ponders on the relations of his country with the United States many times for every time that a thought of Japan enters the mind of the average American citizen. And this is true despite the strong feeling against the Japanese in our Pacific Coast states and despite the recurring agitation against them in certain sections of our press. But apart from the local feeling of the Coast, and apart from the influence of anti-Japanese press agitations, both sincere and insincere, it is the fact that the ordinary citizen of our country has for half a generation been coming to regard Japan with a deepening distrust. The generality of American citizens, who do not take seriously to heart the problems of our international relationships and who pretend to no knowledge of what has passed or is passing on the farther shores of the Pacific, have nevertheless become inclined to consider the Japanese "a tricky lot." They would a little rather have us hold aloof from such a people and usually think the Californians rather inconsiderate to insist upon bringing us into controversy with them about what is generally regarded as a mere matter of racial prejudice. They have a somewhat indefinite persuasion that Japan has not dealt fairly with the Chinese, who, it is almost invariably commented, are a much more honest people than the Japanese. And the citizen who finds occasion to gather together his views on the matter is nearly sure to end with a word of wonder as to what those "inscrutable people," the Japanese, are really up to.

From such a welter of half-truths and unformed views it

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would be impossible to infer any definite convictions of the public mind of our country—such convictions as in France dictate a policy of security against Germany, or as in England determine a policy adjusted to the balance of power in Europe. But it is clearly and unmistakably to be inferred that American opinion has reacted unfavorably to Japan since the close of the Russo-Japanese War, and has become so far sensitive to Far Eastern conditions that its harbors a latent feeling of antagonism to the course of international action with which it understands Japan to be identified.

To understand the development of this unfavorable trend of American sentiment towards Japan, one must recall the almost universal eagerness of this country's unofficial partisanship for the Japanese cause in the war of 1904–5 with Russia. That enthusiasm was natural enough. We were already out of conceit with Russia, for reasons that culminated, in 1911, in our petulant denunciation of our old Treaty of Commercial Relations. Japan, on the other hand, we conceived to be our protégé. It was our Commodore Perry, we recalled, who had opened Japan to the world; and Japan had defied the Russian giant in championship of that very doctrine of the open door which our Secretary of State (then still in office) had conceived, as we generally understood it, only a few years before (1899). In Japan's behalf, moreover, we combined with the complacent sense of patronage of the weak the gratifying experience of backing the successful side. Then, too, these spontaneous human reactions were stimulated by a press campaign of considerable adroitness. In the generosity of our somewhat detached enthusiasm (for we did regard the war rather as a sporting event than as an introductory chapter in a history of our own modern relations with the East,) we were glad to believe all things. We believed not only the unquestionable loyalty and discipline of the Japanese people, the minute and careful pertinacity of their leaders, and the heroism of the rank and file, but myths of altogether incredible skill and efficiency, of foresight and wisdom wholly superhuman. Such was our mood up to the conclusion of the Peace of Portsmouth, the climax of our partisanship, when the good offices of President Roosevelt caused the seal to be set upon the triumph of the right.

But while we so construed it, the people of Japan (wrongly, no doubt, but very earnestly and resentfully,) considered that our interposition had deprived them of a fair portion of the antici-

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pated fruits of victory; and from then on we come to realize that the Japanese thanked us not at all for our platonic zeal in their behalf, that they did not regard themselves as our *protégés* and that their championship of our principle of the open door had not been construed by them as a trust from which they themselves could not honorably profit. We were perhaps surprisingly indifferent to the fact that the results of the war had caused Korea to gravitate towards Japan so as to lead inevitably to the annexation which took place five years later. But it was the thoroughness with which Japan consolidated the sphere of influence which she had inherited from Russia, in South Manchuria, which brought to Americans a doubt whether they had not given their suffrage to a new tyrant in the place of the old. With care and thoroughness the paternalistic Japanese Government saw to the organization of the South Manchuria Railway and to the administration of Port Arthur and Dairen, in the former Russian Leased Territory of Kwantung. The railway and its appurtenant "zone" were so administered as to constitute a Japanese province within the Chinese Empire, perpetuating in this respect what the Russians had done in impairment of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity; and the unified Japanese control of railway, port facilities, postal and telegraphic arrangements, and other accessories to trade and industry in South Manchuria, gave to Japanese commercial enterprise in that region advantages which would have driven out all but the most firmly established competitors, even in the absence of any positive discrimination.

Disillusion is a distorting complex of sentiments; and the general American concept of the Japanese took on a strange transformation. We retained a belief in the superhuman efficiency of these people who had disappointed our generously impossible imaginings about them, but we came to think of it as an inhuman and malignant power which they possessed—something inscrutable, not to be understood but to be superstitiously dreaded. And to this day our current view of Japan and her people is colored by this misleading tradition that the Japanese singly and collectively are actuated by motives that have nothing in common with ours, know nothing of our ideals and of our scruples, and as restlessly and implacably as a nest of ants pursue their destiny in accordance with laws we can scarcely expect to fathom. It is not strange that, with this underlying miscon-

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ception in their minds, Americans have on the one hand been too often daunted in matters of controversy with the Japanese, and have on the other hand been intolerant and suspicious in cases where a more realistic viewpoint would have brought about understanding.

It was in such a frame of mind that the American people first found themselves in direct controversy with Japan, in 1907–8, on the Japanese school question in California and the question of Japanese immigration that ensued upon it. There swept over the country a feeling in which were combined irritation and a degree of apprehension that in retrospect it is difficult to understand; we caught our breath with a sense of daring when President Roosevelt ordered the battleship fleet on its cruise around the world, and we thrilled with exultation when its return demonstrated to us that we had successfully challenged the perils of the unknown. And it was with a similar sense of relief that we welcomed a solution of the question of Japanese immigration by means of the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement, by which in return for our consenting to hold in abeyance the exercise of our treaty right to exclude Japanese immigrants by our own legislative action the Japanese Government undertook to restrain the emigration to the United States of the laboring classes. To that obligation Japan has adhered faithfully in letter and in spirit; and if, in fact, there have come into our mainland territories a certain number of unauthorized Japanese of the classes obnoxious to us by reason of economic competition or of political and social immiscibility, that fact is not attributable either to bad faith or to negligence on the part of the Japanese Government, and the number is probably less than that of the Chinese who have entered surreptitiously during the same period. Yet (to go forward several years, momentarily, in this outline of events), in spite of the statistics of our own immigration authorities, the belief has become general that the Japanese Government has evaded its obligations under the Gentlemen's Agreement, and has actually fostered the growth of Japanese colonies in our western states. If a reason be sought for a belief so little justified by facts, it is no doubt to be found in a somewhat indefinite consciousness that in our revised Commercial Treaty with Japan, in 1911, we did positively forego the treaty provision expressly conceding the right (which by the Gentlemen's Agreement we had consented to hold in abeyance)

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to exclude Japanese immigration by our own domestic act, thus putting ourselves in the position of relying upon another power for the enforcement of our own national policy in this phase of the immigration problem. The consciousness of this dependence upon the action of Japan in a matter involving the sovereign will of our nation has rankled in the minds of those who feel that we have entrusted our dignity and our interests in this matter to a government unworthy of such confidence; and they have found an apparent justification for their distrust in the situation created in California by the tendency of the Japanese to group themselves together in organized colonies in a manner which makes their presence more conspicuous, as it does in fact make them more unassimilable to our institutions—a cyst in our body politic.

But to revert to the phase of our relationship with Japan that followed upon the conclusion of the Gentlemen's Agreement. It was in 1911 that a new element in the Far Eastern situation made itself evident. The negotiations in connection with Secretary Knox's project for the neutralization of railways in Manchuria had made it manifest that, in spite of our government's efforts to enlist Japan and Russia in a policy of international coöperation for the economic development of China on the basis of the open door, those two Empires had sunk their differences and arrived at some *modus vivendi* for the exploitation of their spheres of influence in China. The conviction of such a realignment of Japanese policy in the Far East gave an altered significance to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which, as originally concluded in 1902, had been directed primarily against German and Russian pretensions in China, and, as revised in 1905 (just prior to the Treaty of Portsmouth), had been designed to support Japan's position as against the encroachment of Russia upon China and Korea. With Japan in accord with Russia to ignore the principles of Chinese integrity and of the open door in those regions where they respectively claimed special interests, the Alliance took on a new implication in that it obligated Great Britain to Japan under circumstances in which Japan's policy was in fundamental opposition to those doctrines which we have considered essential in our Far Eastern policy. The opportunity presented itself, in connection with the Treaty of General Arbitration which Secretary Knox was then negotiating with the British Ambassador, to deflect from the United

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States the point of the Alliance; the treaty between Great Britain and Japan was revised in 1911, and an article was inserted in it which provided that the Alliance should not obligate either party to go to war with any power with which it might have a Treaty of General Arbitration. Although this proviso never in fact became legally operative because of the failure of the Knox Arbitration Treaty to obtain the ratification of the Senate, it was nevertheless an effective notice of Great Britain's unwillingness to be drawn into antagonism with the United States in Far Eastern matters. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance might indeed have remained, so far as concerns the United States, an innocuous and in fact a rather meaningless document, but for the further development of its implications which resulted from the Great War and its reactions upon the situation in the Far East.

There had in the meanwhile been a change of administration in this country, and one of the first acts of the new administration had been to withdraw the governmental support theretofore given to the American Group in the Consortium for China business. It would lead too far afield to attempt a discussion of the actual reasons for this reversal of a policy which the previous administration had vigorously pursued in the conviction that it afforded the sole means of giving practical effect to our open-door policy in China, and to which, as a matter of fact, the Wilson administration reverted later by taking the lead in reëstablishing a Consortium, with an American group participating, in 1920. But the reasons for the withdrawal of support from the Consortium, as set forth forensically in the public announcement made in behalf of the administration in March, 1913, were such as created among those familiar with the affairs of China an impression that the realities of the situation had been ignored. It was almost immediately thereafter that the question of the status and rights of Japanese residents in this country, in the new phase precipitated by the California Alien Land Laws of 1913, again became a matter of concern to the Federal Government. There followed a correspondence, extending over a year and more, which was interesting enough in itself, but quite inconclusive, and significant from the general viewpoint of American-Japanese relations only in that it confirmed in the minds of the Japanese Government the conviction that the American administration lacked the perspective of Far Eastern affairs that would enable it to distinguish between the essential

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and the adventitious, and that under the control of our foreign relations by Secretary Bryan Japan might reckon upon encountering neither definiteness of purpose nor firmness of resolution in any issue which it might prove politic to force upon us.

Thus, when the war broke out, and the stern necessities of self-preservation removed from the Far Eastern field the activities and the influence of all European rivals, it was possible for Japan virtually to discard from consideration the sole remnant of the former balance of forces; Japan confronted the situation in China with no rivals and with no restraints other than the somewhat academic pleadings of the United States for a fair field. Japanese statesmen were quick to perceive the possibilities of the occasion presented them by this situation and by their alliance with Great Britain. It may be doubted whether there was a *casus foederis* under the terms of the Alliance, and it is more than doubtful whether Great Britain willingly accepted Japan's voluntary association with her in the war in ostensible fulfilment of the obligations of the Alliance; it is certain, from the terms the official communiqué in which the British Government announced Japan's accession to the cause, under specified limitations upon the area of Japanese military and naval action (which limitations Japan wholly ignored from the outset), that Great Britain at any rate attempted to prevent Japan's carrying the war into Chinese territory. But within a fortnight of the outbreak of the war Japan had demanded of Germany, by an ultimatum whose terms were palpably impossible to meet, the rendition of the German leasehold of Kiaochow; and within three months the Japanese forces, with the somewhat unwelcome assistance of a small British force, had placed Japan in actual possession not only of the German leased territory but also of the Shantung Railway, the appurtenant mines, and other German properties in the province of Shantung. Japan had, in fact, taken to herself the reversion of German rights and interests in China, and made Shantung as well as South Manchuria a Japanese sphere of influence.

Momentous as was this appropriation by Japan of Germany's "place in the sun" in the Far East, it was but the first development of plans by which the Japanese Government proposed to establish a new relationship towards China. The next development was the secret presentation of the "Twenty-one Demands" upon China, during January, 1915—some two months after the

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capture of Tsingtao. The substance of the demands, with the exception of the more indefensible items of Group V, was eventually, after tedious negotiations and a final ultimatum, embodied in a set of treaties and exchanges of notes concluded on May 25, 1915. And despite their assertion of preferential rights, and the consequent impairment of the rights of other powers, so complete was the political vacuum created by the war that the demands elicited, so far as is known, no remonstrance from any quarter, save for a tardy reservation by the American Government of its treaty rights and of its doctrines of Chinese integrity and the open door. Even Great Britain, the contract rights of whose nationals were claimed to have been infringed, was understood to have refrained from any comment or inquiry.

Japan's next test of strength came in connection with the entry of China into the war, in 1917. Ever since the Japanese occupation of Shantung, the Chinese had desultorily and half-heartedly entertained the idea that their position in the final settlement following the war would be bettered if they were to participate on the side of the Allies. To all suggestions of this sort, whether originating with the Chinese or with one or another of the Allied powers, Japanese influence had made effective opposition. But when the United States severed relations with Germany in February, 1917, it invited China, along with other neutrals, to take similar action. After several weeks of violent controversy, the Chinese Government ranged itself with the United States as a result of the temporary triumph of the parliamentary element, under the leadership of certain of the younger Chinese of foreign training, over the reactionary Chinese military party who had to a large degree affiliated themselves with Japanese influences. Then, when the United States had actually declared war upon Germany, the contest raged with even greater heat until August, when the militarists made a sudden shift of policy, declared war as an executive act, dispersed the Parliament for declining to acquiesce in so palpably and provokingly unconstitutional a manner of declaring war, and from then on became theoretically allies in the war against the Central Powers. It subsequently appeared that during the period when the severance of relations was in controversy, Japan had, by a secret agreement with France, undertaken to assist in causing China to break with Germany, in return for French support of Japan's claim to the reversion of the "territorial and special interests"

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of Germany in Shantung and in the islands of the North Pacific. Similar secret promises of support to Japan's claims at the peace conference were also given by Great Britain, Italy, and Russia; and though their arrangements did not, like that of France, stipulate for Japanese good offices in the matter, the plain truth was that China in fact, and with the cognizance of the principal Allied powers, entered the war as a protégé of Japan.

From that time until well after the close of the war, Japanese influence and material facilities maintained in power at Peking the military group (the so-called Anfu clique) which had served as the instrument by which this result had been accomplished. And through the complaisance of this clique Japan was able to obtain not only understandings which strengthened her position in Shantung, but a series of concessions which to an alarming extent mortgaged to Japanese interests the economic future of China. The ruling group in Peking was debauched by loans (totaling somewhere near $100,000,000 in United States currency) contracted ostensibly for railway construction and other industrial developments, but given without security or supervision, and actually spent in futile partisan warfare and in the building up of the personal armies of the several Anfu leaders. The Chinese people were outraged by this wholesale corruption of their government, and their foreign friends were aghast at the prospect of China's following the course of Korea. In the face of the universal protests and expressions of apprehension in regard to this demoralization of the Chinese Government, the spokesmen of the Japanese Government disavowed in its behalf all responsibility for the activities of the agent, Nishihara, who was negotiating these loans as the agent for an independent Japanese banking syndicate; but it afterwards appeared in a detailed report of the Japanese Ministry of Finance that it had in fact organized the "independent" banking syndicate for the purpose, and caused it to make the so-called "Nishihara loans." This, then, was a new phase in the relationship of Japan with China—a stage in which the Japanese Government was keeping in control of the Central Government of China an administration subsidized for the service of Japanese political and economic aims.

Ironically enough, it was in the heyday of this debauchery of Chinese political life in the interests of Japan that the American Government—the traditional champion of the principles of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity and the open

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door—concluded with the Japanese Government the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, an executive understanding by which it recognized that "Japan has special interests in China." It has never been made clear what were the considerations which led the administration of the day to subscribe to a formula which had never before been adopted in our diplomatic correspondence, and which lent itself to a construction so plainly incompatible with the traditional American policy in the Far East. From the statements subsequently made by Secretary Lansing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, at the hearings on the Treaty of Versailles, it appears that when Viscount Ishii had come to this country as Ambassador on Special Mission, Secretary Lansing had deemed it of fundamental importance to obtain from him a reaffirmation of the open door policy ("in order to silence mischievous reports," as the text of the notes reads), but that the Japanese Special Ambassador had insisted on coupling with this reaffirmation an acknowledgment of Japan's "special interests;" and that, having explained his own view that if this phrase meant "paramount interest" he could not discuss it further, Mr. Lansing was "not very strongly opposed" to its inclusion in the proposed exchange of notes, as he construed it to mean nothing different from the special interest which, for example, we have in Canada—"only the special interest that comes from being contiguous to another country whose peace and prosperity were involved." But although Mr. Lansing consented to embody this phrase in the notes, in the faith that it meant no more than this, it was in fact a phrase of art which in the terminology of European diplomacy had acquired definite connotations over and beyond the bare meaning of the component words. To those, in particular, who were familiar with the political treaties which Japan had at various times concluded with Great Britain, with France, and with Russia, the recognition of Japan's "special interests in China" could mean nothing less than an acknowledgment that Japan possessed interests and rights in China admittedly different, not merely in degree but in character, from those of other nations; and the qualifying phrase, "particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous," meant clearly an admission that South Manchuria was a Japanese sphere of influence. The Japanese Government so interpreted the phraseology, although (as appears from one of the reports of the Russian Ambassador at Tokyo, made public by the Soviet

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authorities) the Minister of Foreign Affairs was conscious that the Japanese interpretation differed fundamentally from the American; and in communicating to the Chinese Government the English text of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement the Japanese Minister at Peking accompanied it with a Chinese translation in which the phrase "special interests" was rendered in language unmistakably signifying "predominant interest." Certainly the Chinese never doubted the completeness of the American recognition of Japan's superior position. It was even contended by the Chinese authorities, in a case in which American interests claimed the benefit of certain regulations favorable to Japanese trade in Manchuria, that by conceding Japan's special interests the Government of the United States had waived the right to most-favored-nation treatment provided by its treaties with China.

The consummation of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement had, in fact, completed Japan's outworks of diplomatic defense against restraint or effective remonstrance on the part of the other powers. The United States, whose solitary influence had been inconsiderable up to the time when it made a hearing for itself by its effort in the war, was now made negligible in China by its own acknowledgment.

There remained a further triumph for the imperialistic policy of Japan to achieve—the confirmation by the powers of her conquest of Germany's position in China. This was accomplished at the Peace Conference at Paris. The testimony of President Wilson and of Secretary Lansing, at the hearings on the Treaty by the Senate Committee, makes it clear that the American Delegation had sought to uphold China's claim to the direct restitution of Shantung, but that this effort had been abandoned when the President became convinced that Japan would bolt the Conference rather than acquiesce in that claim. The Treaty of Versailles therefore provided for a renunciation by Germany in favor of Japan of all German rights in connection with Shantung, though there appears to have been an oral undertaking on the part of the Japanese Delegation that their government would "hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany, and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao"—a promise, as the Chinese construed it, to give them the shell of the oyster. The apprehension of Japan's withdrawal

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from the Conference was replaced by the certainty of China's refusal to participate in the Peace Treaty; and the Shantung question therewith became a rankling sore to the Chinese and a mortification to those who felt that the Treaty had set the world's approval upon Japan's policy of aggression. It may indeed be questioned whether this was not the Achilles' heel in which American participation in the Versailles settlement received its deathwound in the Senate. It is at any rate certain that this disposition of the Shantung question produced in this country a dangerous tension of feeling towards Japan, the more acute because it was associated with domestic questions of great bitterness.

And it so happened that just at that time—in the spring of 1920—the American expeditionary force, which had for two years been stationed side by side with the Japanese forces in Siberia, was withdrawn and demobilized; and its members carried to all quarters of the country the story of what they had witnessed in the Japanese occupation of Russian territory. They had indeed seen Japan—the imperialistic politico-military Japan—at its very worst. The Japanese expedition had been sent to Siberia upon a definite understanding with us that the several cooperating governments should each send a force of approximately 7,000 men to occupy strategic positions along the line of retreat of the Czechoslovak force which was fighting its way out from Bolshevik Russia to Vladivostok, but should scrupulously refrain from interference in the affairs of the Russian people. The Japanese Government, however, sent 70,000 men, who effected an occupation of Eastern Siberia; their leaders intrigued for political influence in the country, and the lesser ranks meddled in local affairs, connived with Japanese traders to smuggle their goods into the occupied territory in the guise of military supplies, treated the local population with a high-handedness and even with a brutality explainable only by the assumption that they smarted with resentment at the attitude of superiority which the Russians had formerly assumed towards them, and behaved towards the military contingents of the other associated powers with a supercilious disregard of any purpose of cooperation in the military enterprise they had jointly undertaken. Our rank and file came back with their minds impregnated with rancor at the truculence of the Japanese troops and revulsion at the callousness of their dealing with the helpless Siberian peasants, and with a

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profound distrust of the Japanese political ambitions which they had seen at work.

From the spring of 1920 to the summer of 1921 the resentment and suspicion of the American people towards Japan were at a dangerous pitch. With the majority, this was a sentiment not logically formulated; but those who sought the essential elements in our relationships with Japan found an explanation of the dislike and the distrust on the part of our people in the consciousness that for approximately twenty years Japan had been pursuing a "realistic" policy of domination, in Korea, China and Siberia, which seemed clearly designed to achieve such a hegemony of Eastern Asia as would enable her not only to exclude us from independent relations with the Far East but to derange the balance of power and assert a military supremacy which might ultimately jeopardize our national interests and safety. In the attainment of any such imperial destiny for Japan, the preponderant factor would of necessity be China, with its vast territory, its great undeveloped natural resources, and its enormous population to produce, to buy, and perhaps to bear arms. And in China Japan had pursued a particularistic policy in direct contradiction to our doctrine of the open door, had ignored the principle of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity, and had by intimidation and by corruption gained an almost complete mastery over the instrumentalities of government. In this policy towards China, moreover, Japan was to a certain extent insured by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which, despite Great Britain's natural interest in the maintenance of China as an independent national and economic entity, obligated Britain to an observance of Japan's "special interests," and made her willy-nilly a partisan of Japan's exploitation of the position thereby conceded. And against such influence as the United States might bring to bear, Japan was further fortified by the construction which she and the world placed upon our recognition of her "special interests" by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement.

These facts, underlying the mutual animosity and suspicion of the two peoples, were the basis of the unhealthy and menacing Far Eastern situation which confronted the Harding administration when, in the early summer of 1921, it resolved upon seeking a means to limit the competition in naval armaments. In the light of a realization of this situation it may be understood how much significance there was in the words of the President's formal

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invitation to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to participate in a Conference on the Limitation of Armament:

"It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this government that, through an interchange of views with the facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned importance at this time; . . . "

To the Conference thus called Japan came with reluctance. One of her leading publicists was quoted at the time as saying that it was the gravest crisis in the history of the Empire; and the import of this comment was made plain by the aggrieved protestations, from all quarters in Japan, that the nation was being placed upon the defensive. But at the first meeting of the Conference the Japanese Delegation found that its animating spirit was not one of accusation but of cooperation; Secretary Hughes, who was its moving and directing force as well as its formal chairman, presided not as a judge of what had been but as a leader in the effort to place international relations for the future on a saner basis. The momentous declaration with which he opened the work of the Conference by proposing the 5–5–3 ratio of naval strength for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan not only afforded a practical basis for a truce in naval competition; it revealed an innocence of any aggressive tendency towards Japan such as the Japanese had not believed or thought themselves safe in believing. The proposal clearly meant that this country had no intention to take advantage of its incomparable industrial and financial superiority over Japan to build an overpoweringly superior fleet; and that the United States was prepared to limit its naval superiority to so narrow a margin as would, during the term of the understanding, make it a practical impossibility to attack Japan or her possessions. In the face of so unmistakable a manifestation of this country's desire to live and let live there was no longer room for doubt, in the minds of the Japanese Government and people, of the sincerity of our policy towards themselves.

There had indeed been developments in Japan which had

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cleared the way for a new evaluation of the situation and a reconsideration of national policy. The imperialistic method had not been paying dividends. Although the war had stimulated an artificial prosperity by which many became rich, the poor were poorer than before; living costs had unbelievably increased, and the burden of taxes to pay the costs of foreign adventures was becoming unbearable. Even the moneyed classes who had invested in the exploitation of Siberia and China had lost faith in the manner in which this exploitation had been conceived; they had obtained next to nothing in Siberia, and in China the concessions they had so eagerly taken up had proved for the most part worthless by reason of the conditions of political anarchy produced by the very processes which had made the concessions possible to obtain. As the proceeds of the Nishihara loans had been squandered there was nothing tangible to show for them, and the Chinese Government had ceased to pay interest or amortization on them. The boycott with which the Chinese people had retaliated upon Japanese trade for their humiliations in the matter of the Twenty-one Demands and the Shantung settlement had been serious enough to bring it home to the mercantile classes that the aggressive policy of their government endangered their sources of supply of raw materials and, still more directly, their largest and most accessible market for their manufactures. The conviction had been growing, in the business world of Japan, that their material interests were being sacrificed to the ambitions of the military clansmen who had so long controlled their government. It would be a mistake to suppose that there was any organized liberal movement seeking to wrest power from the reactionary elements in the government; rather, the close interrelation between political and financial interests, in the new Japan, made it possible for the convictions of the business world to carry weight with all but the more fanatical adherents of imperialism. There had, moreover, come into power a new ministry, under Mr. Hara, which included besides the Premier himself several leading members who were responsive to the new tendency of thought. One of these was Admiral Baron Kato, Minister of the Navy, who headed the Japanese Delegation to the Washington Conference.

Not only did the Japanese learn at the beginning of the Conference that America had no hostile intent towards their country; they perceived also that the other participating powers, no less

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than the United States, regarded Japan's aggressive course in Siberia and China with suspicion and with a guarded but nevertheless apparent disapproval; and they became conscious that Japan stood in danger of a political isolation which they could not contemplate without apprehension. It gradually came to be realized that after the storm the waters had flowed back to their level—that the balance of political forces in the Far East had been restored, and that Japan could no longer pursue a policy of ruthless aggrandizement without estrangement from her political friends as well as from the Chinese people with whom her economic destinies are inevitably linked.

Those who read the published report of the Conference—particularly the minutes of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions—must be struck by the progressive development in the viewpoint of the Japanese Government as reflected in the action of its delegation. Little by little, the original stiffness of their defensive posture gave way to an attitude of confidence and coöperation, until in the end they accepted wholeheartedly a group of principles designed to give China the opportunity for unembarrassed national development and to assure a genuine equality of commercial and industrial opportunity in China. Once the occasions for distrust were eliminated, the acceptance of this policy was in fact the obvious resultant of forces which had caused Japan to realize that the endeavor to obtain an exclusive position in China had led only to Pyrrhic victories, and that in the practical working out of a policy of equality of opportunity Japan would always and necessarily, by virtue of the facts of geography and ethnology, have an advantage over all other competitors. It was therefore not a diplomatic gesture nor an ephemeral impulse, but a carefully considered dictate of enlightened self-interest, which led Japan to discard her aggressive policy of the past fifteen years or so and associate herself with the policy of fair dealing.

The result of this adoption by Japan of a rational and wholesome policy has been a *détente*, in the relations between the United States and Japan, which is only partially indicated by the settlements arrived at by the Conference or in connection with it. Aside from the Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Armaments, the Conference brought about several concrete results which are vital to a right relationship in the Far East. It led directly to the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

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by virtue of the so-called Four-Power Pact, which substituted for the Alliance a somewhat platonic understanding that the United States, France, Great Britain, and Japan will respect each other's "insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean"—thus towing the Alliance away from the mainland of Asia and beaching it, a derelict, upon a coral reef in mid-Pacific. And although the Conference did not actually dispose of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, its results so far clarified the position in regard to that ambiguous document that Secretary Hughes has recently had occasion to make public the fact that discussions carried on by him with the Japanese Embassy in Washington have resulted in an exchange of notes recording that in the light of the understandings arrived at by the Conference the two governments are agreed to consider the Lansing-Ishii correspondence as cancelled and of no further force or effect. These cancellations of the two agreements which had so bedevilled the Far Eastern situation may be viewed as somewhat negative results, as also may the understanding (arrived at by the Chinese and Japanese representatives apart from the Conference, but in its atmosphere and in close relation with it) by which the Shantung question was settled on a basis as fair and reassuring as human wisdom could have been expected to contrive in so complex and difficult a situation. But the Conference achieved also, in the two Nine-Power treaties and the several resolutions concerning the affairs of China, positive results which may fairly be hoped to provide for China the opportunity to set her house in order, and for the other interested nations the means of developing their relations with China in accordance with such principles as will obviate the danger of generating serious political jealousies among themselves. The fundamental work of the Conference in relation to Far Eastern affairs was the establishment of the principle of the open door on a basis of mutual treaty obligations among the nations possessing substantial interests in China, and defining the principle with such a degree of precision as to make it a working rule of action. What had become a vague and empty expression of pious hopes, more honored in its breach than in its observance, has now been formally accepted and restored to its full significance.

In full accord with this principle Japan was in the end content to forego all claim to any "general superiority of rights" and to

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relinquish specifically all such preferential or exclusive privileges as had been asserted in the arrangements arising out of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915. Virtually nothing, indeed, was left of the results of those demands, other than the extension of the leasehold of the Kwantung Territory and of the concessions for railways in South Manchuria—which, it may be noted, China had granted early in the course of the 1915 negotiations, prior to the first threat of duress recorded in the Chinese Government's official account of those negotiations. And not merely did Japan freely adopt the essential principles established by the Conference; during the year that has since elapsed the Japanese Government has not only scrupulously fulfilled its undertakings to China, but has gone beyond them in retiring from its occupation of the Siberian mainland, and in withdrawing the garrison at Hankow which had for ten years been an affront to Chinese feeling. Unless it be for the case of the Federal Wireless—in which the press from time to time reports that the influence of the Japanese Government is being brought to bear upon the Chinese Government to prevent the carrying out of an American contract, on the ground that a Japanese firm had previously obtained a monopolistic concession for all external wireless communication with China—such information as is available appears to indicate that the Japanese Government has loyally lived up to the letter and the spirit of the Washington Treaties. Japanese opinion takes pride in that fact; and American opinion has for its part come to feel a restored confidence in the good faith and the good will of Japan.

If only because of the disintegration both of authority and of the sense of governmental responsibility in China, it would be folly to imagine that the problems of the Far East have been disposed of; but so satisfactory has been the *détente* brought about by the Conference that for the foreseeable future those problems seem to be no longer a menace to peace. Certainly, as regards the relations of the United States and Japan, it now seems possible for the two countries to develop, each along the lines of its individual genius, in commercial competition relieved from political implications and free from such mutual distrust and jealousy as have hitherto kept them under the shadow of a fear of what might come to pass without the deliberate will of either.

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SCANDINAVIAN SYMPATHIES AND DESTINIES

By Georg Brandes

EVEN in Europe the sympathies and actions of the Scandinavian countries carry little weight and for America they are of almost negligible interest. This is due to the small number of their inhabitants, their geographical remoteness and the differences in their habits of thought.

In 1523 Sweden became independent of Denmark-Norway, whose kings had ruled over it for a single century, marked by a constant animosity. In 1809 Finland was cut off from Sweden; in 1814 Norway was lost to Denmark, and in 1905 separated itself from Sweden; in 1918 Iceland was lost to Denmark. Thus the small Scandinavian states may now be said to be five in number. Moreover, there is no union among them, not even an alliance. Now and then their ministers, their economists or their scientists meet and perhaps agree on some common action concerning hygienics or weights and measures. But the only really common thing to all five countries is that, at the time of the Reformation, following the example of northern Germany, they adopted Lutheran Protestantism, which was not able to attract proselytes elsewhere.

In political matters, the histories and the sympathies of these countries have in later years differed widely.

Finland has had the most turbulent fate. For about three-quarters of a century it was mildly ruled by Czarism, under its own constitution, but in the nineties its privileges were swept away by the Russian reaction. Discontent became widespread. In 1903 Finland was subjected to Russian dictatorship, with the result that the exasperation of the Swedish minority as well as that of the Finnish majority reached the boiling-point. The population was as one man against the tools of the Czar. In the face of the Russian encroachment, national and social differences for a time were forgotten. Czarism succeeded in putting down the first Russian revolution, but when the second revolution was successful in 1917 Finland declared itself an independent republic despite the protest of Russia. A Bolshevik revolt, supported by Russian Bolsheviks in Finland, broke out in 1918. It led to a civil war which was carried on by both parties with all the cruelty

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first practised by the Bolsheviks and was only terminated by the intervention of German troops. A plan of choosing a German prince as king soon came to nothing, and since 1919 Finland has been living under a republican constitution. At first there was some friction with Sweden, to whom the Swedish-speaking population of the Aland Islands wished to be transferred, but in accordance with the decision of the League of Nations in 1921 these small islands remain united with Finland.

Although the Swedish-speaking citizens of the Finnish towns probably feel grateful to Germany—because it was a German force that freed them from the dictatorship of the proletariat, and also because on account of their difficult position in the midst of a Finno-Ugrian population they have a consciousness of being Germanic—on the other hand their most eminent men, like Leo Mechelin and General Mannerheim, have always looked to Paris for their support. Finnish scholars in large numbers have studied in France, and the higher classes bear the decided stamp of western Europe. F. L. Runeberg, the greatest Finnish poet of the first half of the nineteenth century, was a European in spirit even if he never was abroad, and he was influenced by antiquity, by Goethe, by Ossian and by Slavic ballads. During the World War modern Finnish literature took no sides but preserved its universality.

On the outbreak of the war all three Scandinavian kingdoms declared themselves neutral, and they maintained their neutrality throughout.

Sweden, the largest of them, had never previously thought of choosing between the western powers and Germany for she was on equally good terms with both. The royal house is French, being descended from Bernadotte. Curiously enough, all three Scandinavian kings have Bernadotte among their ancestors, just as all three of them are descendants of Joséphine Beauharnais.

At the beginning of the war, in spite of Sweden's century-old connection with France, which had been especially close during the period of Gustav III, strong German sympathies found utterance among the higher classes. The queen, who is a German princess, one day expressly designated herself as such. Sven Hedin, the famous explorer, went to serve with the German staff and wrote in behalf of Germany with as much ardor as if he had been a German. The general public in Sweden, however, was obviously quite indisposed to entertain affection for a Germany

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steeped in militarism, and it soon became evident that the chief figures in Swedish politics, especially Hjalmar Branting, the Socialist leader, who became Minister of Finance in 1917 and Prime Minister in 1920, were in the good books of the statesmen of France and England. Branting has believed in the League of Nations and has several times attempted, though in vain, to induce it to settle the great European issues by arbitration.

August Strindberg, the first writer of Sweden, died before the World War broke out, but he would scarcely have taken sides even if he had lived to see it. It is impossible to chart his mental course. He had been a follower of Rousseau, a Deist, an atheist, an occultist, an orthodox believer in the Bible, a democrat, a pacifist, an aristocrat, and a Socialist. He lived for a long time in Germany, in Switzerland, and in France, but wars of nationality never interested him, and as a result he did not influence the sympathies of his audience in any definite direction in the various disputes between European nationalities.

Norway, a typically seafaring nation, has since the eighteenth century felt attracted towards the western powers, especially England. As far back as 1783 Wessel, the satiric poet, was reproaching his countrymen for their belief that human beings were only born in England and Norway. Henrik Wergeland, the founder of the modern literature of Norway, had his mental inspiration in the French Revolution and entertained, in spite of his fundamental republican ideas, a predilection for Bernadotte as his king.

The literature which has rendered Norway famous and given her a spiritual independence—for a time the greatest in Scandinavia—was founded by her two greatest poets, Ibsen and Björnsson, and is of course principally Norwegian. But the two owe very little to France and England, though much to Denmark and next to Germany. Of the men of Ibsen's day, the witty Alexander Kielland learned much from France, specially appreciating Maupassant. Jonas Lie, on the other hand, who for the greater part of his life lived in Paris, was quite uninfluenced by his surroundings there and never knew French. Among the younger poets Hamsun is strongly influenced by Russia, especially by Dostoievski, and during his stay in America in his youth, in spite of his contempt for the intellectual life there, he adopted much of the American form of humor. Hamsun was one of the few Norwegians who during the war sided passionately

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with Germany against France. The eldest son of Björnstjerne Björnson was also entirely on the German side, while Johan Bojer was entirely on the French. The Norwegian press, by the way, was absolutely for the western powers and strong resentment was expressed against Germany when U-boats, without heeding the neutrality of Norway, sank a great number of her ships and caused the death of many of her seamen.

None of the Scandinavian countries had any foreign policy during the war, nor have they had one since. Norwegian politics center, strangely enough, about two issues, both of them apparently non-political.

About the year 1860 the Norwegian literary language was still not to be distinguished from Danish. The Norwegians had the same orthography as the Danes, and in the towns then as now the same language was spoken as in Denmark, with only a slight difference in pronunciation and stress—a difference not greater, however, than is often to be found in two districts in the same country. Within the last fifty years, however, Norwegian orthography not only has been altered so that it differs quite considerably from the Danish one, but a new language has been constructed out of the local vernacular. This language, which is said to conform to the true Old Norwegian, has, from national enthusiasm and in order to satisfy the supposed demands of the common people, been set in juxtaposition with the language which the Norwegians and Danes have in common. None of the great writers of the nineteenth century wrote in this language, and Björnson fought it in his last years with the utmost passion. It has given rise to numerous domestic conflicts and has now been introduced into the schools.

The other issue ruling Norwegian politics turns on the prohibition of spirits. In Norway, as in America, prohibition has been carried through from moral motives; but the outcome has been highly unfavorable. In the first place, much more and far worse home-made spirits are drunk, so that intoxication has increased instead of decreasing. In the second place, Portugal and Spain, whose sales to Norway were suddenly stopped, grew furious and took revenge by ceasing to buy Norwegian klip-fish (salted and dried fish), which had been the chief nourishment of the poorer part of the population in those countries. Norwegian finances suffered severely in consequence. In the third place, it has been necessary, in spite of the disinclination of the govern-

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ment, to repeal, in part at least, the prohibition law and to conclude a new treaty with the two southern wine countries.

One Norwegian has won the highest credit under the unhappy conditions prevailing in Europe since the war, even if, to my mind, he has not shown any special capacity for politics, namely Frithiof Nansen. He has not only demonstrated that he is free from prejudices at a time when statesmen are iron-clad with them, and unsnobbish at a time when hardly anything not touched with snobbism can make itself heard, but he has asserted himself as a highly useful man, willing to sacrifice time and effort in fighting the Russian famine, having first fought the prejudices which were largely responsible for it. That he believes in the League of Nations in its present form is, if anything, touching, and bears testimony to the well-preserved naiveté of his mind in spite of many experiences and many disappointments.

Of the Scandinavian countries Denmark is, of course, the one I know best. From 1848 down to our own time its foreign policy has been entirely dictated by our relations with Germany.

For centuries the Danish dynasty has been of German descent; the nobility, which arose after the establishment of absolutism in 1660, has also been German. In addition, the triumph of the Reformation in its German form gave the German language a supremacy, increased by the fact that it is spoken in Holstein and Southern Slesvig. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the eighteenth century French and English civilization prevailed in Denmark as well as in Norway, thanks to one great man, Ludvig Holberg, the founder of the literature of Denmark as well as of Norway. In his day a German literature did not yet exist; he was familiar with Molière and Pierre Bayle, studied at Oxford and knew the English writers of the Restoration. That Klopstock for some time lived in Denmark and influenced Johannes Ewald by his Germanic "bard-style" was of less significance than the fact that Wessel and all the other Norwegians felt themselves the pupils of the French and the English.

Denmark's unhappy political relations with England (who in 1801 attacked Copenhagen and in 1807 bombarded the city and carried off the Danish fleet lest it should be used by Napoleon), brought about an intellectual rapprochement with Germany which lasted for more than a quarter of a century. But in 1848 the inhabitants of Holstein and of the German-speaking part of Slesvig, incited by the revolutions in Paris and Berlin, revolted

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against Denmark. The war, carried on by the rebels but supported by the German Confederation, dragged along for three years and ended in the restitution of the two duchies to Denmark, though on certain conditions which always made German intervention possible, as the Danish king in his capacity of Duke of Holstein was a member of the German Confederation and the state was not a national state, but Danish-German.

From the year 1848 Germany and everything German were regarded by Denmark as enemies, and this was particularly true after the second Slesvig war of 1864, declared by the two great powers, Prussia and Austria, and ending in the cession of the duchies to Prussia. This ill-will was intensified because in the treaty Denmark had also been deprived of the Danish-speaking and pro-Dane portion of Slesvig. A strong nationalism spread through the little country and it was inclined to shut itself off completely from the Germans, despite the fact that so much European civilization had made its way to it through them.

Denmark hoped that the imminent war between Prussia and Austria would bring a relief. The war ended in the victory of Prussia, but Napoleon III managed to have inserted in the Prague Treaty a paragraph assuming that the Danish part of Slesvig was to be given back to Denmark if such a wish were expressed by a plebiscite. The Prussians did not make haste, however, to comply with this suggestion. Years passed. After 1870 Napoleon was no longer in power, and in 1878 Bismarck made the Austrians cancel the paragraph in the Treaty of Prague from which the Danes had entertained such great hopes.

It is not to be wondered at, then, that Danish nationalists ever afterwards were hostile to the German Empire. Nevertheless, prejudice was so slight in Denmark that the political antagonism did not exclude sincere private friendships between Danes and Germans or the ready acknowledgment in Denmark of everything great in German literature, art and music. The commercial intercourse, too, was close. But in the year 1899 a change took place on the part of Prussia. German nationalism, grown more and more aggressive, thenceforth subjected Danish-speaking North Slesvig to the same sort of brutal annoyances which had made it hateful in Poland and in Alsace.

The men—among others the author of these lines—who up to that time had endeavored to bring about a reconciliation between the Germans and the Danes, thereby impairing their

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own popularity in Denmark, now gave voice to vigorous utterances against German encroachments and German injustice. I, for one, in the years 1899–1905 wrote a number of pamphlets and articles against the way in which the Prussians ruled Northern Slesvig, and in consequence forfeited the good-will I had hitherto enjoyed in Germany. Up to 1914 I was considered "the enemy of Germany" and was subject to continuous attacks.

It will be understood that although at the outbreak of the war the Danish Government declared itself neutral, Danish nationalists felt no sympathy for the cause of Germany. The position of the government was extremely difficult. In less than two hours the German fleet could reach Danish ports—in a single night it might be before Copenhagen. The utmost caution was necessary and the sagacity with which the Danish ministry succeeded in keeping the country out of the war is to be admired.

In consequence of the World War Denmark gained Northern Slesvig and Finland became an independent republic. Nevertheless—human passions remaining as they are—it is impossible to foresee whether Germany, once she is reorganized, will not seek to regain the part of Slesvig which she has lost, and still more impossible to foresee whether Russia will be resigned to the loss of Finland.

In order for Scandinavia to have an important future it is first of all necessary that there be a Scandinavia. But to this there is an apparently insurmountable obstacle: geography. There are no natural frontiers and there is not even a unity of language. In these northern countries classes are divided as they are elsewhere. There are socialists and communists who have more or less sincere sympathy for the Russian Bolsheviks, who in turn are the horror of the upper classes.

Since I began this article Denmark has followed the example of Sweden and has negotiated a treaty of commerce with the Soviet Government. This is a beginning of the work of restoring normal relations but one which will give little enough satisfaction to industrialists and traders. The Russians promise to pay for the goods which they buy in the future but they pay nothing for the millions worth of goods which they confiscated during the revolution. Attempts will be made to get along with more or less cordiality. The Danes, however, have not merited any too much good-will from the Russians. After the revolution the Danish Ambassador who had remained at Petrograd some little

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time after the departure of the legations made a trip to Paris to urge the French and British Governments to declare war on revolutionary Russia. Nor, on the other hand, has Russia merited much good-will from Denmark. Two young Danish brothers, for example, who carried some millions to hungry and suffering Russians were killed and plundered. But as the world is governed by economic interests these matters will be arranged in the course of time.

The new Germany enjoys much sympathy in the Scandinavian world. Little as the Empire was admired for its use of brutal force, there nevertheless is sympathy for Germany now that she is vanquished and mistreated. The intellectuals are indignant that the Allies, after having given their signature to Wilson's Fourteen Points as the condition of the Armistice, have broken their word and begun a war during the peace. In Scandinavia it is not forgotten to what a fate Germany consigned Belgium, and the injuries done the north of France are understood, but that does not justify the demand for impossible sums of money, still less the invasion of the Ruhr Valley.

While finding the passive aloofness of America comprehensible, one cannot become very enthusiastic about it. The weakness of the British Government's policy can also be understood in view of the difficulties with which it finds itself confronted in the East, but it is glaring if one compares it with that of Palmerston. Mr. Lloyd George, who with extravagant violence is attacking all the arrangements of which he is himself the author, appears frankly ridiculous. If the future is always difficult to foresee, the chaos in Europe today renders it even more difficult. One need not be an augur to foretell that one of these days M. Poincaré will fall, and with him the fanaticism which he represents, but since the masses of the French people get almost all their ideas from the newspapers of the capital even the fall of the ministry will not change markedly the course of French public opinion. Only an overwhelming economic crisis, which cannot fail to arrive, will open their eyes, will make possible some sort of an understanding between the three or four great nations who divide Europe between them, and will give us a real peace. The little Scandinavian powers who are in no position to wage war will join in welcoming a European peace, which shall be, if not final, at least not too brief.

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LITHUANIA AND POLAND

By Robert H. Lord

AMONG the numerous antagonisms that disturb the new Eastern Europe, there is none that has been more unexpected, none that has proved more troublesome, few that may be fraught with greater dangers than the hostility that has grown up between Lithuania and Poland. For four years now the quarrel between these states, particularly over the Vilna territory, has kept them at swords' points. Periods of armed conflict have alternated with protracted and heated diplomatic struggles; the coveted territory has changed hands six times; the great powers and the League of Nations have been involved in the dispute; and yet today the rivals are still on a war footing towards each other, and the chief question at stake may be reopened at any moment. Nor is this affair one of merely local or neighborhood interest. Apart from the moral issues bound up with the question whether this is or is not a case of a weaker nation suffering from the "imperialism" of a stronger one, the settlement of the Vilna problem is sure to have important consequences for the political equilibrium of Europe. For statesmen at Paris, Moscow or Berlin it is doubtless a matter of great moment whether, by the attribution of Vilna to Poland, a considerable barrier is to be erected between Germany and Russia, while Poland is enabled to join hands with Latvia, Esthonia and Finland, with whom she is trying to form a Baltic League; or whether, by the assignment of Vilna to Lithuania, a corridor is to be opened up between Germany and Russia across the territory of a small state that has shown a certain friendliness to both these powers. In general, the new political system which the Allied Powers have been striving to create would be appreciably strengthened if Poland and Lithuania could become friends or allies, while the continued enmity between these two states may greatly serve the designs of those who desire to overthrow the new order.

This antagonism is the more regrettable in that there are scarcely any other two nations in this part of Europe that have so much in common, that seem so clearly marked out to be friends, as the Poles and the Lithuanians. They do, indeed, differ widely in language, the former, as everyone knows, speak-

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ing a Slavic tongue, and the latter a rather archaic and very interesting language of the Baltic group, which, it is frequently said, remains closer to Sanskrit than does any other living European tongue. But the two peoples are bound together by the ties of religion—both being ardently Catholic and almost surrounded by nations of the Protestant or Greek Orthodox faith—by a common and distinctive "culture," and, above all, by having lived a common political life through many centuries in the past. Through most of their history the two nations have been indissolubly united; they long shared in the same glories and achievements; they have since suffered from the same Russian and German oppressors; they recovered their independence simultaneously; they face very similar problems and dangers today. Their past relations with each other were, indeed, of a unique character, and some knowledge of them is indispensable for an understanding of the present situation.

While Poland appears, from the tenth century onward, as a more or less consolidated kingdom in the valley of the Vistula, Catholic in faith and belonging to the cultural world of Western Europe, the Lithuanians in their secluded forests of the Niemen lingered in paganism and figured little in history until in the thirteenth century they were roused from their lethargy by the pressure of the oncoming Germans. Then, under the rule of an unusually gifted line of princes, Lithuania suddenly turned "militaristic." Not only did she successfully defend her independence against those Germans who had just subjugated her only kinsmen, the Letts and the aboriginal Prussians, but, turning to the east and south, where the old Kievan-Russian realm had now split up into a host of weak principalities, she spread her conquests with amazing rapidity. By the latter part of the fourteenth century a vast Lithuanian empire had been built up, extending from the Baltic nearly to the Black Sea, and including most of what in our day has been called western Russia. In this realm the ruling nation formed scarcely one-tenth of the total population, the remainder consisting chiefly of Orthodox White Russians and Little Russians (Ukrainians), peoples so superior in culture to the still pagan Lithuanians that the empire would probably soon have become Russified and riveted to the Byzantine civilization of the East had it not been for a great historical accident. In 1386 Jagiello, Grand Prince of Lithuania, married Jadwiga, the young Queen of Poland. This was the beginning

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of that Polish-Lithuanian union which lasted, with a few brief interruptions, down to the destruction of the joint state by the partitioning powers in 1795.

This union has scarcely a parallel in history, unless it be the almost contemporaneous union between Denmark and Norway (1380–1814). For the peculiarity of it was that during this long connection Lithuania, much the larger and originally the stronger of the two states, voluntarily submitted to being dominated and assimilated by her associate. Poland inevitably became the dominant partner, not through any external compulsion, but because of her greater wealth and higher civilization, because of the attractions which her social and intellectual life and her freer political system held out to the upper classes in Lithuania. Hence at the very outset the hitherto pagan population of Lithuania proper accepted Catholicism, the Polish religion. Hence, too, Polish culture in all forms gradually permeated the Grand Principality, displacing, not a Lithuanian culture—for one can scarcely say that there had ever been any—but rather that Byzantine kind of civilization which was represented by the Russian element in the population. The numerous nobility and, to a large extent, the townspeople throughout the Lithuanian realm adopted the Polish language, customs, and manners —became in fact quite "Polonized." The institutions of Lithuania were gradually assimilated in all respects to those of Poland. Finally, the two states which originally were bound together only by a common ruler, contracted a perpetual, organic union through the Act of Lublin (1569), and this in turn led to the complete fusion effected by the famous constitution of May 3, 1791.

Nor did this community of interests, culture, traditions, and sentiments disappear with the Partitions. Far down into the nineteenth century, amid common trials and persecutions and ever recurrent common struggles for liberation, the public mind in both countries clung to the ideal of the deathless union between the two "brother nations." Indeed, Poland and Lithuania within their "historic frontiers" of 1772 were still conceived to be one indivisible country, just as France is; and while it was recognized that the peasantry in Lithuania proper spoke an unlettered jargon of their own, just as the Breton peasants do in France, this was not regarded as a danger to the moral unity of a land where the upper classes spoke only Polish and the all-pervasive

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Polish spirit and culture still seemed as dominant as before the Partitions. This view appeared to be justified as late as 1863, when, in their last struggle for independence before the World War, the Lithuanian peasants vied with the Poles in their efforts for the common cause. In short, down to two generations ago the old ideal prevailed—the ideal enshrined in the Act of 1569, where it was said: "The Crown of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are only a single body, one and indivisible, as is the Republic itself, which, formed of two states and nations, has united and fused them into one people." Or, in the words of one of the wisest of Polish-Lithuanian rulers (Sigismund Augustus, in 1571): "All the citizens both of Poland and of Lithuania ought to form an indivisible whole. . . . They must love each other with a deep, sincere, fraternal love, like the members of one body, like inhabitants of one and the same republic."

But modern nationalism plays havoc with old ideals and the most venerable traditions. Among the Lithuanians, too, a nationalist movement was bound to develop, as among all the other small peoples of Eastern Europe; a movement which first set out to assert the rights of the national language and then to work for national autonomy and ultimate independence. This movement began on a considerable scale only about 1883, but it has since made remarkable progress. Inevitably, it assumed from the start a marked anti-Polish character. For from the standpoint of the nationalists the first task was to win back the whole Lithuanian people to the use of the Lithuanian language and to a distinctly Lithuanian national consciousness; to overthrow the long predominance of the Polish language, Polish culture, and Polish patriotism; to teach their compatriots to be a self-sufficient nation like any other, rather than to consider themselves a slightly differentiated species of Poles. This attack upon time-honored customs and established positions was conducted in rather militant fashion and aroused an equally pugnacious opposition. Not only the upper classes but in many cases the masses refused to be "Lithuanianized." They clung to the old ideal, that one could be a good Pole and a good Lithuanian at the same time. But if that was no longer possible, if they must choose between loyalties, they preferred to use Polish and to be classed as Poles. In their eyes, the "Lithuanomaniacs" were trying to force an uncultivated and unlearnable jargon

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upon them, forsaking the good old traditions, betraying the common mother country, serving the ends of Germany and Russia. On the other hand, in the eyes of the Lithuanian nationalists, these "Polonized" or "Polonizing" elements (whom the nationalists always insisted on considering Lithuanians by blood, on the theory that there could be no genuine Poles in Lithuania) were regarded as deserters from the national cause, enemies within the household, traitors to the Lithuanian fatherland. Hence a rather bitter conflict was developing just before the World War between the local "Polonizers" and "Lithuanianizers," which furnished a most unhappy background for all efforts made since the war to restore the old union between the two "brother nations."

On the Polish side, indeed, the desire for such a reunion has been deeply felt and very frequently manifested. Overtures to Lithuania in that sense were made by the declaration of the Polish Council of State of April 6, 1917, the declaration of the seventeen Polish parties at the assembly of May 19 and 22, 1917, the declaration of the Polish Government of January 30, 1918, the note of the Paderewski cabinet to the Lithuanian Government of February 12, 1919, and on numerous other occasions. But this persistent wooing of the erstwhile partner has evoked no response. To the Lithuanian nationalists everything Polish is anathema. According to their (rather questionable) reading of history, the former connection with Poland was the ruin of that great Lithuanian empire of the Middle Ages of which they are so proud. They cannot forgive Poland for having "stolen" their upper classes away from them, "robbed" them of Kościuszko and Mickiewicz (the one the Polish national hero, the other the greatest of Polish poets, and both born in Lithuania). They fear that in a new union Poland would once more become the dominant partner and Lithuania would again be threatened with denationalization. And while they have at times appeared to recognize that, in view of Lithuania's small size and exposed geographical position, her fortunes would be better assured if she had some connection with Poland, the union they have had in mind has been of a kind which the Poles have thought it impossible to accept. It would be, namely, a union in which, within the territory which the nationalists consider to be Lithuanian, their own language and culture should exclusively prevail: that is, the Poles are asked to agree to the complete "Lithuaniani-

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zation" of a large region, particularly around Vilna, which they regard as essentially Polish. To such a sacrifice the Poles have felt unable to assent. They would prefer a federal union between Poland proper and a Lithuanian state which would be frankly binational, placing the Lithuanian and Polish languages on a plane of equality; and in that case they might renounce the Vilna region in favor of Lithuania. But as this solution has seemed impossible, they have fallen back on the other alternative of claiming the disputed territory for themselves, in order to save it from "depolonization." It is this quarrel over territory that has wrecked the relations between the two new republics in the past four years.

In approaching the merits of this dispute, it is well to remember how much confusion is introduced into the question by the numerous divergent uses of the term Lithuania. One can, in fact, distinguish five different senses in which that name is used, five different areas to which it is at times applied. First, there is what may be called "original Lithuania"—the region which in primitive times was occupied by Lithuanian tribes and which probably coincided roughly with the modern Russian governments of Kovno, Vilna, and Suwalki. Secondly, there is "Lithuania proper"—to use a term familiar during the period of the mediæval Lithuanian empire, *i.e.*, "original Lithuania" plus certain White Russian territories in the modern governments of Minsk and Grodno, which were early conquered and partially colonized by the Lithuanians and were long considered by them as forming, within the wider complex of their loosely-knit empire, the special domain of their race. Thirdly, there is "historic Lithuania"—the whole area of the old Grand Duchy, an area which varied at different epochs but which from 1569 to 1772 consisted essentially of the modern governments of Kovno, Vilna, Suwalki, Grodno, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Mohilev. Fourthly, there is what may be called "linguistic Lithuania," *i.e.*, the small area within which the Lithuanian language is spoken by the majority of the population today. In spite of the claims sometimes put forward by overheated patriots, the limits of this area have been fixed with much precision by the labors of Lithuanian, Polish, Russian, and German scholars. It includes the government of Kovno, the northern part of Suwalki, a narrow fringe around the western and northern border of the government of Vilna, and what was formerly the northeastern

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corner of the German province of East Prussia (which also belonged to "original Lithuania"). It is to be noted that for centuries the Lithuanian language has been losing ground, on the south and east to Polish and White Russian and on the west to German. This may help to explain the desire of the nationalists today to establish their concept of the fifth term in our series: what they call "ethnographic Lithuania," *i.e.*, the region where the population, though now in many districts denationalized, weaned away from the old national language and sentiments, is still of Lithuanian stock and could and should be won back to conscious Lithuanian nationality. This area has been defined in somewhat divers ways by recent Lithuanian spokesmen. Sometimes it is restricted to what I have called "original Lithuania" —Kovno, Vilna, Suwalki, and part of East Prussia; sometimes it is also made to include much of the governments of Minsk and Grodno, *i.e.*, to approximate the concept of "Lithuania proper."

The vast differences between these various meanings of the name is shown by the fact that "historic Lithuania" had an area of over 117,000 square miles (about the size of Italy or Norway) and a population before the war of 12½ millions; while "ethnographic Lithuania," defined by the limits of what the Kovno Government is claiming today, has an area of about 60,000 square miles (half as large as Norway) and an estimated population of 4 millions; and "linguistic Lithuania," which coincides pretty well with what this government holds at present, includes only about 24,000 square miles (*i.e.*, it is not much larger than Denmark) and a population of about 2 millions. Or, if one applies what is after all the most workable test of nationality in Eastern Europe, the language spoken today, one finds, on the basis of what is necessarily a rough estimate, that 80 per cent of the population of "linguistic Lithuania" speak Lithuanian; less than 50 per cent in "ethnographic Lithuania;" and only about 16 per cent in "historic Lithuania." Nevertheless, in spite of these great differences in the size and in the racial and linguistic character of the various areas to which the name Lithuania has been attached, the word is too often used loosely in present-day discussions, now in one sense and now in another. It is important to remember that the name is commonly used by the Poles and in general by many of the inhabitants of the old Grand Duchy simply in the historic sense, to denote a vast region which long formed a political unit and still possesses a large measure

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POLAND AND LITHUANIA

The size of the disputed area may be estimated by comparison with the small map in the corner, which is drawn to the same scale. (Maps compiled by Col. Lawrence Martin.)

of economic and cultural unity, although it has always had a very mixed population, speaking four languages—Lithuanian, Polish, White Russian, and Yiddish. It is in this sense that Polish patriots like Mickiewicz have lavished their affection upon Lithuania, their secondary, local fatherland; that Marshal Pilsudski calls himself a Lithuanian; and that Żeligowski proclaimed his "Government of Central Lithuania" at Vilna. But the nationalist government at Kovno uses the word in a quite different sense. Since they have always aimed at creating a state based on unity of language, culture, and nationality—quite unlike the old Grand Duchy—they have refused to lay claim to the eastern half of "historic Lithuania;" they have

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limited their ambitions to what they consider their legitimate ethnographic domain. But they have, on the other hand, taken this concept in a rather generous and elastic sense; they have included within it wide areas where it is doubtful whether the inhabitants ever were Lithuanian, and it is certain that the bulk of the population does not speak Lithuanian today; and in advancing these claims they have gained a far more ready hearing from the outside world through the ambiguity of the word Lithuania. The western public, knowing that the Poles themselves referred to Vilna as in the center of Lithuania, was inclined to conclude that Vilna must be Lithuanian in language and nationality. From the fact that all the territories claimed by the Kovno Government lay in what the native population called Lithuania, it seemed to follow that that government was fully justified in its claims. Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple.

The territory chiefly in dispute coincides roughly with the former Russian government of Vilna.[1] It is probable, but not certain, that this territory was originally settled by Lithuanian tribes, as the place names seem to suggest, and that a large part of the present population is of Lithuanian ancestry, though it would be difficult to say how large. But for centuries there has apparently been a steady infiltration of White Russians and Poles, and a still more marked tendency to the spread of the languages of the latter two peoples at the expense of Lithuanian. This latter phenomenon may be ascribed largely to the influence of the Polish clergy, the Polish or "Polonized" upper classes, and latterly of the Russian officials and of service in the Russian army. In mixed districts the peasant was likely to conclude that Lithuanian—a language so different from the Slavic tongues—was of little use to him in his dealings with the outside world, whereas Polish or White Russian (closely related and mutually intelligible tongues) or the characteristic local jargon, composed of a mixture of both, would serve him equally in his relations with the priest, the squire, the *chinovnik*, or the drill-sergeant. Moreover, Polish was the "gentleman's language," which one naturally adopted as he rose in the social scale and which alone was proper to be used on solemn occasions or for polite inter-

[1]The Poles have never claimed the northern and western fringe of this province, which since 1918 has remained in Lithuanian possession. The Lithuanians have never claimed the two northeastern districts (Dzisna and Wilejka), which Russia has now ceded to Poland; while, on the other hand, they do claim some small parts of the old governments of Grodno and Suwalki.

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course. This linguistic change and in particular this process of "Polonization" seem to have made most rapid progress in the last half-century. It is said that there are villages in this region where the elders still speak Lithuanian habitually, the middle-aged people White Russian, and the youngest generation Polish, Amid the resulting chaos in the linguistic situation, one fact stands out as certain: the area within which the Lithuanian language still predominates in the government of Vilna is confined to a narrow strip around the western and northern border of the province, seldom approaching nearer than 20 or 25 miles to the city of Vilna, and then to a few scattered linguistic "islands."

The remainder of the population—the great bulk of it—has now come to speak either Polish or White Russian.[2] But as between these two languages, the exact ratio is very difficult to establish, because of the unsatisfactory nature of the existing statistics. There are four main sets of statistical data that come into account here: the Russian census of 1897, the Russian estimates of 1909, the census taken by the Germans in 1916, and the one carried out by the Poles in 1919. These sets of data agree tolerably only in one thing: in presenting the Lithuanians as only a small minority of the population (18 per cent in 1897; 13 per cent in 1909; 7 per cent according to the Polish census, which, however, does not refer to precisely the same area as the Russian estimates). But they differ enormously as to the proportions of Poles and White Russians. The two Russian estimates purport to show a large White Russian majority in the province of Vilna. But these estimates are so generally suspected of political bias—of being distorted in order to minimize the importance of the Polish element and to prove that this was a "genuinely Russian country;" they differ so widely from the German and Polish censuses; and they exhibit so many improbabilities and glaring contradictions between themselves that it is difficult to attach any real faith to them.[3] And yet

[2]Or among the very numerous Jewish population in the towns, Yiddish.

[3]For example, the *uiezd* (district) of Vilna had only 20 per cent of Poles according to the census of 1897, but 43 per cent according to the Russian estimates of 1909, while the German census of 1916 showed 75 per cent and the Polish census of 1919 made it 87 per cent. The conflict of authorities could scarcely be worse!

What particularly undermines one's faith in the Russian statistics is such a case as that of the district of Bialystok, where one is asked to believe that in 1897 the Poles formed 34 per cent of the population, but in 1909 only 18 per cent (the German census shows over 50 per cent of Poles); or of the district of Bielsk, where the Poles are supposed to have fallen off catastrophically from 35 per cent in 1897 to 4 per cent in 1909. There are plenty of other examples.

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through the long-existing alliance between Russian statisticians and German cartographers, virtually all our current maps of the racial situation in this region are based on this utterly unreliable census of 1897—a veritable ethnographic mare's nest.

The Polish census of 1919 might, perhaps, be suspected of an equal bias on the other side. But the methods by which it is known to have been taken seem to afford some guarantee of its honesty, and at all events it has the great advantage of agreeing tolerably well with the German census—the only census ever held here against which no charge of political bias can be raised, since the German military authorities took it solely for their own information, with no intentions of publication. Unfortunately, the German census was taken only in the western half of the province of Vilna, and its results, in as far as they have been published, are not so complete or detailed as the Polish census. At any rate, I am inclined to hold that these two latest sets of data taken together furnish a much more reliable basis of approach to the Vilna problem than do the old Russian estimates.

According to the census of 1919, the Polish-speaking inhabitants make up 53.6 per cent of the population in the province of Vilna, as against 21.4 per cent of White Russians, 8.1 per cent of Jews, and 6.9 per cent of Lithuanians. In the city of Vilna itself there were reported to be 56.2 per cent of Poles, 36.1 per cent of Jews, and 2.3 per cent of Lithuanians. In nine out of the twelve districts into which the province was divided, the Poles had an absolute or relative majority, which in the districts of Vilna (without the city) and Lida rose to 87.3 and 76.0 per cent, respectively. It is probable that, apart from all questions about the fairness of the census, the proportion of people who habitually speak Polish is not so high as these figures might suggest, for the census of 1919, unlike that of 1897, called for a declaration from each inhabitant, not about his language, but about what "nationality" he professed to belong to; and doubtless many people who do not usually speak Polish, declared themselves to be of Polish nationality—it may be, in some cases, for prudential reasons, or because of genuine Polish sympathies. This must, in particular, have been the case with large numbers of Catholic White Russians—for the most part a poor and ignorant population which seems utterly destitute of any national feeling based on language, but naturally oriented towards Poland by their religion (the "Polish faith," as they are wont to say).

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The evidence supplied by the censuses is somewhat reënforced by the results of such elections as have been held in this region. In all four of the Russian Dumas the province of Vilna regularly had a majority of Polish representatives (5 out of 7 or 5 out of 8). The municipal government of the city of Vilna has almost invariably been in Polish hands; and the communal elections held throughout the province in 1919 and the elections to the constituent assembly in 1922 seem to attest the predominance of Polish sympathies.

It may be admitted that every election, like every census, is open to some charge of unfairness, and that all these bits of evidence taken together do not furnish entirely conclusive proof of the political aspirations and affinities of the population of the Vilna territory. But what evidence there is does seem to favor the claims of the Poles. The Lithuanians, in making out their case, are obliged to repudiate the results of all the censuses and all the elections, and have nothing serious to fall back upon except the originally Lithuanian character of the population and the argument that all the Jews and all the White Russians wish to belong to Lithuania, and that these two races, if added to the Lithuanians, would produce an anti-Polish majority in this territory. But the Poles deny both halves of the latter proposition, and as to the former one they retort with some justice that the fate of Vilna ought to be settled on the basis, not of the hypothetical character of the population centuries ago, but rather of the present situation and the wishes of the population today.

Since 1918 the Polish-Lithuanian dispute has passed through vicissitudes too numerous to be more than briefly recapitulated here.

It will be recalled that during the World War and the German occupation of the country a Lithuanian nationalist government was organized at Vilna. After the armistice and the withdrawal of the Germans, the Bolshevik flood burst in from the east and the Lithuanian authorities had to retire to Kovno (January, 1919). Soon afterwards Poland, which was quicker than her rival to get organized in a military way, assumed the offensive on the east, and gradually drove back the Red armies from the Bug and the Niemen to the Berezina. In the course of this operation the Polish troops occupied Vilna on April 20, 1919. The government at Kovno at once protested warmly against this "seizure of its capital," and with that the long litigation

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

ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE VILNA REGION

1. Polish ethnographic claim (based on the census of 1919). 2. Lithuanian ethnographic claim. 3. A British view (based chiefly on the census of 1897). 4. Political boundaries in 1923.

over Vilna began. Some fighting also broke out between Polish and Lithuanian troops, which led the Allied Powers, in the interest of peace, to fix a provisional line of military demarcation (the "Foch line" of July, 1919) to the northwest of Vilna. Meanwhile the two governments conducted intermittent negotiations, which are very little known to us (the Staniszewski and Wasilewski missions to Kovno, the Saulis mission to Warsaw,

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etc.). It appears that the Poles continually urged a new federal union between the two countries, intimating that in that case Lithuania might have Vilna; but the Lithuanians always replied in substance, "Give Vilna back to us, and then—we'll see." As the Poles would not surrender the bird in their hands for the very uncertain one in the bush, and the Lithuanians refused to treat of a union as long as the Poles were "invading their territory," no agreement could be reached.

In the meantime the Peace Conference at Paris, after some discussion of the eastern frontiers of Poland, renounced a definitive solution of that question for the present in view of the uncertainty of the ethnographic situation in the debatable border lands and the lack of a recognized Russian Government with which a treaty could be concluded. The Conference contented itself therefore with voting the resolution of December 8, 1919, which marked out a line on the eastern side of the former "Congress Poland" and declared that what lay to the west of this line was indisputably Polish territory, within which Poland might organize a permanent administration, while what lay to the east of it was left for future adjudication, with all rights reserved. Though this so-called "Curzon line" was put forward only as a kind of provisional, minimum Polish frontier, with express recognition of the fact that Poland had claims to the east of it that might come up for consideration in the future, there has ever since been a strong tendency in various quarters to assume that the Allies had now defined, not the minimum, but the maximum limits of what Poland could justly aspire to on the east, and that any claims beyond this must be a case of sheer Polish "imperialism." That seems, in particular, to have been the attitude of the British Government, as was soon to be demonstrated.

The events of 1920 singularly aggravated the situation. At the beginning of July the Polish front temporarily collapsed, and for the second time the Red armies occupied Vilna. At the same moment Russia concluded a treaty with the Kovno Government by which most of the Vilna territory and parts of the former provinces of Grodno and Suwalki were ceded to Lithuania (Treaty of Moscow of July 12). Polish resentment over this transaction was increased by the fact that it was believed at Warsaw that the Lithuanians had pledged themselves by an annex to the treaty to put their new territories and railroads

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freely at the disposal of the Bolsheviki for the prosecution of the war with Poland; and whether or not there was an engagement to this effect, the Bolsheviki undoubtedly acted as if there had been. Meanwhile Poland, apparently driven into the last ditch, appealed to the Allies for aid. At the Spa conference her prime minister seems to have given a promise, demanded, it is said, by Great Britain, that in return for aid Poland would accept the "Curzon line" as a final frontier on the east. Not long afterwards the Poles were disposed to hold that they were not strictly bound by this engagement, since no effective aid from England was actually received by them; but at all events that promise seriously hampered them in the events that immediately followed.

By the middle of August the military situation was suddenly reversed by the "miracle of the Vistula" and the ensuing complete *débacle* of the Red army. The Lithuanian Government had scarcely installed itself for the second time at Vilna when the Poles came thundering northward in hot pursuit of the Russians. Lithuanian and Polish troops again met, and at once started firing. Lithuania appealed to England, Poland to the League of Nations. The latter body at once agreed to mediate and sent out a commission, under whose auspices on October 7th the two contesting parties concluded the famous and ill-fated armistice of Suwalki. Under the terms of this agreement a line was drawn about twenty-five miles south of Vilna, beyond which the Poles agreed not to push their operations. Apparently it was the Spa engagement that prevented the Polish Government from reoccupying Vilna by force, which from a military standpoint it was amply able to do.

Immediately afterwards General Zeligowski, a Polish officer, and the "Lithuanian-White Russian division" in the Polish army "mutinied" and went off to do what the Polish Government seemed diplomatically precluded from doing. Only two days after the Suwalki armistice these Polish troops occupied Vilna, the Lithuanian Government, after a few glorious weeks in "its capital," again retiring to Kovno, where it has ever since perforce remained. Zeligowski proceeded to organize a "government of Central Lithuania" for the territory about Vilna, announcing that the ultimate fate of this region was to be decided only by the inhabitants thereof. Whether the Polish Government had a hand in preparing Zeligowski's *coup* has never, I think, been fully

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established. At any rate, that government could scarcely have opposed it, had it desired to do so, for the whole Polish public enthusiastically applauded this "liberating act." Much as one may deplore this flagrant violation of the Suwalki agreement and this resort to naked force, it was the not unnatural retort of a nation which had found the Bolsheviki, the Lithuanians, and even the Allied Powers leagued together to deprive it of what it considered to be an essentially Polish land—with a population of 800,000 Poles against only 100,000 Lithuanians.

The League of Nations patiently resumed its task of pacification. A new line of demarcation and a neutral zone were arranged between Zeligowski's forces and the Lithuanians (November 29, 1920). It was agreed that the future of the disputed territory should be settled by a plebiscite to be conducted under the supervision of the League, while an international force was to be sent to Vilna to replace Zeligowski's troops and to keep order. Unfortunately, however, these plans were not carried out. Owing to the difficulties encountered in arranging for the international force, and even more in bringing Lithuanians and Poles to agree on the terms of the plebiscite, the Council of the League presently decided to abandon the project (March 3, 1921) and instead to invite the two states to settle their disputes by direct negotiations, under the guidance of a representative of the League, M. Hymans of Belgium.

In the ensuing conferences at Brussels and Geneva, intermittently pursued from May to September, 1921, M. Hymans made a brave and persistent attempt to find a way out of this *impasse*. His fundamental idea was to satisfy the Lithuanians by giving them the Vilna territory, and to gratify the Poles by ensuring autonomy to Vilna and arranging some kind of federal union between Lithuania and Poland. At the opening of the conference he stated that in the view of the Council of the League there ought to be a close connection, approaching federation, between the two states with regard to economic interests, military defense and foreign policy. He embodied this idea in a draft agreement, which provided for:

1. The establishment of a federal Lithuanian state, made up of the two autonomous cantons of Kovno and Vilna, with the capital of the joint state at Vilna.

2. The permanent connection of Lithuania and Poland through:

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(a) A joint council for foreign affairs, with parliamentary control maintained through something resembling the former Austro-Hungarian Delegations;

(b) A defensive military convention;

(c) An economic convention embodying the principle of free trade between the two states.

Objections and reservations were offered by both sides, Poland insisting that the inhabitants of the Vilna territory must be consulted before their fate was settled, and Lithuania protesting against the degree of autonomy accorded to Vilna. Hence M. Hymans prepared a second plan, considerably reducing that autonomy, while trying to satisfy the Poles by providing that the agreement between Poland and Lithuania should be ratified by an assembly in which the Vilna population would be represented (among the delegates of Lithuania). But all efforts were useless. The Polish Government finally rejected the plan on the ground that the proposed connection between Kovno and Vilna was quite too close and that between Poland and Lithuania not close enough. The Lithuanian Diet rejected the plan for the opposite reason: it could not bear to be so closely bound to Poland. After this disappointing outcome, the Council of the League wearily washed its hands of the matter and invited the two litigants to settle the question as best they knew how. The representatives of the League had at least shown the highest impartiality, breadth of view and constructive statesmanship in this affair, and they can scarcely be blamed for not trying to impose their solution upon the two parties by force.

The Poles now proceeded to a decisive stroke. In January, 1922, elections were held throughout the contested territory for a "constituent assembly of Central Lithuania." As Polish troops were occupying the electoral area and Polish officials made the arrangements for the elections, the validity of this popular consultation has often been questioned. It is, at any rate, clear that the rules issued for the occasion were fair enough, that the vote was granted to nearly all resident adults, and that the elections passed off quietly and peaceably. While many Jews, White Russians, and Lithuanians kept away from the polls, nearly two-thirds of the qualified voters (64 per cent) cast their ballots. The result was a complete victory for the Polish cause. The constituent assembly promptly met and on February 20th, by a vote of 96 out of 102, passed a set of resolutions repudiating "the

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pretensions of the Lithuanian Republic" to their territory, and declaring that "the territory of Vilna, without conditions or reservations, forms an integral part of the Polish Republic." The Diet at Warsaw then ratified this decision, and in spite of protests from Kovno, Moscow, and London, the annexation of Vilna to Poland was formally carried through (March to April, 1922).

Whatever displeasure England may have felt over this *dénoue-*



THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN FRONTIER

The present boundary, and various boundaries suggested between 1919 and 1921.

ment, France was probably not a little pleased with it, and during this past year French diplomacy seems to have exerted itself to bring her allies to recognize the *fait accompli*. Two means were at hand for partially mollifying Lithuania: to grant her government *de jure* recognition, and to hand over the Memel territory to it as an offset to the loss of Vilna. The recognition was at last given in December, 1922, but the transfer of Memel was delayed until the impatient Lithuanians took matters into their own hands.

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When the Allies by the Treaty of Versailles took the northeastern corner of East Prussia away from Germany, their only excuse was that the majority of the population here was Lithuanian and that Memel, the port at the mouth of Lithuania's great river, the Niemen, was the one natural outlet for the trade of that country. Nevertheless, for nearly four years the Allies failed to take the next logical step by ceding the *Memelland* to those whom they had recognized as its rightful owners. One can only guess as to the reasons for this strange delay, but the ostensible pretext was that Lithuania's juridical status was not yet finally determined. Meanwhile, the district remained under French occupation and control; the Germans began to agitate for the return of the region to Germany or at least for its erection into a "free city" on the model of Danzig; and the Poles commenced to display a strong interest in Memel, which might possibly be excused on the ground that they held large territories on the upper course of the Niemen, but which, in view of all that they had recently taken from Lithuania, does not do credit to their tact or moderation.

The Lithuanians feared that even Memel was about to elude their grasp. Hence they proceeded to carry out a stroke somewhat reminiscent of Zeligowski, but which was natural enough for an exasperated people, who felt that they had been too long deceived and trifled with. On January 10, 1923, an insurrection broke out in the Memel district against the Allied authorities. A provisional Lithuanian Government was installed, headed by M. Simonaitis. A local diet, made up of 120 representatives of the various political and economic organizations of the district met at Heydekrug (January 19) and unanimously voted for the union of the *Memelland* with Lithuania, with provisions for local autonomy as already sanctioned by the Lithuanian Diet. After a brief outburst of wrath, the great powers of Europe surrendered to a handful of Lithuanians. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say they decided to perform a belated act of justice. On February 16, 1923, the Council of Ambassadors voted to transfer the Memel territory to Lithuania, though apparently under certain conditions guaranteeing the autonomy of the district and the rights of Poland to the use of the Niemen and the port of Memel.

These concessions to Lithuania seemed to some extent to pave the way for further action by the great powers in the Vilna

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question. Already on February 3rd the Council of the League of Nations had recommended that the narrow neutral zone established since 1920 between the areas of Polish and of Lithuanian occupation should be divided between the two states for police and administrative purposes, though without prejudice to the question of sovereignty. There was a real need that this lawless no-man's-land should disappear. The Poles gladly acquiesced, and on the appointed date (February 15) proceeded to occupy the portion of the zone assigned to them by the League. The Lithuanians, fearing that the territorial question would now in effect be regarded as settled, protested against this new "invasion." A little fighting took place, but the partition of the neutral zone seems now to have been completed.

Finally, on March 15, 1923, the Council of Ambassadors passed a momentous resolution to regulate *en bloc* all the long-pending questions regarding the eastern frontiers of Poland. By this act the Allied Powers recognized the Russo-Polish frontier as fixed by the Treaty of Riga, and the Polish-Lithuanian frontier as defined by the recent recommendation of the League of Nations concerning the neutral zone. The official sanction of Europe for her possession of Eastern Galicia, of Vilna, and of all the broad territories won by the war with Soviet Russia—such were the fruits which Poland obtained by this decision. Her government has seldom gained so great a victory.

Lithuania has, of course, refused to accept this verdict. She maintains her attitude of indignant protest. She will not even treat with Poland unless the latter shows true repentance for past sins by restoring the status established by the Suwalki agreement. But one must suspect that in their hearts the Lithuanian leaders know that the great question is definitely settled against them—at least for a long time to come.

One can understand the bitterness of the Lithuanians over all that has happened: the violation by their neighbor of a solemn agreement; the loss of half of what they regard as their rightful territory; above all, the loss of that beautiful city of Vilna, the historic capital of the old Grand Duchy, the one city in that whole region which seems fitted to be the capital of a state and beside which Kovno is no more than a shabby country town. But, on the other hand, it is only fair to recall that the best evidence available seems to show that the majority of the disputed population feels itself to be Polish and desires to go with

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Poland. As far as language statistics afford a criterion, the Lithuanians are hardly more than an insignificant minority in the territories to which they lay claim: scarcely ten per cent in the region as a whole, not three per cent in what they call their "rightful capital." At bottom it appears to be a question in which claims based chiefly upon "historic rights" and sentiment are matched against claims based on the principle of nationality and what seems to be the will of the population concerned.

A happier outcome might probably have been attained along the lines of the Hymans proposals, had both sides displayed more wisdom, generosity, and willingness to compromise. And perhaps one may express the hope that in the future, when passions have cooled and long-range views again become possible, these two nations will find the way to adjust their differences through some kind of federal union and will become again what they were through so many centuries in the past—allies and comrades in glory and adversity.

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AUSTRIA'S RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND ITALY

By Sigmund Münz

IT IS not easy to discuss Austria's present relations with Germany on the one hand and with Italy on the other. Everyone in a responsible position here in Austria avoids touching publicly on our relations with Germany. But it should be deemed permissible to bare even this *secret de polichinel.* Austria has been delivered over, bound hand and foot, not only to the Treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain, but even to the so-called Protocol of Geneva through which she has obtained the guarantee of the League of Nations for her great international loan.

Little Austria's frontiers on Germany and Italy are very different from those of the former Austrian half of the Hapsburg Monarchy. They no longer touch the chief states of the German Commonwealth—Prussia and Saxony. These old frontiers have now come into the possession of Czechoslovakia. It is only on Bavaria, the second largest German federal state, that our new little Austria still borders, and in three regions—Upper Austria, Salzburg, and the Tyrol. With respect to Italy, the Austrian boundary has been moved far to the north, as far as to the Brenner Pass.

Nevertheless, the relations of this Alpine republic of scant six million souls with these two great neighboring powers are of consequence to the entire political and moral structure of Central Europe. However important Austria's relations may be with the other nations on which she borders—in the first place with Czechoslovakia, and then with Hungary, Jugoslavia and Switzerland—as in the case of any small country the most important relations are those which it maintains with its greatest and most powerful neighbors. Austria's greatest neighbor today is Germany; her most powerful, in view of Germany's impotence, is Italy.

I

The relation of Austria to Germany is of rather a shamefaced type. Notwithstanding the fact that after the collapse of the

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two great Central European Empires the injunctions of Versailles and of Saint Germain forbade any amalgamation, the idea of a union with the unfortunate Teutonic neighbor republic still remained alive in Austria as a temporarily unrealizable aspiration. It was openly talked of; the famous Fourteen Points were cited as justification; and, in accordance with the Wilsonian theory, plebiscites were held in the Tyrol and in Salzburg at which union with Germany was advocated by majorities which almost reached unanimity. And, to speak frankly, one did not usually meet many members of the victorious Entente with the same attitude of objection that France had. It is true that Italy, England, and the United States had also signed the Treaty of Versailles and had signified formal agreement with the French veto against the amalgamation of Austria and Germany. But I can remember hearing, subsequent to the conclusion of peace, expressions, if not of consent to such a union, at least of indifference to it. One day I was approached by a French diplomat with the request that I give him some information regarding the real feeling of the Vienna public concerning the matter. I asked him: "Can you stand hearing the whole truth? If that is the case, I can tell it to you. There is only one place in all Vienna where there is objection to such a union." "And what place is that?" asked the Frenchman, with some curiosity. "The French Embassy," I replied.

It is a fact that immediately after the collapse of the Monarchy our economic and financial groups believed that the Danube states would have to join in some sort of a federation. They believed also in the reestablishment of such a customs union as the Hapsburg Empire had maintained. To an English publicist who inquired my opinion regarding the matter I replied that a Danube Federation could only prove successful if no Danube state were excluded from it, not even Germany, in which country the Danube has its source and through which it runs (in Bavaria) for a great distance. But the two Slav "Succession States" to the old Hapsburg Monarchy, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia, fought from the first moment against any suggestion of a Danube Federation, because they saw in it only the initial move toward a restoration of the Hapsburgs. The attitude of these two nations toward the idea of a union between Austria and Germany was less fierce, for such a union would prove the surest guarantee against a return of the Hapsburgs, whether Germany remains

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a republic or whether at some distant day it constitutes itself an empire under Hohenzollerns or Wittelsbachs. The idea of a union with Germany still remains alive in the hearts of Austrians, even though further plebiscites have been precluded by order of the victorious powers. But were a new plebiscite to take place today its result would unquestionably be less definite than were the results of the previous manifestations of the people's wishes.

Conditions in Germany are such as to cause grave apprehension in saner Austrian circles. Bavaria, the state on which Austria borders, is particularly diseased. Everything German that stands for disorder and destruction is gathered together in the Bavarian capital. All that is reactionary is concentrated there. Munich is the hospitable haunt of all the pretenders who are awaiting the ruin of the German Republic and who also desire to drag the neighboring Republic of Austria down into the abyss of that ruin. And the web of this unholy passion for destruction is being spun across the border from Bavaria into Austria. For a long time Bavarian hospitality has been extended to that wretched Count Berchtold, the former Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who by his overweening ultimatum to Serbia in the summer of 1914 set fire, like a super-Herostratus, to the Temple of Peace, kindling a world-conflagration compared with which "Muspell," the world-conflagration of northern mythology foretold by the Edda, pales into insignificance. It is Munich which is the residence of the Archduchess Maria Josefa, mother of the late Emperor Karl. The mental caliber of this bigoted woman, a sister of the last King of Saxony, is indicated by her announcement to the world at large that the Hapsburg and Wettin dynasties collapsed because both of these arch-Catholic houses hitched their wagons to the Protestant star of the Hohenzollerns. Furthermore, Archduke Max, brother of the late Emperor Karl, makes his residence in Munich, as does the Crown Prince of Saxony, the latter as a tenant of the palace built in the faubourg of Schwabing by the aesthetic Mr. Loeb, a member of the New York family connected with the house of Kuhn, Loeb & Company. By his marriage the Saxon Crown Prince became a brother-in-law of the pretender to the Bavarian throne, Prince—or as his adherents call him—"King" Rupprecht. This royal fellowship, a thorn in the flesh of the new Central European republics, is bound together by the activities of General Ludendorff, whose tireless propaganda in behalf of restoration

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and revenge keeps aloft the sword that threatens future destruction. This *miles gloriosus*, whose insatiable military ambition dug the grave of all German hopes, even ventured a short time ago to propound his doctrines to us Austrians on our own soil. As he would have been unable to do so in Vienna without some danger, he was satisfied to appeal to the Pan-German feelings of the smallest of the Austrian federated states by holding forth in Klagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia.

The fact that Bavaria is a hotbed of reaction—fostered even by the governmental authorities, including the police—is responsible for the strong suspicion with which the Bavarian Government regards the influx of any foreign elements, even of Austrians. Consequently, permits to enter Bavaria can be secured by Austrians only with great difficulty, with the result that in those divisions of Austria which touch Bavaria—Upper Austria, Salzburg, and the Tyrol—such irritation, not to say aversion, has been aroused that the desire of these provinces for annexation to Germany has appreciably declined. A prominent German diplomat said to me lately: "While two years ago more than ninety per cent of the population of the Tyrol was in favor of annexation to Germany, today perhaps not more than twenty-five per cent could be found to favor a union with Bavaria." It should be emphasized that the Tyrol has turned against Bavaria in particular, but not against Germany as a whole.

Austria's relations with Germany suffer as a result of this obstruction of normal intercourse. Austria cannot understand why the great sister nation refuses to open her doors to her little neighbor without putting so many difficulties in the way. Even the Foreign Office in Berlin itself is irritated at this unseemliness, but is nevertheless powerless to bring about a speedy change, as certain of the German federal states are intentionally setting the needs of the Commonwealth at defiance while clamoring for their own particular prerogatives—Bavaria and Saxony preeminently, but Prussia not far behind. For even in the capital of Prussia there are occasional conspiracies against the Commonwealth. Thus it comes about that during the past six months there have been numerous complaints voiced from Vienna against the unfraternal attitude of Germany.

On the other hand it must be pointed out that the idea of an eventual union of Austria with Germany has not been abandoned.

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The German Government realizes that in Austria even those elements who still continue to align themselves under the banner of affiliation with Germany are compelled, under present conditions, to conceal their feelings. Consequently, when the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Abbé Seipel, went to Paris a short time ago in order to hasten the fulfillment of the loan already determined on by the League of Nations, the report that this "journey to Canossa" alarmed the authorities at Berlin was untrue. Not at all. The degree of Austria's dependence on other nations—and not least on France—is, and has been, recognized at Berlin. The idea of an amalgamation is understood on this side of the frontier, as well as on the other, as something that is bound to be realized some day.

In accordance with this understanding various cultural details are being worked out which may prove the groundwork for the future. Both sides are preparing for the assimilation of legislation along statutory (especially criminal), economic and financial lines. Of course, it is not possible to go very far in these matters, inasmuch as not only the Treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain but also the Geneva Protocol prescribe certain definite courses for the two neighbor states to follow, neither of them being permitted to favor the other with any preferential treatment without according it also to the fellow-signers of Versailles, Saint Germain and Geneva.

At the present time the notion of annexation is also less heard of owing to the fact that the Christian-Socialist Party, which is in control of the government, is not so devoted to it as are the Socialists who now form the opposition, and who would find a firmer seat in the saddle after a union with Germany, where Socialism is so powerful. Thus Chancellor Seipel, leader of the Christian-Socialists, made one unavoidable but hurried and half diffident visit to Berlin—almost in felt slippers, so to speak—whereas Otto Bauer, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of the Social-Democrats, had paid that city a most ostentatious call. In the latter's time, also, the Austrian Minister at Berlin, the historian Ludo Hartman, carried on an open agitation in behalf of annexation, while the present Minister, Riedel, a Christian-Socialist, is directing his activities more toward the development of commercial relations between the two countries as far as the international restrictions imposed upon them permit. But even under the former Social-Demo-

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cratic rule in Austria, Chancellor Renner was compelled to emphasize a leaning toward the west, in order not to arouse the suspicions of the Entente. In this connection, the only difference between the party in power and the opposition is at bottom that of emphasis and timeliness in declaring their faith; and it is naturally the former party, with its greater responsibility, which is obliged to adopt an attitude that will provide the League of Nations with no cause of complaint that Austria is kicking against the pricks. All of us realize in these days that Austria must first of all live—live in the sense of supplying her material needs—and that she cannot afford the luxury of playing big politics.

Thus constrained, Austria has had to gravitate towards Prague rather than towards Berlin. There has indeed been a great change from the last decades of the Hapsburg Monarchy, when the German fiat used to control the conduct of Austro-Hungarian affairs. Opportunism bids the little Alpine Republic of Austria turn to the Czechoslovak Republic which is so rich in all natural products. Even Chancellor Renner, notwithstanding the fact that as a Socialist he should have pressed the idea of annexation to Germany, on a visit to Prague concluded with Czechoslovakia a secret agreement which contained political as well as economic clauses. His successor, the non-partisan Chancellor Schober, accompanied President Hainisch to Prague only after he had assured himself that the pact concluded between Beneš and Renner would be modified as far as possible into one of a purely economic character, though holding naturally to the principle that Austria, like Czechoslovakia, would always oppose a Hapsburg restoration. But Austria's Pan-German party, which up to the time of Chancellor Schober's journey to Prague had supported him, refused further support from the moment he returned from Prague with the new compact. It was evident that the Pan-German party was under the thumb of the leaders of the Germans in Czechoslovakia, whose cries of distress had reached Austrian ears. These three and a half million Germans, oppressed by the ruling powers in Czechoslovakia, refused to understand that German Austria was not necessarily sanctioning the tyranny of the Czechs over them by entering into a compact with their oppressors, and their feeling was shared by the Pan-Germans in Austria.

Chancellor Schober's successor, Monsignor Seipel, could not

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follow any different policy towards Germany. And the worse the relations between France and Germany have become during this year, 1923, the more cautiously and circumspectly has the present Chancellor had to proceed. He has protected himself against the suspicion of a lack of sufficient pro-German sentiment by admitting Pan-German partisans into his government. The Vice-Chancellor Dr. Frank, a German Nationalist, is now one of his most prominent colleagues. But in Vienna as well as at Berlin it has become an accepted conclusion that it is useless to hope for an alteration in the relations between Austria and Germany for a long time to come. All our policies are now wrapped up in economics, and this not only in regard to the neighboring Succession States, but also in regard to Germany. Nevertheless, we are filled with a very live desire that Germany be taken as soon as possible into the League of Nations. This is natural enough, since Austria is nothing but a small torso of Germanism, lost among the peoples.

As the Germans in Austria (unlike the Czechoslovaks) have left religious affairs as they were, the entrusting of the government to a priest like Abbé Seipel met with no opposition. Only the Social-Democrats sneer at his "prelate rule" and seek to disparage him among the lower classes and particularly among the free-thinking workmen. But it must be remarked to the honor of the Chancellor that he never makes use of his priestly character for worldly purposes. Not unworthy of such great political ancestors as Richelieu and Mazarin, Consalvi and Talleyrand, Seipel has shown himself an able diplomat, and the relations of the pietistic Republic of Austria with its two rather infidel national neighbors, Germany and Italy, have not suffered in the least. When he has to, he knows how to make his German confession of faith without emphasizing it too strongly, and the clerical magnates of both Rome and of Austria, as opportunists, take it quietly that Seipel keeps the purple of his prelate's robe in the shadow. He has never abandoned an attitude of extreme correctness in his dealings with Germany; and in Italy, which he has twice visited, he has held thorough and satisfactory consultations both with Minister Schanzer at Verona and with Mussolini at Milan. Just how opportunist the Curia can be is shown by the fact that it permitted the Austrian prelate, first among the prime ministers of Catholic states, to visit the King of Italy in Rome before he had paid his respects to the Pope. The sagacity

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of this priestly Chancellor has thus understood how to maintain both Germany and Italy.

II

With Italy the relations of Austria are more clearly indicated than they are with Germany. Today it is Italy which is Austria's real protecting power. And in her helplessness she is indeed in need of a protector. Who else should it be than her nearest neighbor among the victorious great powers? On the other hand, it is necessary for Italy to keep on good terms with Austria, as she is not counting on perpetual peace but rather is concerned with the possibility of a reckoning at some not distant date with Jugoslavia in the matter of Dalmatia and Fiume. Now that nationalism is in the saddle in Italy, it is not going to content itself forever with a mere partial solution of the Adriatic problem.

But for the moment Italy is forced to share with Jugoslavia her domination over the Adriatic. For both parties, indeed, the agreement concluded at Rapallo was only an opportunist way out of a difficulty; it was a diplomatic friendship announced to the world with the same sort of éclat as that which earlier had heralded the understanding between Austria-Hungary and Italy—which was only to come to an end on the eve of war. The close friendship between Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and Rumania means among other things that Czechoslovakia and Rumania, the two signatories to the Little Entente who are not antagonistic to Italy, will for as long as possible bridge over the gulf between the Great and the Little Power of the Adriatic, much as Germany formerly labored to smooth out the differences between Italy and Austria-Hungary. But Italy's leaning towards Austria and Hungary is much more honest than her rapprochement with the Slav elements of the Little Entente, for between Italy and Slavism there yawns a wide abyss and today there is in Italy an Irredenta against Jugoslavia as well as one in Jugoslavia against Italy.

It is true that Austrian national sentiment has not been able to condone the barbarous separation of the German South Tyrol from the rest of the Tyrolese province, though in Austria there no longer is any hatred. Nevertheless, who could forget the Tyrolese mountains, the world of the Dolomites, the Schlern, the Rosengarten and the pink-tinged Latemar? Who could forget that Bozen and Meran were German, completely German,

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cities, more German than Berlin or Vienna? What German and what Austrian can help feeling the sharpest pangs at the thought that the monument to one of the most German of poets, the medieval singer Walter von der Vogelweide, stands in Bozen and testifies that this Tyrolese land, firm and true as its beautiful mountains, shall ever remain German? And who can uproot Germanism from a land in which the legend of Andreas Hofer is a living force at the present day?

But aside from the frightful blow Italy dealt to Germanism in general and to Austrianism in particular by the seizure of the German portion of the southern Tyrol, her general attitude towards Austria since the conclusion of peace, and even before the conclusion of peace, has been thoroughly benevolent.

For example, there were serious difficulties to smooth out between Hungary and Austria. The Hungarians could not forgive Austria for having wished to carve the Burgenland out of the body of her fellow-victim despite the fact that they had fought side by side during the World War. The Hungarians failed to remember that the Burgenland had been designated to serve as the corridor between Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia and that its possession by Austria alone prevented such an event. The matter had to be mediated between Austria and Hungary. Italy offered her services and at a conference in Venice brought about a settlement according to which Oedenburg, the former capital of the Burgenland, was to belong to the country for which it decided in a plebiscite; and the plebiscite decided in favor of Hungary. Italy on this occasion showed how much she cared for a good understanding between Austria and Hungary. It probably was in her mind that if at some distant day there should be an appeal to arms between herself and Jugoslavia, she would want Austria to form the bridge between her and Hungary.

Just as during her days of desperation Austria cried out louder than ever for a union with Germany, so there then was even a sentiment for incorporation with Italy. In her moments of direst need Austria came to believe that it was impossible for her to continue to exist independently. Annexation to Germany was barred by the sentence of Versailles and Saint Germain. If she had been swayed by economic reasons Austria might have been joined to Czechoslovakia, a country rich in agrarian and industrial resources. But no one would resist such a proposal more strenuously than the lords and masters of that polyglot

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state which, like a small Hapsburg realm, is made up of many nationalities but all under the domination of a ruling race, the Czechs. If Austria were to be incorporated in Czechoslovakia the supremacy of the Czechs would be destroyed, since the German element in the state (which would then have a population of twenty millions) would greatly outnumber the Czechs and would match the Czechs and Slovaks combined.

But if Austria should fall to Italy it would be a different matter. That would mean something like a reversal of the past. In earlier times the Lombard-Venetian kingdom formed part of Austria, not to say Germany. The rulers at Vienna committed the folly of keeping their Italian subjects under severe political pressure until well into the second half of the nineteenth century, thus driving them into the arms of revolution and of the Irredenta. Now things would go differently. According to the sentiment of part of the Austrian population, the authorities at the Quirinal would have to grant some sort of autonomy to an Austria which was joined to Italy. The Tyrolese especially liked the idea of remaining in this way undivided and of not seeing the creation of the hostile wedge which, in the shape of the Brenner Pass, today separates the peoples of North and South Tyrol from one another. The journey of Chancellor Seipel to Verona in the autumn of 1922 was due to this tendency to look to Italy as a redeemer. In those days Austria's misery had reached its climax. Seipel journeyed by way of Prague and Berlin to Verona, where he met Schanzer, the Italian Foreign Minister; there the Chancellor made plain announcement that if Austria were to be left in the lurch in her hour of need she would have to throw herself, even against the will of the powers, into the arms of Germany, or as a last resort into those of Italy.

Today, under the Seipel régime, the relation of Austria to Italy is being stressed as one of economic character. The clerical Chancellor can be credited with a patient and able cultivation of a field far removed from the sphere of theology. In this he is following in the footsteps of Schober, his predecessor; and with creative initiative he has gone further. Contrary to the custom of the free-thinking Socialists, who like to put obstacles in the prelate's way, decry him as a Jesuit and attribute hypocritical moves to him, every honest observer must testify that he offers his breast courageously to the attack of every arrow, never in cowardly fashion uses the altar as a screen, never assumes a more

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pretentious attitude than might a minister chosen from among the laity. Never has a minister—and one of a clerical character, at that—been so defended and praised by the liberal press as has this same Seipel. Nor has the Rome which lies beyond the bridge of St. Angelo made his path over-difficult for him by handing him too profuse demands of a spiritual nature and urging that he press them upon the legislative assembly. He goes his way unshaken as the representative of the citizens against a party which attributes to itself the mission of realizing the kingdom of Karl Marx on earth. In order to realize it in Austria, where so far there has not been any too brilliant a success, the Social Democrats, whose principal leaders belong to the Left, are fighting on the same line as their party comrades in the German Commonwealth; and consequently they emphasize, despite all policy at present feasible, their solidarity with Germany. This is a luxury which the statesman in charge cannot permit himself to the same extent, inasmuch as he is unable to feel himself more powerful than the victorious fraternity of Versailles and the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva. He, too, recognizes in Italy the protector of Austria and his last journey across the Alps meant two things: the homage of the representative of a ruling conservative coalition to the Italian statesman who has shown himself stronger than insidious Marxism, and the homage of a little republic just recovering from a severe and lengthy illness to the neighboring great power which, as a part of Europe and in particular as the Kingdom of Italy, has an interest in the real recuperation of weak little Austria.

Little Austria's principal problems of existence are not such that their solution is of world-staggering importance. But as once upon a time the Turkish peril was halted by the walls of the city of Vienna, so does the maintenance of order and economic well-being in Austria, which is the center of Europe, constitute a dam to prevent the west from being flooded by the gospel of Bolshevism which now threatens from Moscow. From this point of view the paramount statesman of the greater monarchy might well greet an ally in the person of the representative of little Austria.

But entirely apart from these general considerations Italy has her own particular reason for interest in Austria. As the Facisti *Epoca* pointed out, Austria is the wedge between Czechoslovakia

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and Jugoslavia, and prevents the establishment of a great Slav bloc running down Eastern Europe and into the Balkans. Close coöperation between Austria and Italy would compel the Little Entente to seek a loyal understanding with Italy. Separated by Austria, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia would then have to give up their great Danubian-Balkan plan, and serve the ends of peace. On her side, Austria is anxious to have Italy concede her a preferred position at the seaport of Trieste, and this would be also greatly to the interest of Italy, for a hinterland in a healthy economic condition could arrest the decay of the trade of Trieste which has been noticeable ever since the collapse of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Indeed, it is a life and death question for Trieste that Austrian traffic with the Levant and the rest of the Near East should survive.

Dr. Grünberger, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was quite right in saying not long ago that the practical non-existence of Austria's economy was of moment to the world, as even the smallest wheel in the clockwork of business could not be allowed to rust if the mechanism were to continue to function properly. The proceedings in the Ruhr do not leave us indifferent, for the interference with economic life in one of the most richly blessed districts of the industrial world automatically reacts on Austria; just as, on the other hand, the return to order in Italy is rapidly having the effect of making Austria also a home of good order. Chancellor Seipel may well have talked in this fashion at his recent conferences with Mussolini, the King and the Pope.

Finally, Austria constitutes the bridge between Germany and Italy. The Austrian temperament is a compromise between the German and the Italian, and it is in her temperament that the charm of Austria culminates. According to a French proverb the finest perfumes are contained in the smallest flasks. Austria is perhaps one of those costly flasks which contains within itself the extract of both German and Italian culture. For the purpose of conserving this flask an appeal may well be made to the sympathies of America.

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THE CAPITULATIONS

By Philip Marshall Brown

THE Department of State was notified by the Turkish Ambassador to the United States on September 10, 1914, that: "The Ottoman Government has abrogated, as from the first of October next, the conventions known as the Capitulations, restricting the sovereignty of Turkey in her relations with certain powers. All privileges and immunities accessory to these conventions or issuing therefrom are equally repealed. Having thus freed itself from what was an intolerable obstacle to all progress in the Empire, the Imperial Government has adopted as the basis of its relations with the other powers the general principles of international law." Ambassador Morgenthau was promptly instructed to notify the Sublime Porte that the United States did not acquiesce in the attempt of the Imperial Government to set aside the Capitulations by a unilateral act having no legal effect, and that it reserved the right to make further representations on the subject.

During the World War Turkey was able in large measure to maintain its sovereignty in internal affairs, having constrained Germany and Austria-Hungary to assent to the abrogation of the Capitulations as part of the price of its participation in the war. After the armistice of Mudros of October 31, 1918, the Entente Allies revived the Capitulations in the areas under their control, though the Nationalists under Mustapha Kemal regained full freedom of action in most of Anatolia and even in Eastern Thrace.

In their negotiations with the powers represented at Lausanne the Nationalists refused categorically to consider any proposition tending to revive the régime of the Capitulations. They stood resolutely on Article Six of their Magna Carta, the National Pact drawn up by Mustapha Kemal and other patriots at Sivas on September 13, 1919. This article read as follows:

"With a view to assuring our national and economic development, and giving the country a more regular and more modern administration, the signatories of the present pact consider the possession of complete independence and liberty as the *sine qua non* of our national existence. In consequence, we oppose all juridical or financial restrictions of any nature which would arrest our national development. The conditions

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of settlement of our proved debts shall likewise not be contrary to these principles."

What, then, were these juridical and financial restrictions which were considered "an intolerable obstacle to all progress in the Empire?" What were the special privileges enjoyed by foreigners under the régime of the Capitulations?

First of all, it should be noted that the term *capitulations* has a significance entirely apart from its usual military meaning. It denotes the various early privileges accorded to foreigners by the Sultan in the form of imperial ordinances or treaty clauses which were colloquially designated as *cápitula*, namely, chapter headings. It in no way implied a yielding under pressure, or surrender.

The régime of the Capitulations has sometimes been characterized inaccurately as one of *exterritoriality*, implying that foreigners by a legal fiction were on their own territory and subject only to their own laws. This was true, of course, of the early colonies of Genoese in Galata, and of the Venetians in Constantinople, who had been permitted by the Greek Emperors to reside in their own precincts governed by their own laws and officials. It ceased to be true when under the Turks they lost these special residential privileges and were granted only certain specified privileges. These were more correctly to be characterized as *immunities of jurisdiction* such as were subsequently conceded to other foreigners.

Among these immunities of jurisdiction enjoyed by most foreigners prior to 1914 was an exemption from the jurisdiction of Turkish courts and police in many matters. The Turkish tribunals had no jurisdiction in suits between foreigners. Even in litigations between foreigners and Ottoman subjects or in cases growing out of some offenses against public order they were sometimes denied jurisdiction. The United States went very far in denying the right of Turkish courts to judge American citizens, though with indifferent success owing to a reasonable divergence in the interpretation of the Turkish, English, and French versions of the Treaty of 1830 between Turkey and the United States.

After the sweeping judicial reforms of 1856 and the concession of the right of foreigners to own real estate, the various treaty powers—the European powers in 1868 and the United States in 1874—formally consented to the trial of foreigners by Turkish

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tribunals and to domiciliary visits by the police under certain circumstances in remote parts of the Empire. This concession amounted to a considerable breach in the régime of the Capitulations.

The powers retained, however, an effective control over Turkish tribunals through the provision that rendered a trial involving a foreigner null and void unless held in the presence of his Consular Dragoman. The signature of this official was required not only to the *procès-verbal* of the trial but to every document in the proceedings. The Dragoman was thus a most important functionary who appreciated himself more highly than did the Turks. The practical result of his enormous powers was virtually to paralyze the action of Turkish courts and permit their decisions to be annulled by the powers whenever it suited their pleasure.

Foreigners were so completely exempt from the jurisdiction of the Turkish police that they came, in effect, to be regarded as subject to *no* law inasmuch as none of the powers could attempt any general or special police surveillance over their own nationals. Consciously or unconsciously foreigners not infrequently indicated an utter disregard and contempt for many of the police regulations. The Turkish authorities often found themselves quite helpless under most trying and exasperating circumstances.

The most notorious instance of this helplessness was the impotence of the police in dealing with the hotels, cafés, gambling houses, saloons, dance-halls, and other pleasure resorts which were owned by foreigners and flourished insolently in defiance of Moslem sensibilities. Not that the powers deliberately protected dens of vice, but that the owners and inmates, by reason of the provision of the Capitulations requiring the consent and actual presence of consular representatives on the occasion of domiciliary visits by the police, were able to impose on the Turkish authorities. The proceedings were so complicated and so likely to give rise to controversies of a highly disagreeable nature that it was generally found more prudent to refrain from any interference with these foreign establishments. The result could not fail to be deplorable, and the so-called European quarters in Pera and Galata degenerated into districts so degraded as to constitute a shameful commentary on European civilization. It has been said on reliable authority that this situation became even worse after the Allied occupation of the

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city in November, 1918. It may readily be appreciated why the Nationalists on taking possession of Constantinople endeavored to prohibit, in accordance with the prescriptions of the Koran, the sale of intoxicating liquors.

This general exemption of foreigners from the jurisdiction of Turkish police and tribunals naturally gave to the various foreign missionary and other philanthropic institutions a peculiarly privileged status. The instruction given in these schools and their varied activities were subject virtually to no supervision or control by the Turkish authorities. Many of them endeavored most conscientiously to avoid giving offense to Turkish sensibilities but in some instances they were unquestionable centers of propaganda, religious and political, over which the Ottoman Government could exercise no real control. Among the further peculiar privileges of foreign schools and like establishments was a general exemption from taxation and from certain customs charges. A special favor originally granted to a French monastery to import articles for "religious purposes" became the basis of the claim of many foreign missionaries and teachers to import valuable household goods free of duty.

Some of these religious communities, such as the Syrian Catholics, were placed under the protection of a foreign power. Many Ottoman subjects thus enjoyed a privileged status. Because of their exemption from the jurisdiction of the Turkish authorities the foreign religious and philanthropic institutions practically became places of asylum for many Ottoman subjects. This system—called the *protégé* system—meant that the various employees and dependents of foreign establishments, whether commercial or otherwise, were practically withdrawn from Turkish jurisdiction, and it grew into so great an abuse that there actually was a class of "hereditary *protégés*!" The Turkish Government tried to abolish the system in 1863, but without much success, because it soon found that trouble could best be avoided by raising as few questions as possible with foreigners who could always count on the vigorous support of their governments.

A galling servitude imposed on Turkey was the right of the powers to limit the customs duties. No matter how bad the state of its finances or the needs of home industries, Turkey could not alter its tariff at will. If any increase was permitted it was generally at the cost of special concessions exacted by the

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several treaty powers. A striking example of how this restriction operated was the practical monopoly enjoyed by the Austrian manufacturers of the *fez*, the national head-dress of the Turks.

Another serious restriction on Turkish sovereignty was the establishment of post-offices throughout the country by the great powers, namely, by Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. This effectively guaranteed the "inviolability of correspondence" assured under the Capitulations but it also enabled many persons—including Ottoman subjects—to escape the rigors of the customs and of censorship. The loss of revenue to the Empire by the operations of these foreign post-offices could not fail to be considerable.

In view of all these varied restrictions on the sovereignty of Turkey it may readily be understood why the régime of the Capitulations became intolerable. It may not be so readily understood how this state of affairs originated and how these restrictions were progressively increased and strengthened. We must go back several hundred years for the answer.

Long before 1453 the general usage of the peoples bordering on the Mediterranean had permitted foreign merchants to carry with them their own laws and customs wherever they went. This practice prevailed also among the members of the Hanseatic League and even in England and Scotland. Attention has already been drawn to the fact that the Venetians and Genoese had enjoyed a complete immunity of jurisdiction within their own precincts prior to the capture of Constantinople by the Turks. And the Turks themselves before the conquest of the city had been permitted by the Greek Emperor to have their own community under the administration of a *Cadi*, in accordance with Moslem law.

When Mohammed the Conqueror entered Constantinople his immediate concern was to institute an effective system of administration adapted to the needs of his new subjects and calculated to give the government as slight trouble as possible. The fact that Moslems in all questions of personal status—that is to say matters relating to marriage and conjugal relations, paternity, affiliation, adoption, the capacity of individuals, guardianship, trusteeship, majority, interdiction, etc.—were entitled to the benefit of their own sacred law, the *Sheri*, made it reasonable that non-Moslems should enjoy a similar privilege. Four days after the capture of the city Mohammed assisted

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personally at the investiture of the new Patriarch, on whom he conferred the title of *Mil'let Bashi*—"head of the nation"—with sweeping powers of jurisdiction over the members of the Greek *nation*. The Patriarch was empowered to settle most of their disputes and to act as an intermediary between them and the Turkish Government in the capacity virtually of an ambassador. The Patriarchate was also the agency for the collection of taxes.

Similar powers were conferred in turn on the other non-Moslem communities, which inevitably became *imperia in imperio* where a vigorous national or autonomous spirit was fostered in antagonism to the unity of the Ottoman Empire. This militated strongly against the efforts of the Young Turks after the revolution of 1908 to bring about a genuine fraternization between all Ottoman subjects and to encourage the sentiment of a single national allegiance. So strong was this separate nationalistic loyalty among the different non-Moslem communities, that it was found necessary to grant them the right of proportional representation within the new Chamber of Deputies!

The essential point to emphasize with respect to the origin of the régime of the Capitulations is that these extraordinary privileges which were conceded by the Turks to their newly conquered subjects were not unwillingly extorted or grudgingly accorded. They were freely granted as being best adapted to the administration of the Empire and as being in harmony with accepted usage.

This system of governing the non-Moslem elements of the Empire worked very well on the whole and only broke down because of the growth and accentuation of nationalistic aspirations. Curiously enough, it was the Greek Patriarch who took the initiative in attacking the system by his action in breaking off relations with the Ottoman Government on March 9, 1919, in anticipation of the Greco-Turkish War.

To extend to foreigners similar rights to those granted to non-Moslem subjects was quite logical. General usage, we have noted, permitted foreign merchants to retain their own ways and laws wherever they went. This avoided much trouble and greatly facilitated commercial intercourse. The dissimilarity of legal ideas and of the religious sanctions that regulated in large measure their relations made it more convenient and advisable that aliens should carry on their affairs under the jurisdiction of their own officials, namely the consuls.

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It was but natural for the Turks to permit the Genoese in 1453 and the Venetians in 1454 to retain many of the immunities of jurisdiction which they had enjoyed under the Greeks, though denying to them the right of residence in special precincts. As a matter of fact, the Venetians had obtained quite similar privileges two centuries earlier from Melek-el-Adel, the Sultan of Egypt, and also from the Turkish Sultan of Konia. It should be specially noted that these privileges were reciprocal in nature. Sultan Suleiman II formally confirmed in 1528 the immunities of jurisdiction long enjoyed by the French and Catalan merchants in Alexandria.

These were the prototypes, if not the direct sources, of the régime of the Capitulations. The treaty of 1535 between Sultan Suleiman and Francis I of France was legally the commencement of the régime which was established *in perpetuo* by the treaty of 1740, in contrast with earlier conventions which were deemed to remain in vigor only during the reign of the Sultan who signed them.

All subsequent treaties with Turkey were modelled on these two treaties of 1535 and 1740, and other nations claimed as favorable treatment as was therein accorded to France. And this is where the real difficulties of the Turks began: they were often compelled under pressure to make sweeping concessions limiting their sovereign rights. In conceding to all, under the most-favored-nation clause, what they were forced to yield to each nation in turn, they found that the Empire was being gradually strangled in its development as a free independent nation. No wonder that they desired in 1914 to get rid of what they termed "an intolerable obstacle to all progress in the Empire."

Care should be taken to distinguish clearly the peculiar immunities acquired under the Capitulations from the special economic privileges acquired in other ways. Many important concessions like the Bagdad Railroad were granted for political and other reasons, not always of a savory nature. Valuable monopolies such as the *Régie des Tabacs*, and the *Société de Quais* in Constantinople, Smyrna, and elsewhere, were created, quite as much to the profit of private individuals as to the profit of the state.

Whenever the government was in financial straits—and that was its normal condition—it was induced to hypothecate various

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revenues in order to obtain ready cash in the form of loans. In this way came into existence the *Dette Publique Ottomane* created by the Imperial Iradé termed Mouharrem of December 20, 1881. This institution which was designed to protect the interests of the foreign creditors of Turkey and which was controlled by Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, became the most flourishing and powerful institution in the Empire. It collected at their source many of the taxes assigned to its service and acquired a large authority in fiscal matters all over the Empire.

In the light of all these various judicial and economic restrictions on the internal sovereignty of Turkey it is natural that the Turkish Nationalists should have insisted so tenaciously on the complete abolition of the Capitulations and of all other special privileges. They maintained that in order to accomplish the regeneration of the nation Turkey must be permitted to regain its full independence as a sovereign nation. They claimed the right of self-determination promised by President Wilson in the twelfth of his famous Fourteen Points. They were very properly distrustful of certain of the proposals of the powers represented at the Lausanne Conference which tended to revive in disguised forms some of the reprehensible features of the old régime.

But the difficulties in the way of progress in the Empire are not by any means all of external creation. Many Turks realize that the machinery of government and the administration particularly of justice must be thoroughly reformed in order to afford adequate guarantees to foreigners. Few would deny the utter demoralization of the Empire under the baleful reign of Abdul-Hamid II, or that the succession of wars since 1908 rendered the application of any extensive reforms practically impossible. Nor is there evidence in the past of a strong desire on the part of any of the Great Powers to encourage reforms that would make Turkey strong and independent. It is clear, in any event, that the internal situation of Turkey has long been such as to render excessively difficult its regeneration and rehabilitation among the nations.

It would be unfair to doubt the desire and the honest purpose of the Nationalists to afford adequate guarantees to foreigners for the protection of their persons and property. Nor can it be denied that the Capitulations have been abrogated once and for all. Whether it has been done legally or not does not much

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matter, as only force can revive what force alone was able to maintain. But it may fairly be asked whether the Turks are really prepared in their own interest to assume complete responsibility at the present moment for the adjustment of all the very complicated questions affecting foreigners. Do they not require an interval of at least five years for the accomplishment of the necessary judicial and political reforms to enable Turkey to deal adequately with these matters?

The Turkish delegates at Lausanne have indicated a liberal, wise attitude in conceding the right of foreigners to continue to settle all matters of personal status according to their own laws and procedure. This removes at once a large category of controversies from Turkish tribunals. With respect to other matters coming before these tribunals it would seem desirable during this transitional period in the development of the country to accept the proposal of the powers at Lausanne to permit several foreign legal experts to assist in the application of judicial reforms and in the administration of justice. Such a proposal is quite moderate and in the interest of the Turks. The legal experts are not to act as judges but as advisors, representing no particular nationality, who may see that every facility shall be accorded in cases affecting foreign interests. The provision that the consent of these functionaries should be secured by the police before making domiciliary visits on foreigners would not seem unreasonable. Foreigners properly may ask for some slight guarantee against arbitrary interference with their persons and property during a very brief transitional period of five years while waiting for satisfactory evidence of the ability of Turkish officials and institutions to meet adequately all international obligations. This should really serve the best interests of Turkey. A *modus vivendi* in judicial matters should be found to the advantage of all concerned, pending the achievement of the profound reforms required after centuries of misgovernment and of diplomatic entanglements. There should at least be an agreement that, in case of serious controversy over judicial decisions affecting foreigners, recourse might be had to some simple form of arbitration made readily accessible to all parties concerned.

With respect to economic matters the Turks would seem to be well within their rights in demanding that ancient servitudes should be abolished. Special concessions and privileges obtained by diplomatic intrigues, bribery or unfair coercion should not be

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revived, particularly when they served the ulterior political end of "pacific penetration." The proposals of the European powers represented at Lausanne concerning these dubious matters could not but arouse the distrust and apprehensions of the Turks. It is interesting to note the terms of Article 94 of the draft of the treaty which Turkey was asked to sign:

"All conventions or contracts relating to concessions made between Turkey and Allied subjects, and any agreements and decisions in regard thereto, prior to October 29, 1914, are also confirmed if they have begun to be put into operation, or have formed the object of agreements between the Ottoman Government and an Allied Government, *notwithstanding the non-fulfilment by Turkey of all the conditions requisite for their final confirmation.*"

The last phrase "notwithstanding the non-fulfilment by Turkey of all the conditions requisite for their final confirmation" would seem clearly to cover the case of the alleged concession to France for the construction of the Samsoun-Sivas railroad now included under the "Chester Contract." It is an interesting illustration of the political-economic interests and rivalries which have so long caused the Turks embarrassment.

With respect to its debts and its financial needs Turkey will evidently be compelled like any other debtor to give important guarantees for the adequate protection of the interests of its foreign creditors. The Nationalists are apparently willing to permit the *Dette Publique* to continue to function under new conditions favorable to all interests. Nowhere was the administrative incapacity of the Turks more evident than in the finances of the Empire. Corrupt officials of course were partly responsible for the lamentable state of affairs, but there was a gross inefficiency of administration which will require considerable time to reform. The Nationalists know this and are wise in making these concessions to the *Dette Publique* if for no other reason than to invite confidence in future loans which may be required for national needs.

With respect to the foreign religious, educational and other philanthropic establishments in Turkey, the proposal of the powers at Lausanne that "there shall be no interference with the free working of existing establishments," and that "they shall be subject to Turkish law on the understanding that the special character of the institutions shall not thereby be impaired," may also arouse the apprehensions of the Turks. They have good

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reason to distrust any foreign establishments serving in any way as political agencies and affording at times pretexts for diplomatic intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey. Philanthropic institutions should be disassociated as far as possible from any suspicion of serving political ends. They should stand or fall on their own intrinsic merits. International altruism should keep itself entirely pure and should not rest on coercion of any sort. Certainly in matters of religion this element of political pressure should be eliminated.

No nation has a greater interest of this kind at stake in the Near East than the United States. Its missions, schools, hospitals, and orphanages represent a material investment amounting to over ten million dollars. These American institutions have been carried on for many years without any just suspicion attaching to them of being political agents or centers of propaganda. While they unquestionably benefited by the privileges of the Capitulations they also benefited by the tactful, lofty spirit in which they were conducted. Through them the Turks came to have a genuine respect for Americans in general and a desire for the support of the United States in the development of the country's resources and in the work of its moral regeneration. The cynics may possibly sneer at the recent grant of the "Chester Contract" as proof that the United States is interested mainly in the commercial exploitation of Turkey. But there is another side to the matter entirely independent of the exact nature of this important concession. It is that the Turks are seeking to free themselves from the economic servitudes imposed by Europe and that they turn to the United States with full confidence in its political disinterestedness and in the good-will as well as the ability of Americans to assist effectively in the task of national reconstruction.

The United States together with the European Powers must accept the fact of the abrogation of the Capitulations and must seek through the negotiation of a special treaty to secure adequate safeguards for legitimate American interests. Enjoying as it undoubtedly does the full confidence of the Nationalists, it is in a position of high advantage to render most important services in the rehabilitation of the Turkish nation and thereby to serve civilization and the best interests of the whole world.

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JUGOSLAVIA TODAY

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

VOLTAIRE has said that those who have great virtues usually have great faults. The virtues of the Jugoslavs were in evidence during the war. Their faults, those which one might expect to find in a people lacking political experience, are in evidence today when the long-drawn negotiations and disappointments of peace try the reasonableness of men as greatly as the hardships and dangers of war tried their bodies and souls.

This is a suitable moment to reckon up what have been the achievements and failures of the Jugoslav Government in the period since the collapse of the Hapsburg Monarchy gave its subject races a chance to experiment with the freedom of which they had long dreamed. The general elections which have just taken place in Jugoslavia—the first since the adoption of the national constitution—have served to throw into relief the important internal questions pressing for solution at the hands of the government; and in so doing they have shown very clearly how large a bearing the problem of internal organization has upon the country's foreign relations.

I. DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES

It is difficult to generalize about Jugoslavia,[1] inhabited as it is by three peoples, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who though closely united in race and language differ in almost everything else. They are the descendents of three Slavic tribes that moved into the Danube Valley and the western regions of the Balkan peninsula in the seventh century. The Slovenes, inhabiting the northwestern part of the Jugoslav territory, early came under Germanic rule. The Kingdom of Croatia was attached to Hungary (though keeping its own entity) as early as 1102. The Serb kingdom, after varying fortunes culminating in the magnificence of Tsar Stephen Dushan, crowned in 1346 as "Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks" with territories stretching from the Danube to Thessaly and from the Adriatic well into

[1] "Jug" means "south" in Slavic, so that "Jugoslavia," as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is commonly called, is the equivalent of "Southern Slavia." The term is not usually used, however, as including the Bulgars, whose blood is partly Slav and partly Turanian.

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THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES

what is today Bulgaria, went down at last before the Turkish invasion; the fatal blow was received on the Field of the Blackbirds on the 15th of June, 1389, a day remembered by the Serbs each year through five centuries as a day of mourning—now the national holiday.

Remote and mountainous Serbia, the Piedmont of the Jugoslav movement, is in consequence far more primitive, far more eastern, than Croatia and Slovenia, which for centuries have known the uncertain advantages of association with the politicians and business men of Vienna and Budapest. While Croatia was engaged in petty political and trade wrangling with its Austro-Hungarian rulers, Serbia was fighting for life, at first to regain her liberty from the Turks, then to escape the new threat from the north. As a result, the Serbs are more patriotic —one might even say more idealistic—than the Croats. If the

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Croats look on the Serbs as uncouth and uneducated, the Serbs are inclined to consider the Croats as lacking in stability and moral force. A further difference results from the fact that the Serbs, having been Christianized from the east, belong to the Greek Orthodox Church and, like all Slavs of that church, write with Cyrillic characters, while the Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholic and, though speaking the same tongue as their Serb kinsmen, write with our Latin characters. The difference in religion is perhaps less important than some writers have said; it is the resulting difference in interest and outlook which has so profoundly affected the psychology of the three groups. The Serbs have looked eastward toward Constantinople; the Croats and Slovenes have looked west across the Adriatic to Rome or north to Budapest and that most Catholic of all capitals, Vienna.

These are only the most elementary and obvious differences between the main racial groups which compose the triune state. There are many others. For example, in Bosnia (over the mountains to the westward of Old Serbia and separated by the Dinaric Alps from the Adriatic littoral) not only is a third of the population Mohammedan, though Serb in race, but there also persist remnants of a feudal land tenure introduced by the Turkish conquerors, extinct elsewhere in Jugoslavia. All along the borders of Jugoslavia, too, are found racial mixtures which were the bane of the Paris peacemakers and which engender distinctive local problems. It obviously is difficult to excite a Macedonian peasant over the prospect that some hundreds of thousands of Croats and Slovenes are to be left under Italian rule around Trieste and in Istria; nor will the farmer on the banks of the Drave roar with indignation because seven or eight hundred miles away the Greeks refuse to carry out their agreement to give Jugoslav commerce special facilities in the port of Saloniki. Yet each problem is a burning one in its own part of the country, to be endlessly discussed and, if need be, fought over. In fact the Belgrade Government has been busy restraining outlying districts from settling in their own way their difficulties with neighboring states.

This situation inevitably has produced two conflicting theories as to the proper way of composing the interests of different regions and of carrying on the national government. One group of leaders have taken the attitude that the Jugoslav Government should be federative in character, leaving large legislative powers

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to the provinces and even decentralizing the administrative machinery so far as possible. They recognize the special services and sacrifices of Serbia in the fight for liberty and union by accepting her Karageorgevitch dynasty, and they agree that Belgrade should be the capital (though the Croats, remembering the broad boulevards of Zagreb, turn up their noses at the cobbled streets that wander up from the Danube to Belgrade's main square); but they demand local assemblies for the various provinces and wide latitude in settling fiscal and trade matters. Naturally, the proponents of this theory are in the main Croats and Slovenes, both of whom had experience with provincial diets under the Austro-Hungarian régime.

Strong arguments are brought to bear against the advocates of federalism by those who want a centralized government. The latter point out that Jugoslavia is a new country, surrounded by former enemies likely to seek revenge at the first sign of weakness. They explain that there must be a supreme central government able to unite the full national strength in the face of threatened aggression. They also enlarge upon the country's manifold financial difficulties, which demand coördinated action. In this connection they do not omit to point out that after the armistice Serbia willingly prejudiced her own excellent financial position by assuming jointly with Croatia and the other former Austro-Hungarian provinces the share of these latter in the Dual Monarchy's state debt; they ask whether in view of the fact that the Serbian dinar was brought down to the value of the Croatian and Slovene crown—in the interests of national unity —it is now quite fair for the business men of Zagreb and Ljubljana to demand the exclusive control of their economic and financial affairs, with power to take individual action that might further depress the whole national currency and work fresh hardship to the unfortunate Serbs.

In Nikola Pashitch, now in his seventy-eighth year, the centralists have found a veteran leader who without having lost his preëminent qualifications as a conciliator still retains an extraordinary personal vigor. Pashitch is perhaps the least known of the statesmen who over a period of years have played a really important hand in European politics; his white beard and patriarchal bearing furnished local color for the reporters at the Paris Conference, but his uncommunicativeness in any language save Serbian barred him from gaining publicity for his

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views and from making Jugoslav aims understood abroad. In fifty years of political life he has encountered every variety of fortune, having twice served terms in prison (during the reign of the pro-Austrian Obrenovitch dynasty) and having more than a dozen times been Prime Minister, first of Serbia and then of the triune kingdom. Through all these fifty years he has always fought Austrian and Hungarian influences in the Balkans and he early became a sponsor for the movement to federate all the Southern Slavs, including the Bulgars. During the most bitter moments of the war, when some counselled compromise with the enemy and some would have sacrificed the ideal of Jugoslav unity to follow the easier plan of setting up merely an enlarged Serbia, leaving the Croats and Slovenes to settle for themselves their own disputes with Austro-Hungary, Pashitch held firm. His determination is still like iron. He is determined that the fruits of so many years of idealistic effort, in Zagreb and Ljubljana and Sarajevo and Ragusa no less than in Belgrade, shall not be thrown aside at the last by a sudden reaction toward particularism in the provinces. He believes that the reaction has birth in the inevitable economic difficulties resulting from a complete reintegration of the political structure of Central Europe, and that with ten years of peace it will disappear.

All the premiers who since the war have alternated with Pashitch in office have been handicapped by the fact that no one party has had a working majority in the national assembly. The two chief parties—the so-called Radicals (a confusing misnomer) led by Pashitch, and the Democrats led by Pribitchevitch and Davidovitch—have stood more or less together as regards the problem of internal organization, and on several occasions they have formed a coalition government. The trouble has been that although the Democratic leaders are centralists the bulk of their followers are found in Croatia, where the federalist idea has taken deep root and where a peasant demagogue, Raditch, has by every means been trying to cultivate it.

Raditch is not himself a peasant but an educated man of erratic habits whose performances during the war, when he wrote odes in honor of the Austrian Emperor, and during the armistice period, when he visited Fiume for secret negotiations with representatives of d'Annunzio, strangely enough do not seem to hamper his ability to represent himself to the Croatian peasants as a patriotic liberator and their patricular patron. The real

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basis of his hold on the peasants seems to be that they fear the competition of agricultural Serbia; his personal desire to play a lone political hand is supplemented by their desire for economic independence. While the Serbs are openly afraid that the Croats will seize control of the railways and ports which connect them with western Europe, the Croats are afraid that they will be swamped by the produce of Serbia and the other provinces with whom they suddenly find themselves united.

In the recent parliament the Raditch party held a large block of seats; or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Raditch himself held them, for the Croatian peasant deputies were in the hollow of his hand and he alone took the important decision that none of them should attend the sitting of parliament at Belgrade. With a make-shift coalition between the two leading parties, and with the third most powerful party abstaining from parliamentary life altogether and its leader conducting a revolutionary propaganda for a Croatian Peasant Republic, one may see that the premiership of Jugoslavia was no sinecure.

The position became intolerable last fall when one group of the Democrats began flirting with Raditch. Pashitch dissolved the coalition and resigned. Upon being called back to office he formed a purely Radical cabinet and set to work laying his plans to gain an absolute majority in the next elections. These elections have now been held, and though Pashitch has increased the Radical seats from 92 in a parliament of 417 members to 109 in a parliament numbering 311 (membership in parliament was cut down to a proportional representation basis by the new constitution), he is still far short of a majority. The following table contrasts the composition of the former parliament with the one recently elected:

Parties	*Old*	*New*
Radicals (Pashitch)	92	109
Democrats (Davidovitch, Pribitchevitch)	91	52
Croatian Peasant Party (Raditch)	50	70
Communists	58	0
Serbian Agrarians	39	9
Slovene Clericals	27	22
Mohammedans of Bosnia	24	18
Mohammedans of South Serbia	8	13
Republicans	3	0
Miscellaneous	25	18
	417	311

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The Democratic representation is cut down; Raditch has substantially increased his parliamentary forces; the Serbian Agrarians, of whose constructive program much was hoped, frittered away their chances by internecine disputes and have nearly disappeared from the scene; and the Communists have been annihilated, partly no doubt owing to strong-arm methods but perhaps even more because various discontented racial minorities which before voted the Communist ticket as a rebuff to the new government have now given allegiance to one of the major parties or put forward candidates of their own.

Of the seven deputies elected from Montenegro (included above under "Miscellaneous") only two are separatists, *i.e.*, opposed to the incorporation of Montenegro in the Jugoslav state. The fact that candidates openly opposed to the present régime were allowed to make their campaign unmolested, and that the two elected could proceed to take their seats in parliament at Belgrade, indicates the correctness of the reports of official British observers at the time of the preceding Montenegrin elections, to the effect that the majority of Montenegrins welcome the act of union under Alexander (who is the grandson of their late ruler, King Nicholas) as the fulfillment of historic hopes. The activity of former courtiers of Nicholas who have now lost their posts (such as Col. Plamenatz, who for some reason was recently admitted to the United States on a passport issued to himself by himself in Rome,) may keep alive antagonisms in this country and may serve the ends of a small number of rash Italians who dream of annexations across the Adriatic, but the elections seem to indicate that the propaganda has not had the hoped for effect in Montenegro itself.

Many interesting deductions might be made from the various election results, but for those who are concerned with the question of centralism versus federalism the main point to note is that political and social distinctions have counted less in this election than regional and religious distinctions. The parties with platforms emphasizing questions of social order have lost ground; those with a racial emphasis have gained. This cannot be construed except as a blow to those who think unification of the Jugoslav state is only to be accomplished by complete centralization of all power. Against this view the Radicals argue that after all they are still the chief party, both numerically and in prestige, and they point out that for the first time they have

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gained adherents outside Serbia proper, presaging the day when they will cease to be a Serbian party and become a Jugoslav party. They also are pleased to think that if it has proved difficult for Pashitch to form a coalition it is next to impossible as things stand for Raditch to come into power, even with the full support of the Slovene and Bosnian federalists.

Lacking a majority, Pashitch on the morrow of the elections had to turn to his old task of forming a coalition. He first sent emissaries to Zagreb. They discussed with Raditch personally the possibilities of reaching a *modus vivendi*, and reported that though the Croat leader is willing to admit that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes probably have to live together, the bonds between them must be as shadowy as possible and each province must go its own way—politically, commercially, culturally. In a speech before a great peasant meeting immediately after the Pashitch envoys had returned to Belgrade, Raditch outdid himself in demagogic ardor, saying that he stood for peasant absolutism and a government which levied no taxes and required no military service. For the rest, he said that Russia and Germany are the only two countries worth emulating. This was a political slip if he hopes to obtain foreign support for his separatist movement; as one French paper scornfully remarked, the statement about Germany shows he is "still an Austrian," while England will be no more pleased than France or Italy by this admiration for Soviet Russia. As this article is being written it seems as though Pashitch had given up the idea of coalition with either of the Raditch or Democratic parties, instead contenting himself with the temporary support of one or two minor groups who can give him a majority so long as Raditch abstains from attending parliament. This puts the next move squarely up to Raditch. If he goes to Belgrade he must take the oath of allegiance to king and constitution before he can participate in parliamentary activities; and even if he decides to risk losing his *raison d'être* by doing so, he will probably only find parliament prorogued and new elections ahead. In other words, the present situation is merely a renewal of the former uneasy and unstable condition, and new elections must in any event be faced in the near future —when each side will undoubtedly resort to any and every means to secure absolute control.

The position of the dynasty in the event of open trouble is not sure. King Alexander is personally very popular in all parts of

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the kingdom and on his various visits of state to Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia he has reaped the rewards of having proved his personal fighting qualities during the long and racking campaigns in which he participated on equal terms with the officers and soldiers of the Serbian army. He is, moreover, the great-grandson of Black George, who is much more than a purely Serbian liberator—he is an historic figure acclaimed by all parts of the Jugoslav race in their songs and stories as part of their own inheritance. Even to those like Raditch who talk of a peasant republic in Croatia the Karageorgeovitch dynasty is not necessarily an impediment. Raditch has pointed out that the German Empire contained two or three small republics, and



JUGOSLAVIA'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO MAIN EUROPEAN RAILWAYS

that in any case the real power in Jugoslavia rests not with the king but with the ministers, whom the peasants can control if they will. He stresses the point, too, that Alexander is himself the descendant of peasants and therefore of the same blood as all the peasant nation. Aside from the Raditch movement, there seems no doubt that republicanism is on the wane. During the war it had supporters among the Jugoslavs in the United States, and even in Belgrade in the first months after the cessation of hostilities it was not considered strange or disloyal for men to say openly that they favored the introduction of a republican form of government—perhaps, they remarked politely, with Alexander as the first president. All in all, the dynasty seems fairly safe—certainly in Serbia proper—so long as Alex-

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ander is alive. If he were to die there would be difficulties, as he has no children as yet and his brother George is erratic and has no serious following.

To those who had hoped to see the attention of the Jugoslav people turned without more delay to constructive tasks the real danger seems to be that both the Serbs and the Croats and Slovenes are becoming confirmed in the belief that the aims and interests of the one are in the nature of things contrary to the aims and interests of the other. To avoid the widespread acceptance of such an idea will undoubtedly be Pashitch's chief aim in the difficult months ahead. And it may be repeated that his powers as a conciliator are of a very high order. Perhaps he may see that his policy of centralization has been too rigid and has been forced forward too fast. The essential ends of unity would be served if the conduct of foreign affairs, the control of the treasury and all matters pertaining to national defense were wholly in the hands of the central government, even if education, the administration of justice and similar matters were left to local authority. The reform which will bring together Pashitch and Raditch must begin from both sides. At the same time that the Croatian leader gives over his irresponsible talk of a republic and takes up an intelligent form of parliamentary opposition, Pashitch must show his willingness to make concessions here and there to diversites in cultural and political tradition.

II. THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATIONS

Differences in political ideals resulting from differences in race and tradition are not the only factors interfering with the cohesiveness of the new state. The author of the standard history of Serbia[2] has pointed out that until man could tunnel mountains, dry up marshes and render rivers navigable, Jugoslav unity was an impracticable dream. A glance at a contour map of the Balkans will show that the statement is true. Recognizing its truth, the Jugoslavs ever since the war have been giving whatever time they could spare from partisan and diplomatic disputes to developing plans for uniting their country by aid of modern science. It will perhaps be useful to consider these plans briefly in the present estimate of Jugoslav conditions.

In all the sweep of Europe from France eastward to Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey there is no country fundamentally

[2]H. W. V. Temperly: History of Serbia. London: G. Bell, 1917.

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stronger than Jugoslavia. This is not because she is militaristic. Her population of twelve millions are sturdy and, to their sorrow, only too thoroughly experienced in warfare; she is practically self-contained as far as food is concerned; her mineral resources, though largely undeveloped in modern times, were the subject of classic and mediæval legend and will be the basis for great wealth in the future. Moreover, she stands at the gateway of east and west, and through her territory pass the railroad routes between Berlin and Constantinople, Paris and Constantinople, Paris and Bucharest, and Vienna, Budapest, the Danube Valley in general and Saloniki. In addition, there may soon be the through route along the 45th parallel from Bordeaux to Odessa, of which only two links are now missing. It will be noticed at once that though all these lines cross Jugoslav territory they neither begin nor end in Jugoslavia, and that as far as Jugoslav commerce itself is concerned—on these main routes as well as on the lesser routes—it must submit to levies at foreign customs houses and run the danger of discrimination and delay.

In 1908 when Count Aerenthal, Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was testing European sentiment in preparation for his sudden annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he proposed in the Austrian delegations that a railroad be built southward into the Sandjak of Novibazar. Such a line, he urged, would not only promote Austrian expansion southward—Saloniki being the first objective of the *Drang nach Osten*—but would also serve important strategic and political purposes by dominating Serbia from a new angle. At once Russia entered her protest. The form it took was an offer to Serbia to build another railroad, running in the opposite direction, which would connect the Slav hinterland with the Adriatic and start a current of commerce at cross-purposes to the southward Germanic stream.

But greater events came to monopolize the attention of the two powerful rivals, as well as their Balkan pawns, and for the time being both plans were abandoned. Austria found other means of accomplishing her ends, Russia let her project lapse (if she had ever seriously intended carrying it out) and no more was heard either of the Austrian railway southward to Macedonia or of a rival transverse line to some Adriatic port. The Balkan wars came and went, leaving heritages of poverty and economic disorder that made great investment schemes out of the question. And finally the Great War broke out.

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One of the chief problems of the Paris Peace Conference was to secure for the Southern Slavs an adequate outlet on the Adriatic. In Belgrade immediately after the armistice it was obvious that the bitterness occasioned by Italy's desire to hold the keys to all possible doors to Balkan commerce was already souring the temper of a people who ought to have been partners in Italian projects rather than mistrustful rivals. From purely selfish motives Italy should have made every effort to avoid transforming into an enemy the most promising purchaser of her manufactured goods and the country best able to supply her with needed wheat and meat and lumber. She not only failed to make this effort; she deliberately chose the opposite course. Her hostility to the new Jugoslav state, which she considers as merely the old Hapsburg power in new dress, has barred Italy for many years to come from acquiring the economic power which in the natural course of events would have been hers in the Balkans; and it has appreciably strengthened the very military force which she fears by showing the Croats that they are largely dependent for the preservation of their rights along the Adriatic on the prestige of the Serbian army and the diplomatic efforts of the united Jugoslav state. It is interesting in this connection to note that the Croatian separatist movement has gained strength progressively as the Italian menace in Fiume and Dalmatia has been lessened.

Denied the natural route through Trieste or Fiume, the Jugoslavs have turned back to the more difficult project of tunneling the Dinaric Alps and constructing on the shores of the Adriatic their own port to handle their shipments of lumber, wheat, wine, livestock, meat, and copper. As was inevitable, the choice of the proper point for the terminus of this railway has been the subject of heated controversy between the various provincial elements, the Croats and Slovenes wanting a port in the north as near Fiume as possible, the Serbians noting the advantages they would derive from a southerly terminus on the borders of Albania.

Since the "pig war" of 1905 with Austria, Pashitch has been convinced that without a convenient seaport the farms and forests and mines which Serbia hopes soon to develop on a large scale would be at the mercy of her neighbors, in particular those controlling Fiume, Saloniki and the Danube. The Croats, however, consider that they have even a prior claim to fix the site of the new port, for they were accustomed to at least some of

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the facilities of Fiume when it was under Hungarian control and the produce of their wheat fields in the rich flats between the Drave and the Save rivers is ready for immediate and profitable export, whereas Serbia's claims are based on the needs of the future rather than the present.

The final decision regarding the proper location of the new Jugoslav port on the Adriatic will depend largely on the facilities meantime given Croatian commerce in Fiume. By the Italo-Jugoslav agreement reached at Rapallo in 1920, Fiume was made a Free State and its easterly suburb, Susak, was attributed to Jugoslavia. Susak is of great commercial importance because the railway from the interior divides there, one line descending by a spiral tunnel to the important Baros docks, the other continuing by a gradual descent to the main port of Fiume. Susak is inhabited almost exclusively by Jugoslavs, some of whom are employed in Fiume proper while some work on the Baros docks where the Croatian lumber has always been loaded for export. Whether by bad management or because no exact compromise could be effected, the Rapallo Treaty left the precise frontier between the Free State and Jugoslavia somewhat in doubt at this critical point. The treaty specified that the frontier should follow the little stream Rechina; but near its mouth this forms a delta, one canalized branch connecting directly with the Baros basin, the other reaching the sea a few hundred yards to the eastward. The insignificant strip of territory intervening is the crux of the present dispute, for if the Treaty of Rapallo be construed to leave the delta to the Jugoslavs they will possess excellent, if small, docking facilities and an unbroken rail connection, whereas if the frontier be drawn along the easterly branch of the stream, Baros and the delta will remain in the Free State and a customs barrier can be set up between the mouth of the tunnel and the docks.

While Count Sforza was Italian Foreign Minister he admitted the Jugoslavs' claim to Baros in order to gain their consent to the loss of the main Fiume harbor, and went so far as to make a formal statement in this sense in a note sent to Belgrade, but the present Italian Government repudiates the arrangement and demands that Baros be included in the Free State. It further suggests that a consortium be set up to administer the whole Free State, the governing commission to consist of two Italians, two Jugoslavs, and two Fiumans.

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

THE FIUME DISPUTE

The territory in dispute between the Free State of Fiume and Jugoslavia lies between the lines B–C and B–D. If the delta be awarded Fiume, Jugoslavia's rail communication with the port will be cut; if the delta be awarded Jugoslavia, she will secure direct rail access to that part of the port known as the Baros Basin. The boundaries of the Free State of Fiume are shown on the smaller map.

Jugoslavia's reasons for refusing this plan are plain to anyone familiar with the background of Italo-Jugloslav relations. Briefly, it may be noted that the Treaty of Rapallo binds the two contracting parties to recognize the permanent independence of Fiume. Since that treaty was signed the aim of Italian diplomacy has been to find a method of honoring the letter of the agreement while in some way establishing Italian commercial supremacy in Fiume and preventing its absorption into the Balkan commercial system. Italy is convinced that not only would the latter event give Jugoslavia a threateningly powerful economic position but that unless the development of Fiume is regulated from Rome the commerce of the port of Trieste will be wiped out. But Jugoslavia is not ready to concede that the status or method of administration of the Free State is under discussion or subject to revision any more than she is willing to relinquish her claim to Baros, explicitly promised her by Count Sforza in return for concessions regarding Fiume proper.

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It is with these difficulties that the Italian and Jugoslav representatives must wrestle this summer. The present political uncertainty at Belgrade does not hasten a decision, for the Serbs perforce are less active in gaining advantages in Fiume for a Croatia given over to the heresies of Raditch than for a Croatia firmly established as part of the present Jugoslav political and economic system. So once more we see the ruinous effect on Jugoslav destinies of a partisan disagreement which at the same time that it paralyzes internal political life postpones the solution of international problems of vital concern to the country's prosperity and peaceful development.

It is unfortunate that the Sforza arrangement should have been repudiated by Italy. It seemed to offer an opportunity not only for Italy and Jugoslavia to write *finis* to their protracted and dangerous territorial disagreements, but also for the Jugoslavs to settle between themselves the dispute regarding the proper location of the new terminal port on the Adriatic. For with Baros in Jugoslav hands minor railway readjustments would fit it to take care of the most pressing needs of Slovenia and western Croatia, and these districts would then have no cause for complaint if a point convenient to Serbia proper and Bosnia were selected for the new port.

In these circumstances the logical geographic point for the new port would be Spalato. Fortunately it is also the point best fitted by nature for development by man. The old-time port of Spalato is a typical relic of Venetian days, built on the scale of the Venetian galley. But on the inland side of the peninsula on which stands Diocletian's town there opens up a great bight sufficiently sheltered to give anchorage to the largest modern vessels and with adjoining land for adequate wharves and railway terminal facilities. The mountains rising behind do not offer insurmountable difficulties to the engineer, and once past them the railway can join up with existing branch lines in Bosnia and tap the main line from Belgrade to Zagreb.

Of course even under the most favorable conditions (which are not likely to prevail) the opening of this railway is far off, but if Jugoslavia continues to exist as a national entity the day will come, very possibly with American financial help. And although Fiume should keep the trade of its immediate hinterland and will probably develop also into an outlet for commerce from Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, it will rue the time

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when national rivalries over-rode plain economic facts, handicapping its natural process of development into the premier port of the Adriatic.

III. INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

On every frontier Jugoslavia is faced with military, diplomatic or commercial difficulties.

To the north lie the two main fragments of the great power which the Jugoslavs once so hated and feared. One of them, Austria, they no longer either hate or fear. Comparatively good feeling prevails between Belgrade and Vienna, the two governments having recently completed negotiations for a commercial treaty besides having come to an understanding regarding sequestered properties, the disposition of the gold in the Austro-Hungarian Bank belonging jointly to all the citizens of the former Empire, and mutual good treatment of racial minorities.

Curiously enough, the way for this satisfactory Austro-Jugoslav understanding was paved in Italy not long ago when the Austrian Chancellor, Monsignor Seipel, visited Milan in order to discuss with Premier Mussolini the future relations of their two countries. The Fascisti premier offered Austria a comprehensive alliance, both political and economic. Seipel saw that such an alliance entailed Austria's complete political subordination to Italy, a break with Jugoslavia and probably with Czechoslovakia (who has been her best friend since the war), the failure of attempts on the part of the League of Nations to revive Austria by means of a strict supervision of her industry and finance, and the loss of French sympathy and diplomatic support. An added difficulty appeared in the fact that both Italy and Austria live by their industries. Austria quickly realized that she would not get enough commercial advantages from Italy to compensate for her losses elsewhere or to outweigh the dangers of accepting Italian political dictatorship. A commercial treaty has since been drawn up, but its scope is limited and political matters are wholly excluded.

The comparative failure of the negotiations with Italy demonstrated to Austria her dependence on the three states forming the Little Entente—Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Rumania—and made it possible for Seipel to proceed on his visit to Belgrade, with such useful results.

Parenthetically, it may be noted that probably this is the

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piecemeal way in which an improvement in the relations of the various small states of Central and Eastern Europe will gradually come about. The Danubian customs union often talked about in the British and French press as the salvation of these new states sounds to them far too much like a revival of the Hapsburg system. They realize that Vienna and Budapest are strategically situated at the center of a carefully planned web of railway connections, and they are prepared to utilize them as natural clearing-houses of international commerce, but they want to deal with them independently rather than as members of the same commercial group.

Jugoslavia's feeling towards Hungary is noticeably less friendly than towards Austria. The Magyars never lose an opportunity of expressing their contempt for what one former Hungarian premier described as "those barbarous blacks," and in return the Jugoslavs recount the inhumanities practiced by the Magyars during the invasion and occupation of Serbia and described the shorn but unregenerate Hungarian state as the center of all the plotting for the overturn of the Paris treaties and the resumption of armed conflict. As a result there is always a verbal war in progress between the Budapest and Belgrade press, frequent disturbances occur in the frontier districts, and commercial intercourse between the two countries is more hampered than between any two other states of Eastern Europe.

Jugoslav apprehensions regarding Hungary are shared by others, as the formation of the Little Entente bears witness. The Little Entente is a tripartite agreement between Hungary's three most powerful neighbors for unified resistance to any attempts to reëstablish the Austro-Hungarian Empire, revive the Hapsburg dynasty, or in any way to overturn or evade the provisions of the treaties which laid down the present frontiers in Central Europe. It is not a hard and fast political federation, and those who see in it the genesis of a customs union are not familiar with the special circumstances which brought it into being and which still make coöperation necessary. Neither is the Little Entente a pact of military aggression. On the contrary, its aims are wholly defensive, the object being to discourage the Magyars from attempting to translate into action their talk of revenge and reconquest. There is no necessity for going beyond the plain facts of its being to justify it; those who set it too complicated tasks do it no service, for the treaties

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which bind the member states to each other are not of a nature or a permanence to work miracles. It is an instrument of peace, but of reconstruction only in so far as providing an opportunity for peace leads indirectly to reconstruction.

Of the three states members of the Little Entente, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are the most natural partners and will probably continue to coöperate diplomatically. Before the war most of the disaffected Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire used to get their education and inspiration in Prague; both countries are of Slav blood and both have an enormous admiration for Russia and a faith that when she emerges from her present condition they can again turn to her as the Mother of the Slavs for advice and assistance; finally, the agricultural products of the one admirably supplement the manufactures of the other and, with a reasonable allowance of peace, the trade between the two will become highly important and profitable. It has been said in disparagement of Czechoslovakia's support of the Little Entente that she will fight in defense of the treaties of Saint Germain and Trianon "to the last Jugoslav." It might have been said with equal force that Jugoslavia would fight "to the last Czechoslovak gun, cartridge and army truck." In war as in peace each has what the other needs, and together they form a powerful combination.

On the other hand, it seems not improbable that sooner or later Rumania will slip out of the Little Entente. Although for a thousand years Rumanians and Serbs have existed side by side without an armed conflict between them (the only such example, probably, in Europe), they are as different as oil and vinegar. Since the war they have been held together by common difficulties, but once the Hungarian situation becomes less alarming they will drift apart. For one thing, the frontier question in the Banat is not yet settled. A more remote cause of friction is very likely to be presented by the Rumanian annexation of Bessarabia, which Russia is sure to contest as soon as she resumes a leading rôle in European diplomacy, and which she will expect the other Slav states to contest also. The death of Také Jonescu will increase the divergence. Not only was he the statesman of highest ability in Rumania and the one most determinedly hostile to German and Hungarian influences, but he joined with Dr. Beneš of Czechoslovakia and M. Vesnitch of Jugoslavia in originating the Little Entente and was its chief

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Rumanian supporter. The present premier, Bratianu, is of different calibre and has different aims. However, speculation regarding the extent and nature of Rumania's future participation in the Little Entente may be suspended for the present, as her agreements with Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia expire this year and positive indications of her intentions will soon be forthcoming. The treaty between Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia has just been renewed for a three-year term.

Poland would more than fill the gap left in the ranks of the Little Entente by the defection of Rumania, and negotiations have been taking place between Prague and Warsaw looking toward such action, but here again Russia comes in as a factor. Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia would never be willing to commit themselves to the support of Poland in case of a dispute with Russia, while Poland would not care to participate in agreements to preserve the Treaty of Trianon, in which she is comparatively little interested, without reciprocal guarantees. Her charter of liberty is the Treaty of Versailles and she is concerned in the corollary treaties only in so far as their observance or violation tends to uphold or weaken the prestige of the central settlement. If Austria were to unite with Germany there would at once be a new bond between Poland and the Little Entente states. Meanwhile, expectations that Poland will become a full fledged member of the Little Entente seem over-optimistic (despite the recent visit by Marshal Foch to Warsaw and Prague) and grandiose projects for a Slav-controlled Danzig-Saloniki railway will remain in the clouds.

In considering the relations of Jugoslavia and Bulgaria, to which we now come, it must be remembered that in former days the two countries were not the comparatively free agents they are now that Russia's tutelage is withdrawn from Belgrade and since the influence of Austria, exercised at Sofia through King Ferdinand, has disappeared. The elimination of the two powers who for their own ends most bedeviled Balkan politics opens a new opportunity for independent action on the part of the Balkan states, one which they will probably seize if only they are left to their own devices long enough and provided new difficulties do not descend upon them from other directions. But, lest it be imagined that nothing now prevents a prompt rapprochement between Jugoslavia and Bulgaria, it must be admitted that even were the memory of past disputes wiped out

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many Serbian statesmen, among them Premier Pashitch, would be most loth to see Jugoslavia undertake any further tasks of amalgamation or absorption as long as the Croatian question remains unsolved. Thus once again we are confronted with the unhappy results of Jugoslavia's internal dissension, for it may be said without exaggeration that in a strengthening of ties between Bulgaria and Jugoslavia, culminating perhaps in union, lies the best hope of ending the Macedonian question, for generations the source of constant Balkan quarreling.

Although the Bulgars have a large proportion of Slav blood and though they have from time to time been partners of the Serbs, the feeling between the two peoples has in recent years been as thoroughly bad as possible. In 1912 the Balkan states, worried by Turkey's repeated acts of provocation, came to a joint understanding, the cornerstone of which was a convention between Serbia and Bulgaria. The victory of the Balkan allies in the war which followed was turned into disaster by the refusal of Italy and Austria to allow Serbia an outlet on the Adriatic in northern Albania, and by Serbia's consequent delay in accepting the arbitration which promised to result in the award of practically all Macedonia to Bulgaria. On June 29, 1913, the Bulgars suddenly attacked the Serbs, whose heavy artillery only three months before had been aiding them to take Adrianople. In coöperation with Greece and aided by Rumania, the Serbs brought Bulgaria to terms, but the affair has never been forgiven or forgotten in Serbia, where the word Bulgar means anything but brother. Again in 1915 when Bulgaria after holding off to see which side would bid highest for her services finally joined Turkey and the Central Empires, it was Serbia who suffered most bitterly in consequence. Those who crossed the Albanian mountains in the winter of 1915, after Bulgaria suddenly put her troops between the retreating Serb army and the French expedition advancing slowly from Saloniki, can not immediately cease thinking of Bulgaria as their most immediate enemy nor forget that she was willing to make common cause with the hereditary opponents of Balkan freedom.

It is on this discouraging foundation that the statesmen of the two peoples, who perforce will always live next to each other and who have much in common, must try to build. Remarkable progress has been made since 1918. Immediately after the armistice Bulgaria adopted the course of repudiating the states-

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men who had led her to back the wrong horse. The task of rehabilitating her reputation she wisely placed in the hands of Stambulisky, a forceful peasant leader who had been strongly Ententophile during the war and had suffered imprisonment from Ferdinand's ministers in consequence. As premier Stambulisky has proved that in addition to energy and independence he possesses intelligence and tact. He has not always ruled Bulgaria by quite constitutional means but he has held the country's diverse political groups firmly in hand and has bent every effort towards satisfying the greater Allies of Bulgaria's repentance for past errors and towards proving to the Jugoslavs that he sincerely wants to coöperate with them.

One constant cause of friction has been the activity of bands of Bulgarian *komitadji* along the Serbian frontier in Macedonia. It has been recognized in Belgrade that the control of these bands presented a serious problem to the Bulgarian Government, whose power in Bulgarian Macedonia has been more or less openly defied on several occasions; in fact, the various attempts against Stambulisky's life and the successful attacks on other leading Bulgarian officials originated in the Macedonian "clubs" in Sofia itself. But only in the course of the past winter did Belgrade begin to realize that the very activity of the *komitadji* was symptomatic of the Macedonian Bulgarians' discontent over the conciliatory attitude pursued by Stambulisky toward Serbia. The realization of this fact has measurably increased the warmth of relations between Sofia and Belgrade, and only a month or so ago an agreement was drawn up in Nish for the joint regulation of bandit bands and the maintenance of order along the frontier. This looks remarkably like coöperation between Sofia and Belgrade against all Macedonians, whatever their race, who seek to stir up fresh troubles. If so, Stambulisky is to be congratulated on taking a courageous and most encouraging step.

The course followed by Greece since the armistice could not have been better planned had she wished to see the Bulgars and Jugoslavs draw close together instead (as was actually the case) of wishing by all means to keep them apart. It will be remembered that by the peace treaty Bulgaria was promised facilities at some port in Western Thrace, which is now Greek territory. Bulgaria attributes the delay on the part of the Allies in carrying through this undertaking to Greek opposition; and Serbia, having her own difficulties with Greece, is inclined to sympathize.

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Serbia's grievance goes back to 1914. At that time Greece decided to accord Serbian commerce special advantages at Saloniki, the prosperity of which port is largely dependent on traffic from the north, just as some five millions of Jugoslavs are dependent on it for the proper movement of their exports and imports. But on receipt of an imperious demand from Austria-Hungary that her commerce also be given whatever privileges were enjoyed by Serbia, Greece annulled the agreement. Serbia had no recourse but to consent, as the award of privileges to Austria-Hungary would have played directly into the hands of Vienna and placed the Balkans once for all under its commercial sway.

Since the war, negotiations have been in progress between Belgrade and Athens regarding the nature of the privileges to be given Jugoslav goods at Saloniki and the control of the railway between the Jugoslav frontier and the port. These negotiations have not yet been concluded, and the Jugoslavs are becoming more and more restive. The feeling is not bitter as yet, because the railway down the valley of the Vardar was crippled in the German war machine's most thorough manner and is still barely functioning. But once the roadbed is repaired and the bridges are rebuilt the impatience of the Jugoslavs will be redoubled, and—particularly should the Fiume questions still be hanging fire—it is conceivable that they will be led into making common cause with Bulgaria, even to the extent of demanding that Greece transfer to them outright territorial corridors to the Aegean. If Greece is wise she will not delay in soliciting Jugoslav friendship by conciliatory action regarding Saloniki and in modifying, so far as public opinion will permit, her official attitude toward the Bulgarian Government.

IV. CONCLUSION

Perhaps even this cursory review will have served to indicate that the many problems before Jugoslavia, though seeming rather remote, are of immediate importance in European politics. The chain forged by the peace treaties stretches—little links and big—from the Pyrenees to the Straits and beyond. One of the points of greatest strain is in the Balkans, and the chief pressure is evidently upon Jugoslavia.

But if it is true that serious subversive forces are at work within the state, and intrigues against it without, it is also true that there are in Jugoslavia very powerful cohesive tendencies,

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as was seen in all parts of the country in the patriotic days just succeeding the armistice. These tendencies are weakened from time to time by short-sighted action in Belgrade or by the stress of inevitable post-war economic difficulties; and then again they are strengthened by the over-eagerness of some foreign propaganda or by the sudden pang of realization that the Jugoslav ideal is a reality today, even though an imperfect one, that it is in jeopardy, and that if it is defeated now generations will pass before it can be reincarnated.

There is an old Serbian proverb, "A brother is dear whatever his faith." The native idealism and sentimentality exemplified in that saying will probably win Jugoslavia through its present difficulties, if only no unforeseen event produces a sudden crisis and provokes rash acts which cannot afterwards be righted. In general, the Jugoslav question may be said to be one of time—time for economic conditions to improve—time for old railways to be restored and new ones laid down—time for roads and hotels and schools and banks and houses to be built—time for old Belgrade legislators to adopt new ways to meet new conditions, for impetuous Zagreb politicians to realize that purely negative methods used in Hapsburg days are no longer necessary or effective, and for new young blood gradually to gain power in the life of the country and to exert its conciliatory and patriotic influence.

There unquestionably is such a thing as a Jugoslav national spirit. It was awakened through the last century by a long line of high-minded and resourceful leaders such as the Croats Gaj and Bishop Strossmayer and the Serbian Vuk Karadjitch, who created the literary language and put the epics of the heroic past into written form; it was intensified and hardened in the struggles against Magyarization and Germanization and in the fierce conflicts of the Balkan Wars; it was brought out of the realm of dreams by the steadfastness of the Serbians in the Great War, who lost their country but not their determination to live in it only if it were free and if their kinsmen were united with them; it was materialized at last by the Pact of Corfu and legitimized by the treaties of peace signed at Paris. Is that spirit to die now because the present is always more difficult than the future, because conciliation is more trying than battle? The works of too many patriots, living after them, say no. It will be good for Europe and good for the Jugoslavs—all of them—if that no is made definite and final as soon as possible.

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ITALY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

By Francesco Coppola

I

IT IS impossible to understand the age-long need which has always determined the general lines of Italian policy without taking account of the two principal factors which still govern Italy's present and future—the growth of her population and her geographical position in the Mediterranean.

In 1881 Italy's population was a little over 28 millions; in 1921 it had risen to 40 millions in Italy itself and about 8 millions abroad. Thus in forty years it has increased more than seventy per cent. The area of Italy is 310,000 square kilometers; that of the United States 9,400,000—or more than 30 times as much. Consequently Italy has 129 inhabitants per square kilometer while the United States has only 11. France—to take a European example which in history and geography more closely resembles Italy—with a population of 39 millions, has an area of 551,000 square kilometers; in other words, she has a smaller population but almost double the territory, and only 70 inhabitants per square kilometer. In spite of this, French colonial possessions extend over 12 million square kilometers and contain 50 million subjects, without counting Syria. On the other hand, Italy's colonial possessions have an area of only two million square kilometers and contain only one and a half million subjects. France is immensely rich in raw materials—iron, coal, phosphates—both at home and overseas; Italy proper and the Italian colonies lack them almost entirely. If the comparison be made with England, Italy is ten times as badly off.

This disadvantageous position entails many unfortunate consequences for Italy. The first is that she finds herself unable to provide her population with food, and that as far as concerns raw materials such as iron, coal, cotton, phosphates, and to a certain extent wheat, she is in bondage to foreign lands. This economic dependence inevitably leads to political dependence. Secondly, Italy cannot give employment to her growing population nor can she balance needed imports by developing her own industries; for, in facing foreign competition, these industries labor under an initial disadvantage resulting from the absence of raw materials and proper colonial markets. But the most terrible consequence of all is the forced emigration. For

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over thirty years hundreds of thousands of Italians have left their country annually; in 1913 the number was almost a million. A stream of young blood flows uninterruptedly from the open veins of Italy and spreads itself over the world, adding to the power and wealth of foreign competitors and soon becoming irrevocably lost to Italy. Thus Italy is being stifled by the poverty of her homeland and by her lack of colonial possessions; she is compelled to scatter her strength; *a priori*, she is not only disadvantageously placed in the field of international competition but is forced into a position of economic and political dependency. She is, in short, faced with this major dilemma: either she must conquer a position for herself proportionate to her needs and the possessions of others, which implies colonies which can offer suitable land to her children and proper raw materials to her industries; or else she must forever renounce her position as a great power, even as an independent power, and thus subject herself to continued emigration and accept a subordinate international status.

Now let us consider the second factor governing Italy's development—her geographical position in the Mediterranean. Italy is the only European nation which is exclusively Mediterranean. The major development of the other great Mediterranean nations, France and Spain, is on the coasts of the free Atlantic. England does not touch the Mediterranean, nor does Germany. The interests of Italy, on the other hand, are wholly in the Mediterranean; in fact she has no other means of communication with the outside world. Her territorial frontiers are insignificant in comparison with her coast lines; and ranged along the former stand the Alps, across which travel is difficult and expensive. Four-fifths of Italy's commerce is carried on—and cannot but be carried on—by sea. Her imports and exports, her means of emigration and expansion, her power and her freedom are on the sea; her future, her very life itself, is on the sea. Her destiny is inseparably linked with the equilibrium of the Mediterranean. The problem of the Mediterranean, together with that of her colonial expansion, is therefore the great, the capital historic problem for the Italy of today. There enter into it, as factors of a single problem, the problem of liberty, the problem of security, the national problem and the colonial problem.

II

Viewed thus in its fourfold aspect, how does this greatest of Italian problems stand today?

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From the point of view of liberty, England, though not really a Mediterranean power, holds Gibraltar and Suez, the two great Mediterranean ports, controls its central straits by her possession of Malta, and could, if she wished, cut Italy off completely from communication with the outside world, could starve and stifle her in a closed sea. She would have her at her mercy without firing a single shot.

From the point of view of security, Italy is compressed east, west and south by a semicircle of formidable naval bases—by France with Toulon, Corsica and Biserta—by England with Malta—by Greece with the Canal of Corfu—by Jugoslavia with Cattaro and Sebenico.

From the national point of view, there still are preserved along the entire Mediterranean coast the traces and traditions of Imperial Rome, of Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Amalfi, Ragusa, and of the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily; and hundreds of thousands of Italians, greatly outnumbering the children of any other European race, are scattered along the basin of the Mediterranean. But in Dalmatia they are Jugoslav subjects; in Constantinople and Smyrna they do business under Turkish sovereignty; in Syria they are under a French "mandate;" in Palestine and Egypt (50,000 in Egypt alone) they are under an English protectorate; over 150,000 in Algeria and Morocco have been forcibly denationalized by the systematic absorption of France; while over 100,000 more are desperately defending their nationality against this same absorption in Tunis, which owes its fertility and prosperity entirely to their labors.

Finally, from the colonial point of view, the Italian peninsula, projecting from Europe towards Africa, occupies the exact geographic center of the Mediterranean—the Mediterranean which Rome once dominated, which she united beneath her laws and sealed indelibly with her imperial imprint. Tunis, populated with Italians, is only a few hours' journey from Sicily. Vast and fertile Anatolia, rich in wheat and cotton and lumber and minerals, with a population not over three per square kilometer, in a rudimentary state of civilization, lies only three days distant from the Italian peninsula where the Italian people, one of the oldest and most civilized in the world, with an enterprising expansionist instinct, is being stifled by the poverty and insufficiency of its national territory. And yet, from Tangiers to Alexandria, the entire African coast of the Mediterranean, with

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the exception of the great Libyan desert, belongs either to France or to England. Italy, the Mediterranean nation *par excellence*, is virtually excluded from the control of the Mediterranean; she is imprisoned and besieged in her own ocean.

The reasons for this absurd—and from now on intolerable—situation are to be found in Italy's own past. It must first of all be remembered that it was only after centuries of dissension and servitude that Italy became a single state and only a little over a half-century ago that she became a European power; in other words, she arrived at the international feast when the big world plums, and especially the Mediterranean plums, had been already grabbed up by the older, better established powers. And, secondly, one must take into account the inevitable lack of experience of a newly formed state and its indifference to anything outside its own borders, absorbed, as it must always be at first, in strengthening its internal political, economic and spiritual forces. Thus in 1881 the Italian Government did not know enough to forestall, as it undoubtedly could have done, the French conquest of Tunis, and in 1882 it did not know enough to grasp the importance of the English invitation to participate in the occupation of Egypt. A third reason may be found in the unsatisfactory results of the war of liberation, which had left both the ethnic and geographic unity of Italy dangerously incomplete. As a result of this, Italy found herself limited in her actions by the existence of two different but equally serious obstacles. On the one hand, across the iniquitous northern and eastern boundaries, through the wide-opened gates of Trentino and Friuli, lay the perennial menace of Austrian invasion, paralyzing Italy's freedom of action and forbidding her any real political liberty, much less any attempt at overseas expansion. As proof of this it is enough to remember the proposed aggression of the Austro-Hungarian general staff at the time of the Libyan War. On the other hand, the silent but passionate longing for Italian lands and Italian brothers still in foreign servitude concentrated her every aspiration in a bitter Irredentism and so contributed to paralyze Italy's will—and her power of expansion.

III

To overcome these threefold obstacles, Italy needed to accomplish three things: to grow and to establish herself so firmly in her own estimation as to build up the determination

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and the power for her necessary expansion; to assert, especially against Austria, the indispensable premises of her national unity and strategical security—that is to say, her moral liberty and her political freedom; and to shatter the pre-existing international balance of power in order to acquire in the world and particularly in the Mediterranean a position in keeping with her needs.

The first of these conditions—essentially a subjective one—was speedily accomplished, and the meagre but hard won African colonies were both its reward and measure. The contrast between the feeble national will and lack of popular enthusiasm which paralyzed the conduct of the Ethiopian War for Eritrea, undertaken and directed by the solitary intelligence of Francesco Crispi, and the young fervor of enthusiasm and pride which only fifteen years later marked the declaration, the waging and the winning of the Turkish War for the conquest of Libya, show very clearly the rapid subjective development of Italy.

The European conflagration of 1914 offered her unexpectedly an opportunity to attain the two essentially objective aims. The international equilibrium from which Italy suffered was suddenly upset. It was a decisive moment in her history. She had to choose between the tremendous peril and sacrifice of intervention, with its possibilities of greater power, and a fainthearted neutrality, which meant resignation to her own inferiority. Between mortal risk and quiet resignation Italy, inspired by her expansionist instinct, did not hesitate; she chose the path of peril and sacrifice for the sake of the future. Thus inspired, Italy of her own free will entered the tremendous war; for this she endured, she fought, she won. In Italy—as indeed in other Entente countries—the reasons of justice and right and humanity for which the war against Germany was fought were a purely popular ethical myth. Even though the irredentist reasons of Trentino and Trieste were real motives, yet they were but partial, in some ways prejudicial, ones. In truth, although Italy entered the war to combat the German attempt at hegemony and to wrest her historic frontiers and the control of the Adriatic from Austria, Italy's traditional instinct really aimed to secure the indispensable modicum of security and freedom for Mediterranean expansion.

It was for this reason that in the fundamental pact of alliance —the Treaty of London of April, 1915—Baron Sonnino stipulated for Italian colonial compensations in Africa in the event of a Franco-English partition of the German colonies, and for a

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corresponding zone in Southern Anatolia in the event of Allied acquisitions in the Levant. It was also for this reason that, later on, when he got wind of the complete plan of a tripartite partition of the Ottoman Empire (disloyally concluded in 1916 between France, Russia, and England without the knowledge of Italy who had been fighting for more than a year by their side,) he forced the Allies to reopen the question and to give an adequate share to Italy. The new treaty was discussed in April, 1917, between Sonnino, Ribot and Lloyd George at Saint Jean de Maurienne—from which it took its name—and was concluded and signed in London in August of the same year. While leaving Constantinople and the Caucasus, Armenia and part of the Anatolian coast of the Black Sea to Russia, Syria and Cilicia to France, and Mesopotamia and the protectorate over Arabia to England, this treaty assigned to Italy southwestern Anatolia, the whole Vilayet of Aidin with Smyrna, the whole Vilayet of Konia with Adalia and a small part of the Vilayet of Adana. Palestine was to be internationalized under the collective control of the great allies. But this very treaty contained the poison which was later to weaken it. The new clauses regarding Italy depended upon Russian ratification; such ratification, doubtful enough in April, 1917, when the revolution in Russia was beginning, became manifestly unobtainable by the following August when the revolution was turning to Bolshevism. Shortly afterwards the Bolshevik catastrophe and the peace of Brest-Litovsk eliminated Russia simultaneously from among the belligerents and from among the great European powers. In any event this collapse (which, contrary to the terms of the original treaty, left Italy to face alone the forces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) should have given her an added rather than a lesser claim upon Allied gratitude. Instead, even before the war was over, the Allies hastened to avail themselves of the pretext of the absence of Russia's signature to denounce the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne. This was particularly true of Mr. Lloyd George who wanted at all cost to give Smyrna and western Anatolia to Greece, already selected by him as the vassal and the instrument of England's eastern policy.

Greece, indeed, guided by Venizelos who had been brought back to Athens by French bayonets, did after three years of equivocal neutrality and when Allied victory was no longer in doubt finally take the field. And in her few months of frontier

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warfare against the Bulgars she may perhaps have lost 500 men —or less than a thousandth part of Italy's losses. But Venizelos knew how to flatter President Wilson by standing as the champion of the principle of nationality, of "the rights of small nations;" he knew how to flatter France by posing on the one hand as the enemy of the "boche" Constantine, and on the other as an obstacle to Italian expansion; and above all he found grace in English eyes by offering himself as a political mercenary of England against the Turks and as a tool of British hegemony in the Levant. Thus it came about that in the spring of 1919 Lloyd George, taking advantage of the weakness and temporary absence of Orlando and violating the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne and the Armistice of Mudros, was able to arrange that Smyrna and the surrounding neighborhood be given to Greece. This was done with the full consent of Wilson, who, absolutely ignorant of European and Mediterranean affairs, blindly allowed himself to be governed by idealistic impulses and natural prejudices, and with the approbation of Clemenceau, who was only too delighted to be able to "jouer un mauvais tour à l'Italie." The Greeks occupied Smyrna and by sack and massacre provoked the first Turkish resistance, which later developed into the great victorious Kemalist reaction.

In order not to be left out of everything, Italy thereupon occupied Scala Nova to the south of Smyrna, Sokia in the valley of the Meander, and Adalia on the coast of Anatolia, whence detachments were sent into the interior as far as Konia. These troops were everywhere acclaimed by the Turks as liberators. But the Allies protested even against this occupation, and Tittoni, who succeeded Sonnino as head of the Italian delegation at Paris, had to exert all his eloquence in defending it. Not satisfied with having deprived Italy of Smyrna—the biggest city, the greatest port, the center of all the railroads—Lloyd George forced her to present the Dodecanese islands to Greece, who had never possessed them. They had been acquired by Italy in the Libyan War *prior to the Great War*, and were definitely promised her in the Treaty of London. Tittoni was weak enough to promise to cede them over to Greece in the accord concluded with Venizelos in 1919—which has since been denounced (1922). At the same time the original outright partition of the Ottoman Empire among the victors was changed by the Wilsonian formula into "mandates;" England was given a "mandate" over Mesopotamia

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and Palestine, France a "mandate" over Syria and Cilicia. Italy, deprived of Smyrna, should at least have been given a "mandate" over most of Anatolia.

IV

We now reach the spring of 1920 and the Conference of San Remo where the peace with Turkey, embodied later on in the Treaty of Sèvres, was drawn up. This treaty gave Greece Smyrna and all of the extensive region of Aivali and Ephesus; it gave France the mandate over Syria, and England that over Mesopotamia and Palestine; Italy alone was given nothing. Every one of her political acquisitions had disappeared. The Tripartite Agreement between Nitti, Lloyd George and Millerand conceded a "privileged economic zone" to Italy (corresponding to the cession of Cilicia to France) including the Vilayet of Konia and the greater part of the Vilayet of Brusa—a zone without ports or independent railroads, without either geographic or economic autonomy and very difficult of access. Greece, on the other hand, received directions from the Entente, in spite of the opposition of Italy, to crush the Kemalist resistance by armed force and to impose upon Turkey the execution of the Treaty of Sèvres. This absurd commission, which as Italy had foreseen was quite out of proportion to the military and economic strength of the Greeks, uselessly prolonged a dreadful and bloody war, brought about the fall of Venizelos and ended in the catastrophe of September, 1922, which was not only a Greek defeat but also an Allied defeat, a defeat of the West by the East.

As a result the Turks—whom Italy alone of the victorious powers had always treated in a friendly manner—to whom Italy had held open the ports of Adalia and Scala Nova at a time when the Anglo-Greeks and Franco-Armenians of Cilicia were besieging them in the Sea of Marmora, the Black Sea and the Aegean—whom Italy alone had managed to have recognized as belligerents and admitted to the London Convention of March, 1921—these very Turks obstinately refused to accept the Tripartite Accord, which guaranteed victorious Italy her last small advantage in the Levant. And thus it came about that the Turks, encouraged by the growth of Pan-Islamic solidarity, their alliance with the Soviet and the evident dissension within the Entente produced by the Franklin-Bouillon peace, little by little began to forget their benefactors and included even Italy

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in their growing anti-western xenophobia. This occurred just as Italy was withdrawing her troops from Konia and Adalia and finally to the Meander. So that at Lausanne not only was the Tripartite Accord no longer mentioned but the Turkish delegates demanded the total abolition of the capitulations—the diplomatic protection of foreign citizens in Turkey. This protection is of special concern to Italy since her subjects in Turkey greatly outnumber those of any other great power. Today the Turks are even asking for the return of the little island of Castelorizo, *which is victorious Italy's only remaining acquisition in the Mediterranean.* Even in Africa (if we except part of British Somaliland, promised Italy but not yet turned over to her,) she has not obtained from France or England, despite the Treaty of London, any compensation for the partition between these two powers of the whole German Colonial Empire.

V

In spite of victory, then, Italy's position in the Mediterranean has changed for the worse. It has changed for the worse as far as her liberty is concerned, for England has not only retained Gibraltar and Suez and strengthened her strategic control of the latter by acquiring the coast of Palestine and the great fortifications of Haifa, but at Chanak and Gallipoli she has laid hold of the Dardanelles, the third great Mediterranean port—and heaven only knows when she will let go! Italy's position has been adversely affected from the point of view of security, because the naval bases of the eastern coast of the Adriatic are no longer in the hands of Austria, which at least belonged to a political alliance hostile to the Franco-English group, but are now under the control of Jugoslavia and Greece, satellites respectively of France and England. Italy's position is worse, too, from the national point of view, for the Italians of Syria and Palestine have passed under the control of France and England, and the Italians in Turkey have lost even their capitulatory protection. Her position is also more unfavorable from the colonial point of view as she has had to reconquer Tripoli and Cyrenaica by force of arms and because the disproportion to her needs increases with the growth of her population. And, finally, her position grows more and more unsatisfactory from the point of view of a Mediterranean balance of power; for the new French acquisition of Syria and the new British acquisitions of Palestine

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and Mesopotamia are not balanced by any corresponding gains for Italy and have in consequence rendered the former Mediterranean status still more unfair and intolerable. This has been due partly to the greed and intemperance of others, but also to the innate weakness of Italian policy resulting from the profound depression which existed in Italy during the four years following the Great War, and particularly in 1920 and 1921.

But today Italy's internal condition (which is the really decisive factor) has undergone a radical and definitive change. Once more Italy has become conscious of her national and international strength. She has realized that her victory was unjustly mutilated and that it is her right to retrieve it. She is again fully conscious of her vital need for expansion and she is deliberately determined to satisfy it. The political security given by the possession of her natural frontiers and the virtual satisfaction of her irredentist claims, which the war has given, are today finally recognized as the long awaited stepping-stone to the solution of the great problem of the Mediterranean. Her external problem is the same today as before the war: either to expand in the Mediterranean or to resign herself to being stifled in it. But subjectively it has been solved, and solved forever; Italy will not allow herself to be stifled—and this inevitably means that she will expand. The problem is thus reversed. Its solution is no longer up to Italy but to the other great Mediterranean powers; they will either make room for Italy in the Mediterranean or she will make it for herself—in spite of them—against their wishes if need be.

Indeed, one has only to consider the last sixty years of Italian history to be sure of the future. Sixty years ago Italy did not even exist politically; she was but a mass of small communities, more or less subject to a foreign power. Today she is a great national state, victorious in the greatest war of history and fully conscious of her own strength. Two formidable historic powers—the temporal dominion of the Popes and the Austro-Hungarian Empire—have stood in her path and attempted to bar her way. Italy has overthrown them one after the other. If any other power should insist upon barring her way today, Italy will sooner or later know how to force it aside also.

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NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

By Alfred E. Zimmern

IT IS a common theme among the pessimists that the world has relapsed since the armistice into a temper of nationalism which renders illusory the hopes and dreams of internationalism so widely entertained during the war. These two movements or moods, nationalism and internationalism, are regarded as opposing and mutually exclusive, and the very evident ascendancy of the former is too often unquestioningly accepted as involving, if not the final defeat, at least the indefinite postponement of the latter. If this were really so the outlook for mankind would be black indeed, for nationalism, not only in Europe and America but throughout the world, is clearly a rising power. But the belief that nationalism and internationalism are incompatibles, although superficially plausible, is based upon ignorance of men and nations and a complete misunderstanding of the two movements themselves. As this belief is widespread and is acting as a serious hindrance to the advance of a real understanding between nations, it may be worth while to subject it to the test of a brief analysis.

Let us look first at the complaint brought by the disillusioned idealists and anti-nationalists against the post-war world. What is the general indictment that lurks behind the manifold grumbling about the Balkanization of Europe, the unreasonableness of France, the commercialism of Britain, the impenitence of Germany, the self-assertion of the Little Entente states and of the British Dominions, and the recrudescence of isolationism and Monroeism in the United States? We are often told, when these topics are mentioned, that the world has relapsed from the principles and standards of internationalism into a state of blind and unreflecting nationalism. But, when we look at the facts, this explanation is obviously insufficient. If nationalism were really rampant in East-Central Europe how could the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Jugoslavia ever have come into existence or been maintained for three years? How indeed could these three states and their Polish neighbor, all of them inhabited by a variety of peoples, have succeeded in preserving their identity at all? Or how, if nationalism were the world's ruling passion, could the British Commonwealth,

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with its manifold variety of peoples, have been held together? How could France have maintained the unity of her empire, or even of her newly-integrated home country? How could bilingual Belgium and trilingual Switzerland have survived? How, finally, could the United States have avoided serious conflicts with the unassimilated nationalisms of millions of her recent arrivals? Clearly, even if we grant that nationalism has been one of the forces at work, it has not been the most powerful and determining factor. What we really find, when we examine the counts of the indictment against the post-war world more closely, is that the policies complained of are quite as marked in the case of states consisting of several nations acting in coöperation as in those consisting of but a single nation. The real trouble in fact is not nationalism, in any of the many forms which that movement is capable of assuming, but something which may be described by the less romantic and more comprehensive designation of selfishness. In other words, the indictment should be drawn not against nations but against states; not against statesmen acting as the spokesmen of nationalities and the interpreters of nationalism but against statesmen acting as the instruments of sovereign states, great or small, uni-national or multi-national; not against Mr. Lloyd George as a Welshman, M. Briand as a Breton, President Masaryk as a Slovak, M. Venizelos as a Cretan, but against the policies of the British Empire, the French and Czechoslovak Republics and the Kingdom of Greece.

Some such relapse into selfish policies was almost inevitable after the strain of war and of war-time coöperation. We are not concerned here with its details or degrees—with the question whether it would have been possible, by wiser and more far-sighted statesmanship, to have prevented the pendulum from swinging back so far. What is important for our present purpose is to note that the existing political troubles of the world arise, not from the passions of nations but from the policies of states, and that it is with the adjustment of these policies, not with the sublimation of national passions, that constructive political work in the field of foreign affairs is concerned. Internationalism, in the political sense in which the word is customarily used, is in fact concerned with promoting the coöperation of states, not with controlling or even canalizing the undue self-expression of nations. It is unfortunate that this vital truth should be concealed by the vagaries of our political terminology. The League

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of Nations is, of course, a misnomer. It is a League of States, and it will be subject to perpetual misunderstanding if it is thought of as anything else. If its membership is extended to Ireland and not to Scotland, to Haiti and not to the Afro-American nation, it is because Ireland and Haiti have a distinct political status which Scotland and the negroes of the American continent cannot claim.

The work of internationalism, then—or, as it would be more properly called, the work of inter-state organization—is concerned with the mutual relations of sovereign bodies, however composed, and has nothing directly to do with the relations of nations.

From this it would appear that internationalism and nationalism, so far from being conflicting forces, do not impinge upon one another at all, and that the current impression to the contrary is completely unfounded. Nevertheless there is no smoke without fire and it will probably be felt that the above summary analysis does less than justice to the common view. Theoretically and in principle, it will be said, the two movements dwell on separate planes and ought not to conflict. But in point of fact they frequently do. Both in Europe and America there is a large admixture of what cannot be described otherwise than as nationalist sentiment in the conduct of affairs of state. To explain why this is so and to understand its significance we must subject the whole movement of nationalism to closer scrutiny.

It is difficult for a European to discuss this subject with Americans, not merely because of the differences in current nomenclature which have already been mentioned but because the whole course and direction of national sentiment has been different on the two sides of the Atlantic. The nations of the American continent, north and south, are not only far younger than the nations of Europe, but they have also come into existence by a wholly different historical process. Nevertheless the resultant sentiment of nationalism is of much the same character in America as in Europe, and the likeness will undoubtedly become more marked as the accidents of origin are smoothed out by the normal processes of development and the life of the two continents tends more and more to beat with a similar pulse and rhythm. The nationalism of America, or at any rate of the United States of America, to use a phrase of Mr. Van Wyck Brooks, is coming of age. The difference between fifteen and

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twenty-five in the life of an individual is akin to the difference between one century and three or four in the life of a nation. When the youth of fifteen has come to forty and the man of twenty-five has touched fifty, the common element in their experience becomes much more apparent. The same will be true of the inner experience of the nations of Europe and America as the generations go on.

What is nationalism? It is a movement or manifestation of the sentiment of nationality. It is often employed in a derogatory sense to denote a violent, intolerant and even aggressive manifestation; but it may equally well be employed of manifestations of a more equable temper. It will, however, conduce to clearness in the discussion to set aside the term nationalism and to deal rather with "nationality" and "nation" than with their manifestations in "nationalist" movements of various types. "Nationality," then, is the group-consciousness of which nationalism is one of the outward expressions; and a nation is a body of people bound together by the particular form of group-consciousness described as "nationality" or "the sense of nationality."

What is this particular form of group-consciousness which constitutes nationality? What is it that distinguishes a nation or body of people held together by a sentiment of nationality from other human groups and corporate bodies? It is easier to say what a nation is not than to define satisfactorily what it is. As we have seen, it is not a state or political body. The English nation is something different from the British Commonwealth and (though this is not so commonly recognized) the American nation is something different from the American Commonwealth. English nationality does not necessarily imply British citizenship, nor did Henry James cease to be an American when he surrendered his American citizenship during the war. Again, a nation is not a church or religious body. Turkish nationality is something different from Mohammedanism and Jewish nationality is something different from Judaism. It is true that practically all Turks are Moslems and that many, if not most, of those who share the sentiment of Jewish group-consciousness share also in the Jewish religious belief and observances; but the distinction between church and nation, though frequently denied by Jews, as the distinction between commonwealth and nation is denied by Americans, is nevertheless undeniable.

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Again, a nation is not a territorial unit. There are probably more Irishmen outside Ireland, more Norwegians outside Norway, more Jews outside Palestine, perhaps also more Scotsmen, Slovaks and Letts outside Scotland, Slovakia and Latvia than in the compact area of territory with which their national sentiments are related.

Again, a nation is not a race. None of the existing nations, not even those who, like the Jews, have laid most stress on purity of stock, correspond to the racial divisions and subdivisions of the anthropologists. The attempts made at repeated intervals by anti-Semitic writers such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain in Germany and less doctrinaire and more frankly abusive writers in America, to enlist racial prejudice in the cause of nationalist intolerance spring from pure obscurantism.

Finally, a nation is not a linguistic unit. The English-speaking peoples, whether under the Union Jack or not, are, with one exception, not English; neither are the German-speaking Swiss and Austrians German, nor the French-speaking Swiss and Belgians and Canadians French. Conversely, cases occur in which national sentiment exists not only, as in English-speaking North America and Australasia, without a national medium of expression, but without any common medium of expression at all. Among Welshmen, for instance, there is a large mass who know no Welsh and a very considerable body who know no English, and the same phenomenon can be found on a smaller scale in Ireland. Thus these two bodies of Welshmen and Irishmen, each of them participating consciously and deliberately in the deep-lying sentiment of their nationality, have no means of communicating with one another in speech—an example which is striking not so much for the light it throws on the vicissitudes of Welsh and Irish history as for the revelation it affords of the inadequacy of words as a means for the expression of thought. Another example of the same kind is the survival of the Jewish national consciousness in spite of the varieties of Jewish speech. A heroic effort is now indeed being made to revivify Hebrew and make it the current speech of the Jewish homeland in Palestine. This experiment, like the parallel experiment in Ireland, may possibly succeed; but it is possible that such success may be accompanied by a narrowing and stiffening of the national soul. On the other hand it may fail; but its failure, whilst in some ways regrettable, would certainly not entail the disintegration of the

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Jewish national personality, which has survived far deeper disappointments during its long and chequered career. The fact is that we are only at the beginning of the study of the inter-relations between language and personality, whether individual or national. Students of phonetics, of music, and of psychology have yet to join hands in investigating the sub-conscious region whence proceed the infinite variations of pitch and intonation, of idiom, metaphor and symbolism, of gesture and phonation which, to the student of modes of human expression, are like a warm covering of flesh and blood over the bare skeleton of a mere vocabulary.

If a nation is neither a state nor a church nor a race nor a geographical or linguistic unit, what is it? No definition is satisfactory in a matter which goes so deep or has such wide-spread ramifications, but the following, put forward by the present writer some years ago, may at least serve as a working basis: *a nation is a body of people united by a corporate sentiment of peculiar intensity, intimacy and dignity, related to a definite home-country.*

National sentiment is intense: men feel towards their nation as towards something which plays a large part in their life and inner experience. How intense this feeling is can be tested by the joy which every normally constituted man feels when, after sojourning in a strange atmosphere, he is once more brought into contact with his nationality, whether it be in a gathering in a strange country or on his return to his territorial base. The Englishman who feels a catch in his throat when he sees the white cliffs of Dover after an absence in distant lands (whether under the Union Jack or not) and the American who raises his hat to salute the Statue of Liberty as he steams into New York harbor, are both giving expression, not to their sense of patriotism or state obligation, but to their sense of nationality.

National sentiment is intimate: whether it be mainly compounded of influences of heredity (as in Europe) or of environment, as in the older Americans, or whether it be something newly acquired and deliberately cherished, as among the new arrivals, it is something that goes deep down into the very recesses of the being. Europeans are accustomed to believe that nationality is something so intimate that it cannot be acquired; nationality to them is akin to the family; it is the element of heredity which is paramount. Americans on the other hand are accustomed to

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the idea of an acquired nationality, but perhaps do not always sufficiently realize how intimate such an acquirement may be. The nationality of a European and the nationality of a recent American may perhaps be compared to a man's relation to his parents and his relation to his wife. Both sentiments are intimate; both can legitimately be compared, in the sphere of personal relations, to the sense of nationality in the wider sphere of corporate relations. But the one is hereditary, the other is elective. The European and the older American are born into their nation; the recent American has chosen his nationality and attached himself to it as to a wife. And, as parentage and marriage both go to make up a complete personality, so nationality, even among members of the older nations, will not be complete without an element of election and deliberation, or, to use a more appropriate term which the war brought home to so many, re-dedication.

National sentiment is dignified: it is on a larger and grander scale than a man's feeling towards a country or a parish, a club or a group of professional or other intimates, however warm such a feeling may be. No outsider can judge at what point a group attachment related to a definite territory reaches the degree of dignity entitling it to be described as national. Is Malta the home of a nation or is it a mere municipal port of call? Is Newfoundland the home of a nation or a mere elderly colony? Was Virginia ever a nation? Was the Old South ever a nation? Every student of these problems of sentiment must make these nice valuations for himself. In general we can only say that a nation is a nation, however small its territory, when its members feel it to be one and bear themselves accordingly. "It is not walls but men that make a city," said the Greek orator long ago; and it is not space and population but a sense of great things experienced in the past and greater lying before in the future, if we may thus deepen the implication of a phrase of Renan's, which constitutes the soul and consciousness of a nation.

Every nation has a home. The sentiment of nationality cannot gather simply round an idea or a memory or a programme or about some function or status, such as a priesthood or an aristocracy or a Legion of Janissaries. That does not mean that membership in a nation, participation in its common life and consciousness, necessarily involves residence within a fixed area, or contact with it by visits or economic ties. Conscious-

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ness can overleap the barriers and ignore the qualifications fixed by political authority for the world of statehood. No period of residence for naturalization is required to relate an Emmet born in New York to Ireland, or Theodor Herzl the Viennese journalist to Palestine, or to defer the acceptance by America of the whole-hearted offering of mind and spirit made by so many of those lately landed on her shores. But without the element of environment, the actual physical territory and what man has made of it, to form the framework and receptacle, as it were, of the national ideal, the sentiment of nationality would lose the warmth and concreteness which constitute so large a part of its appeal and would disappear into the clouds which have swallowed up so many unattached idealisms in the past.

We have defined nationality. Let us now observe it in operation in various parts of the world.

It is often said that the nineteenth century witnessed the dawn of nationality in Europe. Of some parts of Europe this may be true, but of Western and Central Europe, to which this judgment is usually applied, it is certainly untrue. Englishmen were already Englishmen in the days of Chaucer and Langland, and the France of Froissart and Villon was already France. So too Dante's Italy, though still only lisping Italian, was Italy and, in spite of the unhappy vicissitudes and backwardness of German political history, the men for whom Luther translated the Bible were already Germans. The history of the rise of the different European nationalities, from Ireland in the west to the various Slav and Baltic peoples in the east, would form a fascinating study, intertwined as it is with the influence of orthodoxy and heresy—where would Bohemia be without its Hussites or Slovakia without its Lutherans?—of music and folk-song, of backward-looking romanticism and forward-looking idealism, of intellectual leadership, from the universities and elsewhere, in history and philology (as in Fichte's amazing panegyric on the German language), in literature, geography and archaeology. But, until the French Revolution, this history is, broadly speaking, non-political. Government being still almost everywhere regarded, according to the feudal tradition, as the concern of a special class, the people, in whom the national consciousness was alive or in process of formation, did not concern itself with what are now-a-days loosely described as "national" problems and policies. The territorial lords of Europe, kings and electors

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and grand-dukes and bishops and petty barons, fought and plotted and intrigued, extended their frontiers hither and thither by conquest, marriage and barter and turned the balance of power this way and that, without enlisting in their causes (which would hardly bear too close a scrutiny), the deep lying passions and sentiments which were growing up in the hearts of the populations from whom they drew tribute. It was in England and Holland that nationality was first enlisted in the political field, but it was the great outburst of the French Revolution which mingled and muddied the two streams and brought about a confusion of thought and a perplexity in action from which the world, on both sides of the Atlantic and of the Pacific, has not yet recovered.

When President Wilson, picking up a phrase from the great mischief-maker Lenin, flung the slogan of "self-determination" into the world's arena he was using a word capable of many interpretations. But the majority of mankind, under the influence of vague nineteenth-century shibboleths, understood him to be associating himself with the doctrine that every nation has a right to be a sovereign state. "It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions," said John Stuart Mill, "that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities." What Mill thus cautiously stated as a maxim of convenience (how in all sincerity could an inhabitant of the United Kingdom of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland put it any higher?) had long since been elevated by more ardent liberals into a gospel of indefeasible right. The necessary result of such a doctrine, as Lenin foresaw and desired, was disintegration—the break-up of that bourgeois nationalist society which he so detested.

A survey of the workings of political nationalism and of the theory of self-determination is instructive. A gospel that claims to be of universal validity and application can only show results in a limited region of Europe and Western Asia. It has helped to break up the Austro-Hungarian Empire but it has left trinational Switzerland untouched; it has disintegrated Russia—if indeed, for most Russians, there ever was, in the deepest sense, a Russia—but it has not brought independence either to Armenia or the Ukraine. It has torn Southern Ireland from Westminster but has left Scotland, Wales and Ulster where they were. It has taken German-speaking Alsace from the German Empire and

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restored it to France; it has rescued the Germanic peasants of Flanders from their invading kinsmen and reunited them with their French-speaking fellow-citizens. It has destroyed the dream of an Illyrian Republic and brought a joint Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom into existence. Finally, having demolished three autocratic empires, it has left the indescribably heterogeneous and multi-national dominion of Britain standing upright amid the débris of imperialisms. In other words, national sentiment, whilst proving an invaluable ally for a movement of resistance against the abuses of misgovernment, as in Austria-Hungary, or against the pin-pricks of misunderstanding, as in Ireland, is unable by its own unaided efforts to make the political map conform more nearly to its pattern design.

Turn now to America. What application can be found, either in North or South America, for Mill's doctrine? Here it is not a question of redrawing a political map so as to carve new frontiers to fit old and existing nations. It is a case of fitting nations into existing frontiers, or rather of helping nations to find themselves and be themselves within the fixed framework of an established political society. The malady of Europe has not arisen, as is so often said, from its nationalisms. It has arisen from a simpler cause, from bad government. Europeans have had to wage a long fight, of which the recent war, we may hope and believe, is the last phase, against autocracy and its consequent injustice, not against the denial of "rights" to "nations," but against the denial of justice and liberty to men and women. The malady of America, on the other hand, the growing restlessness and perplexity of which every student of the United States must be conscious, arises not from bad government (Europe has had to suffer more, in these last years, than America from the defects of the American constitutional machine) but from its nationality problem or problems. It sounds paradoxical yet it is substantially true to say that each continent has wrongly diagnosed its malady. The Europeans who have given their lives, from Ireland to Poland and the Ukraine, for the cause of self-determination and an independent national republic have been waging a hopeless battle for an unrealizable ideal. In all three countries, diverse as is their present status, Mill's coincidence of government with nationality is a practical impossibility. What their champions have really been fighting for, if they only knew it, has been conditions of government which would enable them to be

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themselves—in other words, for the supreme political goods, for Justice and Liberty,—Justice and Liberty for all dwellers in Ireland, for all dwellers in Poland and the Ukraine, irrespective of race, religion or nationality.

Americans, on the other hand, who have been much concerned in recent years over the external problems of their community life, are beginning to look back on their muck-raking campaigns with an uneasy sense that they have not probed the real roots of the national dissatisfaction. It is true that American government and American society leave much to be desired; but surely the real problems of America are national, belong, that is, to the intimate region of mind and spirit which has been spoken of above. Let Europe, from Galway to Lemberg, from Algeciras to Helsingfors, consolidate its newly established democracies, establish firm guarantees of mutual protection among its states, reduce its infantile mortality, introduce labor-saving science into its homes and factories and ameliorate its plumbing. These are the tasks, practical and positive, whether high or humble, for a continent, such as Europe now is, of self-conscious and satisfied nationalism. America's domestic problems are of a different order. They are not so much political and social (the tasks in this region are clearly indicated and not difficult of accomplishment by an energetic and organizing people,) as national in the deepest sense—to work inwards from the influences of environment to the unalterable values of heredity, to discover the quality and substance of the diverse populations that have married themselves to this great continent, and to make the men and women and, still more the children, who have entered into the new national consciousness at home and at ease, in the deepest region of their manifold natures, in the home of their choice.

Once the problems of nationality and the problems of statehood and citizenship have been disentangled, they will easily yield to treatment. It is from their century-old confusion that so much mischief and bloodshed have arisen, whether in the insane German design to base the dominion of the world on the "culture," that is, the intimate expression of a single people, or in the futile and suicidal efforts, now happily discredited, of the straitest sect of "Americanizers." The way is becoming clear, then, both in Europe and America, for a real internationalism, in the truest and purest sense of the word.

For internationalism, properly understood, is not contact

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between states; nor is it contact between supernationalists and cosmopolitans who have torn themselves loose from affiliation with their nation. It is at home neither round the green table of the diplomatists nor "above the mêlée" with the minority minds. True internationalism is contact between nations in their highest and best and most distinctive representatives and manifestations. The true contact between the West European national triangle which is so disquieting the world must be a contact, not between trust-magnates or labor-leaders or even statesmen from the three countries, but, so to speak, between Shakespeare, Molière and Goethe. It is the most characteristic figures of a national literature who are also the most international, and it is through them that understanding must come. Our efforts at internationalism have failed hitherto because they have followed the line of least effort. Any fool can book a ticket for a foreign country, just as any fool can learn Esperanto. But contacts so established effect nothing. They tell us no more than that the German or the Frenchman is a human being, a father, a workman and a lover of beer or coffee, which we knew before. It is through a deeper exploration and enjoyment of the infinite treasures of the world's nationalities, by men and women whose vision has been trained and sensibilities refined because they themselves are intimately bound up with a nation of their own, that an enduring network of internationalism will some day be knit and a harmony of understanding established in a world of unassailable diversity.

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THE AMERICAN FARMER AND FOREIGN POLICY

By Arthur Capper

AMERICAN farmers have shown a keen interest in the foreign policy of the United States ever since that fateful summer day in 1914 when a war-crazed German Government sent its armies marching across the border into unhappy Belgium. This naturally continued until the war ended, and more recently the sub-normal price levels for agricultural products have brought the economic side of foreign markets into the foreground. These foreign markets have been helpful in taking some of our surplus, especially of grains. Without them it is likely that the abnormal decline in the purchasing power of American farmers would have been still more evident.

Taking world-wide conditions into full consideration, I should say that our foreign trade in farm products has held up very well. We sent abroad more agricultural produce last year than ever before in our history, with the single exception of the preceding year, 1921. We are exporting now more than twice as much in farm products as in any year in the decade preceding the World War. So far as the demand from Europe goes, it is possible that this will have some tendency to decline, for reasons I will outline presently, but I hope we will make gains in other directions.

It is well to keep in mind that our sales of farm products in foreign markets—more than 16,351,000 tons in 1922—are only a small part of our agricultural production. In 1922 they amounted to but 6 per cent measured in tons, and only about 12 to 15 per cent when measured in dollars. The other 94 per cent of our products is consumed right here in America, in the markets close at home, which in the long run are likely to be the best. But it is not easy to regulate production, because of the variation in the acreages and the yields, and there doubtless will always be times when we will have a surplus to export, although there are some students of American agriculture who think that we will in time become a food importing nation.

If this occurs I presume American farmers will lose some of the present intelligent interest they have in foreign markets. And I might remark in passing that if they encounter many

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more such "hard-boiled" periods of deflation as that following the war so many folks may leave the farms that we will actually have a food shortage. Without question this recent period of depression has had the effect of driving hundreds of thousands of people off the farms and into the cities, most of whom will never return. What happened is indicated in a terribly real way by the index price of farm products. Measured on the 1913 averages, this stood at 238 in May of 1920; in a year and a half it had declined to 94. This brought ruin to tens of thousands of farmers; many were absolutely unable to pay their living expenses. They were still struggling with abnormal labor and material costs, and were unable, quite generally, to meet them. Without the foreign markets the price levels in this time of surplus production doubtless would have been much lower.

It was under conditions of this kind that the Farm Bloc came into being. Its members believed they could render the best service to the country in general if they made a real effort to help out the business—agriculture—which was in the worst condition. The Departments of Agriculture and Commerce did a great deal of efficient work with the foreign market situation, with the idea of moving as much of the surplus produce abroad as possible, which naturally would have a beneficial effect on price levels. I am sure that without all of this effort the situation would have been much worse than it was.

I am rather inclined to the belief that the agriculture of Europe will continue to improve, just as it has been doing. Certainly the farmers there have been doing a much better job of producing than have the workers of the cities—which, by the way, usually is the rule in periods of trial. The industrial life of Russia especially has declined until it has almost vanished. The farmers there, on the other hand, actually have grown some food for export, although it probably could all have been used in some of the famine-stricken areas.

An interesting agricultural evolution has been taking place in Central Europe and in Russia in the breaking up of the large estates and the placing of the land in the hands of the peasants. The first effect of this great change, extending over tens of thousands of square miles, may be but little—in fact in some cases it is possible that production may decline. But ultimately I am quite sure that the peasants will greatly increase it, and by just that much the American market for farm produce will be injured.

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I believe it would be well for the American farmers to keep in mind the fact that it is likely that the European demand may be very light ten years from now, and this seems to be generally understood; at least I hear more or less talk about it. These calculations are of course based on the idea that Europe will settle down, and also show more of a tendency than it is indicating just now to "settle up".

Here is where we encounter the big stumbling block in any of our calculations in regard to the folks over in Europe. The racial feuds, fanned through generations of strife, are not helpful in working out methods which are economically sound. Take the present dead-lock in the Ruhr Basin for example; it is difficult to see just where France and Germany are to "get off." American farmers "got off" in a hurry, however; they have been met with an immediate decline in the export of food to Germany. Doubtless this will be continued, and it is one reason why I think it is probable that our agricultural exports will be somewhat less this year than they were in 1922.

But if Europe will place itself on a sane basis, and get to work, giving its farmers a chance, it will take less American food. This will be especially true when Russia becomes economically sane and gets its national life on a logical basis. And Russia will do it; perhaps this will take ten years, or more, but it is coming, and when it comes the Russian farmers will pile food into the rest of Europe on a scale that may all but place the American farmers out of business in that section of the world.

In the meantime, however, we have a brief period in which to do several things. One is to find other foreign markets, and some progress is being made in the Far East. Then American farmers also have been making some gains in exporting special produce, such as purebred live-stock to South America. This is a high class type of business that is helpful to both sides, perhaps especially in that it leads to a better understanding of the problems of the other fellow.

I look for the greatest increase in the demand for our farm products to come from the industrial life of America. There is, in my judgment, a great future before American manufacturing, commerce and trade, which will absorb millions of additional workers. When these workers are employed at good wages, as at present, they will buy farm products in a liberal way. The proportion of the American people engaged in industrial life

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doubtless will continue to increase, just as it has been doing. At the first census 90 per cent of our people were rural; now only 30 per cent live on farms. This proportion may decline until every farm family is feeding four or five city families. The American farmer is the most efficient farm worker in the world, or this would not be possible; an American will produce four or five times as much as a farmer in Germany or France. The American does this with broad, fertile fields, big machinery and brains.

Yes, the American farmer has made the greatest records in production ever achieved in this world. In general he has been a better producer than salesman—but he is learning fast. Largely through the power of cooperative effort he is making it possible for salesmanship to be applied in the handling of his products. Some excellent pioneering in this way has been done by the cooperative raisin growers of California in foreign fields, especially in England and in the Far East.

But inasmuch as the American farmer does have a high productive power, it is evident, also, that his scale of living must be maintained on a higher plane than that of the farmers of other lands. This brings up before us another angle of this complex matter of our relationship to other countries, that of the tariff on products which are imported. It is not possible for us to let the American farmer down very long to a subnormal standard of living, although it seems we have been trying our best to do it for the last three years. No—thank God—when the returns in any industry in America become inadequate it is possible for the men in it to shift into some other business. This, by the way, is one of the very real benefits of the system of life which we have here in America. One can see this process working right now, in the shifting of hundreds of thousands of people from the farms to the cities. And this process will go on until the farmer's dollar has as high a purchasing power as that of the city man. There is an especially good illustration of this movement within a radius of 150 miles of Detroit, to which the farm workers have been attracted by the offer of high wages in the automobile plants.

When we take these facts into consideration it seems to me that the average farmer's position ought to become evident even to a "hard-boiled" manufacturer who is concerned with getting food for his workers as cheaply as possible. All that the farmer

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asks in the way of tariff protection is the same as that which the industrial life of the nation gets. Now that is simple, isn't it? From the standpoint of justice it seems to me that it is reasonable enough. And if the farmer doesn't get it he will leave the farm and go into other lines, and then in time food will become abnormally high. All that is logical. But there are people to whom God evidently didn't give the mental equipment required to grasp this thought, or else they don't wish to see it. Therefore we have a considerable procession of men who journey to Washington insisting that the manufacturing interests should have adequate protection but that agriculture should not. All of which I think is "bunk".

I have been much impressed in my experience at Washington, by the way, with the infernal selfishness which is so evident at the hearings on the tariff questions. Too many of our people are "after theirs" in the tariff problems, but equally insistent that other lines of business—producing materials they must buy—should get out on the free trade limb. After seeing so much of that in Washington, it has been a great source of personal pride to me, coming from a great farming state, that the agricultural interests have shown such a sensible attitude. They are not asking for excessive rates on farm products, all they are insisting on is that they get the same protection other folks have. It has been mighty fine to see the way the great farmers' organizations have lined up on this.

I fancy that in this sugar steal which is now attracting so much of the attention of the people of the country we are seeing an excellent illustration of what might happen if we allow agriculture to decline and depend on other countries for much of our food. America does have a sugar industry, but it is not in a very happy condition, from the standpoint of either the sugar manufacturer or the grower of beets or cane. I regret to say that we are still depending to a large extent on the producers of Cuba, who evidently have a most cordial and cooperative feeling toward working together, when they can cooperate in putting their hands a little deeper into the pockets of the average American family. Don't forget that these folks live in another nation, thus escaping from our laws, and also that we use about 1½ billion dollars' worth of sugar a year.

Just think what would occur if something like this were going on in most other lines of food. Isn't the necessity for keeping a

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real American agriculture alive evident? Remember you can't make a peasant out of the American farmer, for he will merely quit and go to town, and you can't feed the city workers at the minimum cost unless you have an efficient and contented agriculture to back them up. Is it any wonder that the Farm Bloc has worked so hard to salvage the wreck of our greatest business from the slough into which the deflation period dropped it?

Another thing which Congress can do to help agriculture, and which is vital from the standpoint of national defense, is that of getting an adequate supply of nitrates, our most expensive fertilizer. I will confess that the delay over Muscle Shoals has made me very weary, and the farmers in general are getting impatient over the lack of action which has been so evident over this extremely important matter. A farmer from another state, a graduate of an agricultural college and a leader in one of the important farmers' organizations, told me a few days ago that "if some of our alleged representatives in Congress don't do something on this matter next session we'll shove over a brick wall on someone." I know that the feeling among many of the leaders in farm organizations is extremely bitter over the way this matter has been allowed to drag along.

The cost of nitrates used in fertilizer is altogether too high. This is commonly admitted. We have been paying tribute for years and years to the country which has the only large source of this essential commodity, Chile. Most of the revenue of that government for a generation has come from an export tax, something which America has never had, on this supply. And yet, despite that fact, in those dark days of March, 1918—when the German drive had started on the Western Front, and the destiny of civilization hung, in the balances of Fate, on our power to get our American sons on that grim line of hate and woe and machinery and death that we called the front, quickly and completely equipped—Chile shut down the mines. We were already paying three times a normal price for their nitrates, and still we were slapped thoroughly in the face right at a time when our very existence was at stake. It required, by the way, some very fine work on the part of that great head of the War Industries Board, Bernard Baruch, to get this extremely difficult situation straightened out. Doubtless this incident has had something to do with the enthusiasm which Mr. Baruch has had for the development of the Muscle Shoals proposition; that and his sincere interest

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in American farmers, and his desire to see them get fertilizers at fair prices.

I mention this to show the thin ice on which we are skating with the nitrate supply. Nitrates are essential in making explosives. We have no adequate supply. That means that if a foreign nation were to gain control of the sea we would be out of luck, to say the least, for at once our ammunition supply is cut off. Isn't that a plain enough reason why Muscle Shoals should be developed, and at once? Then we will have a real supply of this essential material, from the air, and produced by power which is now going to waste. But instead of getting right at the business in hand we pile up masses of alleged information about Henry Ford's offer and other offers and produce large amounts of inflated atmosphere, and do nothing. And then one of these days, if war should come again, we will wish that we had registered a little more action.

One of the attractive features of this whole proposition is that the nitrates produced in time of peace can be used on our soils, supplying perhaps one of the best illustrations of the use of war materials for peace purposes known. Nitrogen is the most expensive element in fertilizers, and the available supply is deficient in a large proportion of our soils, especially in the South. I regret to say that the experimental work of our agricultural colleges is indicating year by year an increasing need for more nitrogen even on the great grain-producing soils of the Middle West. I know that one can produce this nitrogen from the air by growing legumes, such as alfalfa and the clovers, and we are doing this more and more, but I know also that we are buying an increasing amount of the commercial form, right here in my own state of Kansas, where we used foolishly to pride ourselves on the fact that we would never need fertilizers. Doubtless this need will increase with the years.

In the Muscle Shoals proposition we have matters of foreign and domestic policy, national defense and highly technical soils problems, all bound up together. Again I feel that the farmers have taken a reasonable attitude on the matter. They believe that the Muscle Shoals plants should be developed as soon as possible. A great many believe, as I do, that Henry Ford is the man to handle this project. It is a matter of common knowledge among our farm leaders that rapid progress has been made in the chemical processes connected with the fixing of nitrogen in

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metal cylinders by the use of the electric spark, and that this is being done in a big way in Europe, especially in Germany and Norway. We have the power and we certainly have the air. The farmer wants to see this energy now going to waste hooked up and put to work. So far as the problem of who shall do it is concerned goes, he regards this as a minor matter. The average farmer would like to see these nitrate plants developed as a private proposition, as he is somewhat pessimistic toward government ownership in general. It seems to him that it ought to be easy to determine which offer is the best. Then if private capital will not take hold of the proposition on a fair basis, he thinks that the government should do it. Anyhow he wants something done, without any more delay.

All through the whole matter of our foreign policy the farmer takes the same simple, direct and sensible attitude such as I have outlined with the tariff and Muscle Shoals problems. He wants America to be fair and just with other nations. He is proud of the high standard of honor which this nation has always had in its dealings with other peoples. He wishes that maintained.

And he does not want us to become tangled up to the point where we must send American boys away to die in foreign lands to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for some foreign nation. A live and let live policy is his motto. He insists that America shall get justice, and that the nation shall place itself in position, as by providing an adequate supply of nitrates, so that it can protect its rights in case of foreign aggression. He is not interested in maintaining the dignity of foreign kings. And he deplores the tendency, evident at times in the history of our foreign affairs, to use the power of the American Government in backing up the somewhat doubtful claims of American business interests in other lands. In this connection it is well to say that he views the activities of certain American oil interests in other countries with pessimism. He wants justice, no more, no less, for America and for the people with whom this country deals.

And when the dark days of war come, as they did in '98 and again in '17, the farmer does his part, and more. The fighting spirit of the young men from the farms has always been a matter of pride with Americans, running down from Lexington to that greatest of all battles in which American troops were ever engaged, the Argonne. And the older people worked in the fields longer and harder and better, and produced more abun-

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dantly. Indeed, the fact that American agriculture was geared up so high during the late war perhaps had much to do with the suffering during the deflation period, in that there was an overproduction of agricultural products considered from the basis of peace-time needs.

In the matter of immigration the farmers are inclined to believe in a cautious policy. In general the rural people favor the entrance of desirable folks, from Northern Europe especially, but they are inclined to look with disfavor on making America the dumping ground of the undesirable classes of the Old World. Most farmers believe that laws can be made, perhaps a little better than the one we have now, which will efficiently separate the grain from the chaff, and give us immigrants of the most desirable quality who will in time become real American citizens.

So far as economic conferences go, the farmer is inclined to favor them. He is able to work out many of his problems in community, county, state, and national meetings. He thinks that in gatherings of this kind one gets a better understanding of the views and ideas of the other man, and that from this there can be worked out a settlement which provides justice for both. It is on a basis of justice that the farmer wishes to see our foreign policy conducted.

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THE WORLD IRON AND STEEL SITUATION IN ITS BEARING ON THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF THE RUHR

By C. K. Leith

NATIONS have quarreled about economic matters from time immemorial, but it is only in comparatively recent years that mineral resources have become an important cause of war. The reason for this is simple. The world is just beginning the intensive use of these resources. The curves of production are steeply rising—so steeply, in fact, as to indicate that a greater volume of mineral resources has been used since 1900 than in all the preceding recorded history of the world. Within this short time the question of the possession of these resources has changed from one of incidental concern to nations to one of vital import to their prosperity and even to their existence; it is becoming clear that the nation without control of certain essential minerals, such as coal, oil, and iron, can look forward to a position of inferiority, both in war and in peace.

Whether it is right or wrong that economic considerations of this kind should play a dominating part in international affairs is another question; their influence is here merely recorded as a fact. Even if in the best thought of the world the resulting industrial development should come to be regarded as wrong from ethical or other standpoints, it seems unlikely that effective means for curbing it can be devised for many decades; in the meantime it may be safely assumed that the international importance of mineral resources will grow rather than dwindle.

The influence of economic factors on international relations is now pretty generally recognized, but the factors are so varied and complicated that this recognition is scarcely more than academic and as yet it does not seem largely to influence public thought. The problem needs simplification, definition, and better perspective. The following sketch attempts to show how a few salient facts relating to one of the great natural resource problems affect international relations.

WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY

Iron ore deposits are known in all continents and in nearly every country; they number thousands. The aggregate reserve

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can be figured in units of tens of billions of tons—enough to meet all probable requirements of the world for some hundreds of years.

Only a few of the many deposits have yet been heavily drawn upon, because large production of iron and steel requires many favorable conditions: a huge ore reserve of a suitable grade in a limited area, accessibility to a large coal supply of proper grade for use in smelting, accessibility to population large enough and with sufficient industrial development to furnish demand, and control by people with organizing ability, driving power, technical skill, and capital to convert the ore into form adapted to demand. Once established, the inertia of invested capital helps to maintain production at a few places in spite of potentially favorable conditions in undeveloped regions.

The relative importance of these factors is not the same in all the great centers of production. The tonnage, grade and distribution of the iron ore are fundamental to the iron and steel business, but they are not the only factors establishing its locus, and in some cases they are not the dominant ones. A low-grade ore may overcome handicaps caused by other conditions; or a high-grade ore may be useless because the other requisite conditions are not present. With overwhelming demand and energetic management, the handicap of low grade and distant location of ores from consuming centers may be overcome. It is almost impossible to measure the exact effect of any one of these factors independently of the others. However, the net result of their interaction is measured with some accuracy by production figures over a long period of years. Where production has been large and continuous it may be assumed that the favorable conditions on the whole outweigh the unfavorable ones. The distribution of past production therefore discloses the nodal points or foci of the many contributory influences localizing the industry and affords a standard from which we may view and interpret the changes of the present and future.

With the above considerations in mind we may survey the distribution of the world's iron and steel industry. Stripped of detail and qualification it is as follows:

The Three Main Geographic Units of the Iron and Steel Industry. For convenience and brevity we may use the term "unit" to designate the whole network of iron mines, coal mines, transportation lines (water and rail), blast furnaces, steel plants, finishing plants, and factories using iron and steel products,

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which goes to make up each of the principal geographic groups in the iron and steel business.

The iron and steel industry is confined mainly to countries bordering the North Atlantic basin. Of these countries the United States, England, and a third group consisting of Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, are preeminent, together accounting for no less than ninety-three per cent of the post-war steel-producing capacity of the world. Of this the United States produces more than the other two combined, and about half of the total production of the world. In addition, these countries control miscellaneous production in other countries.

The remaining production is scattered through many countries, including Spain, Sweden, Russia, Austria, South Africa, China, India, Australia, Mexico, and the countries of South America. These are small units developed to meet local demands, and they are on the increase both in number and size; but no one of them seems to have all the conditions necessary for the development of a really great industry comparable to the first three units named.

The dominant features of the United States production are the great reserves of high-grade iron ore around Lake Superior, the extensive use of the Great Lakes for cheap transportation of Lake Superior ore to the Lower Lakes, and the smelting of the ores principally in the region contiguous to the Lower Lakes, because of its possession of abundant coking coal and because of its proximity to centers of consuming population. There are other large reserves of iron ore and coal in the United States, such as those around Birmingham, Alabama; but they support only subsidiary units of the iron and steel industry. Iron ores in relatively small quantities are imported from Cuba, Chile, Sweden, and Newfoundland, not because there is insufficient ore available in the United States but because foreign ores are more cheaply available than Lake Superior ores to some of the plants near the seaboard. The United States is largely dependent on imports for the various alloy metals, the "sweeteners" necessary in the making of steel, such as manganese, chromium, tungsten, vanadium, etc. Minerals carrying these elements do not seem to be present in the United States in adequate grade and quantity to meet requirements.

The English iron and steel industry depends mainly on low-grade iron ore from four districts in England, of which the

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Cleveland district in northeastern England is the most important, followed by the Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, and Cumberland-Lancashire districts. These districts have access to large supplies of coking coal and to the ocean. The low grade of the iron ores requires importation of high-grade ores, for mixture, from northern Sweden, northern Spain and to a less extent from North Africa. The ferro-alloy minerals are largely imported, as in the United States.

The great iron-ore supply of Continental Europe is centered in northeastern France, including Lorraine, and overlaps into Luxembourg. The coal beds which furnish the coke for the smelting of this lie mainly in Westphalia (in western Germany), with extensions into Belgium and northern France. The detached Saar basin furnishes an inferior and relatively small supply. The iron and steel industry based on these raw materials is localized principally in the region of the German coal fields, with subordinate centers in Belgium, northern and northeastern France, and in the Saar region. The valleys of the Rhine and its tributaries connect the coal and iron ore fields. The industry is to be regarded as a single great unit, regardless of national boundaries. The low grade of the iron ore favors the use of considerable amounts of higher-grade ores in mixtures, and thus it is that ores are imported from northern Sweden and Spain, together with miscellaneous supplies from other sources. The ferro-alloy minerals are mainly imported.

All three of the great units, in the United States, in England, and in western Europe, are mainly located close to the source of the coking coal and to the consuming population, rather than close to the iron ore deposits. For all three the dominant ore supply is at home, but some ores are imported for considerations of grade and cost. All are reaching farther and farther afield for the proper quantities and grades of iron ore and ferro-alloy ores. Thus it is that there has been considerable activity in the development of the iron ores of northern Africa. The pre-war Agadir incident was related to an attempt of the French and Germans to forestall each other in gaining control of certain Moroccan deposits. Much attention has been given in recent years to the development of great reserves of high-grade ore as far away as Brazil. The distance is upwards of 5,000 miles from any one of the primary units, yet the grade is so high and the quantity so enormous that the time seems to be approaching

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when this ore will be drawn upon. The United States has been less active than the others in its attempts to secure subsidiary outside supplies because its need for them has been less urgent; nevertheless it has been active in recent years in Cuba, Chile, Brazil, Central America, and Mexico.

The Probable Continuance and Growth of Power of the Three Principal Units. Minor units of the iron and steel industry are developing to meet local demands in many parts of the world. Presumably this development will continue in the future, more or less concurrently with the growth of the consuming capacity of the population. There are many places where the raw materials can be brought together, but few where there are not some handicaps of grade or quantity, still fewer where adequate supply is combined with large demand, and not one which promises to compare with any of the three existing units. The three major units have continuously become more and more firmly entrenched in world position. This situation is determined by conditions which cannot be essentially changed by human enactment. Nature put the right combination of materials there, and other conditions of environment caused the growth of a population of sufficient size and consuming capacity.

Capital investments have accumulated to towering size in the three primary units, and it is difficult to transfer this capital en masse to other centers. As an argument for the development of a great iron and steel industry in a particular locality it is often said that it possesses both coal and iron ore and a certain demand for iron and steel products. The reason why this argument is often answered in the negative is that the local demand covers the whole range of iron and steel products, and that while in the aggregate it may amount to a considerable tonnage it is not sufficient to take care of the output of each of the many hundred of supplementary manufacturing and finishing plants which are necessary to make the raw material ultimately available to the consumer. For instance, farm machinery may constitute one of the items going to make up the total demand, but the demand for farm machinery may, in itself, be of too small volume to warrant the establishment of all the necessary plants. Even if locally established, the supplementary operations are handicapped by competition with the quantity production of the primary units. The supplementary elements of any one of the primary units are so thoroughly established that, even if the

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crude iron and steel were to be produced in some new location, much of it would have to undergo long transportation to plants which put it in the form desired by the consuming public.

Thus it is that the increasing world demand is first met by further development of the great primary units of the iron and steel industry. Instead of moving plants out to meet the demand, the established ones reach out and bring in any additional raw materials that may be required. As transportation improves it is possible to reach further and further afield.

In short, it is probably beyond the power of individuals, of governments, or even of combinations of governments, to cause any essential shift in the great centers of iron and steel production.

It is perhaps not generally understood that the emergence of the iron and steel industry into its present powerful position has been a matter of only a few years. More steel has been produced since 1910 than in all the preceding history of the world. Even the conditions existing the year prior to the war cannot be regarded as adequate precedents to the impending situation. The industry is developing power, if it has not already done so, to shake racial and political traditions and even governments. All of us, individually and collectively, are creating the ever-mounting demand which requires the expansion of the industry, and it would require definite and overwhelming considerations to cause us to forego our individual demands for jackknives, automobiles, steel buildings, railroads, farm machinery, and the thousand other iron and steel products to which we have adapted our conditions of living. If we continue our demands it is questionable whether any political control can prevent their satisfaction, and, in consequence, the continued growth in power of the primary units of production.

The part played by the world's primary iron and steel units in the war offer interesting evidence of their power. Early in the war a well-known American engineer, Mr. James R. Finlay, of New York, predicted Germany's success on the basis of her then complete possession of the Franco-German unit. To illustrate his point he drew a picture of the resources in the Great Lakes area of the United States, which includes the great part of the iron and steel industry, and attempted to show that this region could probably stand off all the rest of the United States in a war. This view was much criticised at the time, but the successive

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events of the first three years of the war seemed to bear out its correctness. It was only when the third and largest unit, that of the United States, came into action that the defeat of Germany became certain.

Relations of Governments to the Three Primary Units. The operations of the principal units of the iron and steel industry have become so large and so intimately related to national prosperity that governments are beginning to participate in one way or another in their control. Before the war the German Government took an active part in the organization and direction of the German steel industry, and during the war all governments found it necessary to exercise a considerable degree of supervision. Since the war the European governments, including the English, have retained a large measure of control through embargos, preferential tariffs, bounties and, in certain cases, even direct financial participation. The United States Government alone since the war has left the business exclusively in private hands. And now there is the French occupation of the Ruhr, a situation in which governments are too obviously concerned to require comment. If the industry continues to grow, as seems inevitable, the participation of governments is not likely to be less.

The International Aspects of the Iron and Steel Industry Confined to the Three Primary Units. These are the only units with influences greatly transcending national boundaries, and the major international problems involved are already fairly obvious. These relate to: first, the competition among the primary units both for raw materials and markets; second, the consequent pressure, both economic and political, on the countries having the needed raw materials and markets; third, the struggle for political control of the Franco-German unit.

Difficulties arising from the first and second causes named are not now acute, and they are for the present relegated to the background by the overshadowing portent of the Ruhr. They will be treated briefly with a view to gaining space for the discussion of the Ruhr problem.

Germany's pre-war effort to secure "a place in the sun" was closely connected with the rapid growth of its iron and steel and related industries, especially from 1900 onwards. With the aid of vast merchant-marine extensions, and under the skilful guidance and centralized control of the government, German

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steel products were finding their way to all parts of the world. The sharp edge of the wedge of industrial competition with England was steel.

During the war the steel-producing capacity of the world was greatly increased. In the years following the war it was in excess of world requirements, and the competition for markets was keen. The foreign markets gained by the United States during the war were rapidly recovered to a large extent by the Germans and English—aided by depreciated exchange and by the necessity, in the absence of strong markets at home, of securing foreign markets at any cost. The battle is well under way and is probably far from its climax. The struggle is quiet, but in deadly earnest.

All of the principal units in the iron and steel industry are normally well supplied with raw material. Because of this, their present activity in developing additional supplies in foreign countries has not caused international disputes, nor has it required the use of political pressure. If, however, attempts should be made to block this development, it is easy to foresee that political pressure would soon be forthcoming. Whether or not the pressure is justified on general grounds of world welfare, it probably may be taken for granted that it nevertheless will be exerted. The physical necessity of the survival and growth of the giant units of the industry seems likely to come into sharp conflict with the principle of the "self-determination of nations."

THE RUHR SITUATION

Salient features of the Ruhr situation are:

1. The iron and steel industries of the Ruhr form the core of a single economic unit which overlaps into France, Belgium and Luxembourg. The bulk of the pig iron and steel production is in the Ruhr territory, near the coal; the remaining production in Belgium, France and Luxembourg is from subordinate and tributary units. In addition to blast furnaces and steel mills, there are many plants which put the steel and iron into finished and semi-finished forms; these, likewise, are centered in the Ruhr. The result of division of the industry along present national boundaries would leave France nearly all the iron ore, but insufficient coking coal; and Germany would have most of the coking coal and no iron ore. A study of the pre-war movements of raw materials, resulting from adjustments during a long period

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of peace, indicates the complexity of the relations between the different parts of this great unit. They are generalized and diagrammatically expressed on the accompanying sketch.

2. The economic influence of the Franco-German coal, iron and steel unit can hardly be over-estimated, for nearly all of the remaining industrial activity of western Europe is dependent upon it in one way or another for its driving power and for its raw, semi-finished, and finished iron and steel products. The remaining steel capacity of Europe is only a third as large and is scattered in many small units. Sweden has immense iron ore reserves but no coal, with the result that its iron and steel industry is small. Spain has large ore reserves and some coal fairly near at hand. During the war there was a great increase in the number of local Spanish smelters. Most of its iron ore production, however, has been exported to England and Germany, and this will doubtless continue to be the main feature of the situation in the future. Austria in its present boundaries has a small amount of iron ore, but lacks sufficient coal of coking grade. Czechoslovakia contains the larger part of the iron ore of old Austria, extensive deposits of good coking coal and modern blast furnaces and steel works, and should be in a strong position in the future; but its ore reserve is only a tenth of that tributary to the Ruhr, and presumably this will never be more than a subordinate European unit. Russia has abundant coal and a fair amount of iron ore. The principal production of iron ore is from the Krivoi Rog basin in southern Russia (now included within the boundaries of the Ukraine Republic), where the reserves, though of good grade, are probably not more than ten per cent of those of northeastern France (including Lorraine). It has also considerable reserves in the Ural Mountains. The steel industry is mainly centered near the coal in southern Russia. Following the revolution this came to an almost complete standstill. If this industry should come under the management of Germans, through some future Russian-German alliance, rapid development may be looked for, but the natural conditions (principally the scattered distribution of the iron ores), will limit this unit to a secondary European position.[1]

[1]For more detailed information the reader is referred to: "The Iron Ore Resources of Europe," by Max Roessler, Bull. 706, U. S. Geol. Survey, 1921. Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau, "Iron Ore, Part 6," London, 1922. "Raw Materials Problem," by Economic Committee of the League of Nations, Vol. 2, 1921. "The Iron and Associated Industries of Lorraine, the Sarre District, Luxembourg, and Belgium", by Alfred H. Brooks and Morris F. LaCroix, Bull. 703, U. S. Geol. Survey, 1920.

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3. The preponderant position of the Franco-German unit is of comparatively recent origin. The real use of the Lorraine-Briey-Luxembourg iron ores began only with the invention of certain metallurgical processes in 1880 and the production has reached large volume only in the last two decades. The agricultural Europe of the past could be geographically divided into many self-sufficient parts. Similarly, in the early periods of small production of iron and steel many scattered small units could supply local needs, but in its new gigantic proportions the sphere of influence of the Franco-German industry cannot be so divided. Future settlements of European boundary questions have this new condition to deal with; there is no precedent.

4. The growth of the European iron and steel industry has been facilitated by the active interest of the German Government, but presumably, also, there would have been rapid growth without this aid. In the main, the industry has not been directed by the same minds directing governments, nor is it likely that the governments will or can in the future materially modify or curb its progress. If today the ruling powers of Europe or of the world were to decide that the growth and influence of the coal and the iron and steel industry had gone far enough, it is highly questionable whether the means of stopping it could be devised, at least for a long while.

5. The political control of this great industrial weapon means political supremacy both in war and peace. The history of the increasingly bitter struggle between France and Germany for control of the industry indicates a growing recognition of this fact. In 1870 the iron and steel industry had not largely developed, but Germany already foresaw a shortage of iron ore and in the peace settlement of 1871 drew a boundary line which included in Germany the outcrop of the iron ore as then known in Lorraine. The dip of the iron-ore beds was westerly into France and it was at that time supposed that the ore down the dip in French territory was worthless. Subsequently France's exploration and development of this deeper bed, under the spur of necessity, showed that the ore was as good as that in Lorraine and in larger quantity, with the result that at the opening of the Great War the French reserve was estimated in round numbers at three billions of tons while Germany had only two billions in Lorraine. Before the Great War German capital had secured control of ten to fifteen per cent of the French field. Almost the

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first step of Germany in the Great War was to occupy the French iron ore field and the great extension of the German coal field farther north into Belgium and northern France. The evidence seems to be conclusive that this was not a mere incident of military operations but the result of a long-considered design to secure and consolidate these resources. With the close of the war France recovered all the iron ore fields, including those lost in 1870, and in addition took more or less temporary control of the Saar coal basin. At this stage the great iron and steel unit of western Europe was divided between Germany and France, France holding all the iron ore and part of the coal, Germany holding preponderance in the coal and the steel plants. Neither division could function effectively on a large scale without drawing on the other for materials. Germany's share in the unit was still preponderant, through its possession of the coal, and production in French territory had returned less than half way to normal. Finally has come the French occupation of the Ruhr, giving France political control, for the time being at least, of the entire unit. If this control be made effective—and this is the immediate difficult problem—it means power to levy tribute not only against the remainder of Germany but against all the rest of continental Europe, within the range allowed by the competition of the English and American units. For purposes of the present discussion it is not material what form this control may take—whether financial, or by direct occupation and dispossession, or by the creation of a small buffer state, or by a form of tax or tribute, or by some other device.

The Possibility of a Failure by France to Consolidate Its Position. There are powerful racial, historical, political and psychological factors entering into this problem which it is not in our province to discuss, our purpose being to set forth only the bearing of the iron and steel situation.

The Ruhr is Germany's greatest industrial asset, and its successful occupation by the French is the most obvious means of forcing the payment of reparations. German military resistance from outside the Ruhr is seriously weakened by the loss of an essential agency of war. Passive resistance in the Ruhr itself is a contest of sentiment and stark physical needs. The demand for the products of the Ruhr is insistent from all sources, and the meeting of this demand is the only way for the workers to earn a livelihood and save their families from dire distress.

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World opinion may condemn this as economic slavery, but until such opinion can be organized into united effort through the League of Nations or other control it seems unlikely that it will effectively change the course of events in the Ruhr itself.

Such a fundamental readjustment touches other nations at many points and will necessarily entail much economic friction. From the standpoint of the iron and steel industry it seems reasonably clear that England's dominant interest will be to prevent, if possible, this readjustment. England's trade with the continent is becoming rapidly adapted to post-war conditions and the new situation will require sweeping and annoying readjustments. Of vastly greater import, however, is the fact that the unification of the iron and steel industry of western Europe under the control of France will in time create a much more formidable economic competition than could be expected under divided control. France substitutes for Germany in the struggle for "a place in the sun." England has many times faced the spectre of the rapid concentration of power in a single continental nation, and has uniformly resisted such movements. The presence of British troops near the heart of the region is still another complication, with large possibilities of friction.

There is a commonly accepted view that French genius does not lie in the direction of management of great industrial enterprises and that this may prevent success of the French attempt to manage the Ruhr iron and steel industry. The writer shares this view, but with reservation; the reservation arises from the question whether the French qualities of management would appear different if France had possessed the dominant coal supplies from the beginning and had learned gradually, like the Germans, to use them. The French have done pretty well with their own limited supplies, and it remains to be seen how fast they can learn, if at all, to manage industries based on the possession of larger supplies.

The prize is so great and so well understood by French leaders that presumably nothing will be left untried to make the grip secure. Parenthetically it may be noted that Premier Poincaré was formerly general counsel of the Comité des Forges, the French "steel trust," and that French army reports made public during the last few months indicate full comprehension of the economic possibilities. The highest trump card of the European game is now in hand. Will France be likely to give it up because

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of the more or less muddled advice of outsiders, who are viewing the situation from traditional, political, historical, or ethical standpoints, without full appreciation of the new "economic imperative" in the situation? Likewise, if Germany weathers the present storm, will it forego all future efforts to supply a basic deficiency by acquirement of the French iron ores? Perhaps neither one of these governments as now constituted will gain control. It may in time lodge in some new state or bloc not yet organized.

These remarks are not meant to imply what the present purpose of France may be—whether the immediate collection of reparations, or permanent control. If we accept the French declaration that the purpose is solely one of reparation, we may also understand that the process at best will be a slow one and that after a long and strenuous effort in getting the machine into action, France may gradually become accustomed to the idea of permanent control without at any time making a conscious decision about it. If by the permanent acquisition of the Ruhr France gains such a prominent position as an analysis of the conditions seems to indicate, it will be driven by force of circumstances to protect this position and, as we know, "protection" or "self-defense" or "security" are highly elastic terms which can cover a great variety of activities.

The failure to collect large sums for reparation in the first few weeks or months—or even years—of occupation may be a relatively small price to pay for the ultimate results, although the immediate cost in money and effort will be a large one. German resistance within the Ruhr itself, or political protest at home, or international complications arising from so mighty a readjustment, may prove to be beyond France's power to master. It is clearly to Germany's interest to develop these difficulties to the utmost. If and when it becomes clear to the German mind that these measures will fail, it seems almost inevitable that an effort will be made to buy off France at any possible cost, through an offer to the European allies. It is also to be surmised that under these circumstances the French Government will attempt to drive a hard bargain, and will relinquish its glittering chance for permanent future superiority only at a high price and under pressure of public opinion at home and abroad.

The Possibility That Germany May Replace the Ruhr Asset by Development of Another. There are hundreds of manufacturing

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plants throughout Germany which are dependent on the Ruhr for their pig iron and unfinished or semi-finished steel. This demand can be partly met by developing minor units of iron and steel production elsewhere in Germany and by purchase outside of Germany; but at best this supply is an uncertain one, and it will be many years—if ever—before it can be organized to produce anything like the volume required. The great obstacle in the way of developing another iron and steel industry outside of the Ruhr is the lack of coal and iron ore.

Mighty efforts will be made by Germany to develop its Silesian coal and lignites, but it will take years to make these supplies even approximately adequate, to say nothing of the tremendous readjustment involved. As a result of the partition of Silesia between Poland and Germany proposed by the League of Nations, only twenty-four per cent of the coal production (on the basis of 1913 statistics) remains to Germany. The case would be somewhat analogous if the United States were suddenly to lose the eastern coal field, including Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, thereby becoming dependent solely on the coal fields of the mid-west.

Since the war Germany has been active in its attempts to secure outside supplies of ore from Sweden, Spain and elsewhere, as a means of lessening its dependence on the French ores, but the aggregate supplies available from such sources are strictly limited. They must be divided with England and their transportation adds a heavy burden of cost. It is sometimes argued that with aggressive and skilful management almost any readjustment can be made in the assembling of raw materials, and in support of this argument many specific cases may be cited. England, for instance, has been able to draw in raw materials from all parts of the earth. This argument fails to take into account the enormous volume of coal and iron ore needed for the iron and steel industry in its present expanding form; it constitutes a mighty stream, requiring an adequate source and necessitating transportation facilities of almost unbelievable magnitude and effectiveness.

The Possibility of Reverting to Dual Control of the Franco-German Iron and Steel Industry. The question naturally arises whether it would not be possible to go back to a partnership control of the Franco-German iron and steel unit. The reasonably good results from this kind of control up to the Great War

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naturally afford a standard to which the public mind reverts. Such a solution would accord with the traditional manner of handling such disputes. The failure of the present French effort would almost certainly be followed by at least a temporary working arrangement along partnership lines. There are several features in the situation, however, which raise serious question whether such a reversion to the pre-war status will be permanently realized, and which seem to indicate that the struggle may continue until one nation or the other is in control of the entire industry. The first is the temporary difficulty of curbing passions inflamed by the war. The second is the recent great expansion of the actual physical power and influence of this economic unit, and as a corrollary the increasing desirability of controlling it in the interest of future national power. This is now recognized by the parties involved as never before. The third is the fact that unified control means greater efficiency of operation than divided control by partners hating each other. It is necessary for the future welfare of Europe that this unit be skilfully operated in order that Europe may hold its own in competition with the other two great centers—England and the United States. This necessity is likely to prove to be a powerful influence toward unification of control. A fourth is the fact that the growth of the business naturally puts a premium on firm control of raw materials, for a long future, as a matter of insurance. As long as one available source of essential supply is in control of a potential enemy, the industry is in unstable equilibrium. Before the war the Ruhr industry had made some progress in acquiring control of French iron mines. This tendency to safeguard the future by extending control to raw materials has been concurrent with increasing concentration of industry the world over.

It is quite possible that the struggle will be a long and intermittent one and that some patched-up partnership may be arranged in the near future which will hold until the machine again breaks down. But its ultimate renewal seems inevitable.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Out of the unprecedented growth of an industry based on natural resources comes the present situation in the Ruhr. It may be viewed in the light of the following considerations: (1) The iron and steel industry is the largest single factor in

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modern industrial development. (2) Nature has decreed concentration of this industry in three geographic units—the United States, England, and Franco-Germany, which are the only ones with influence largely transcending national boundaries. (3) There are no others which promise to rival them for a considerable time to come. (4) The growth of these units of power has been more or less independent of politics, and probably in the future they will not be materially curbed by political considerations. (5) They will carry into political supremacy the nations possessing them. (6) Because of the competition of these three units for markets and raw materials international difficulties have arisen, and will continue to arise in the future. (7) Further international difficulties will be brought about by political pressure of other countries which may refuse readily to meet these demands.

Among the several contributory factors to the present Ruhr situation one begins to appear as the probably dominant factor of the future—the struggle for the control of the iron and steel industry of western Europe. The recent growth of this industry has created an industrial problem for which there is no historical precedent. The industry cannot be divided geographically into self-sustaining and effective units; its physical unity favors unit political control. Partnership control, under the circumstances, has become difficult, if not impossible; it would be a condition of highly unstable equilibrium. Unit political control confers supremacy in Europe both in war and peace, suggesting that the fight for such control will ultimately be one to a finish, even though it may be temporarily suspended. The failure of France to secure immediate reparation is a small matter compared with the ultimate issues at stake.

There are many qualifications which might be added to the above general statement, and the problem involves other economic and political factors which may control for a time. No attempt is made to predict when or how unification may be accomplished, or by what nation or group. The purpose of this discussion is simply to set forth the logical effects of the development of natural resources upon international affairs, on the assumption that such development is an element in an uncontrollable environmental change to which political conditions will ultimately tend to conform.

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BRITISH WAR POLICY AND THE WESTERN FRONT

By T. H. Thomas

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S COMMAND, 1915-1918. By G. A. B. Dewar, assisted by Lt.-Col. J. H. Boraston. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922.

THE POMP OF POWER. Anonymous. New York: Doran, 1922.

INTRIGUES OF THE WAR. By Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice. London: Westminster Gazette, reprint, 1922.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND. By General Tasker H. Bliss. New York: Foreign Affairs, December, 1922.

HAIG AND FOCH. By Major-General Sir George Aston. London: The Quarterly Review, April, 1923.

HENRY WILSON. By the Right Hon. L. S. Amery. London: Blackwood's Magazine, August, 1922.

IT IS inevitable that the subject of Allied war policy should continue to be discussed from a more or less controversial standpoint. The matter itself was a controversy in its very nature: a resultant of conflicting forces, of opposing or divergent ideas, purposes and interests. By its nature, too, the subject overlaps the ragged boundary line between politics and strategy. Perhaps the latter may fairly be considered a matter of history, but the political factor is in no sense retrospective. It involves forces still at play, makes the question of credit or blame a matter of very practical importance, and introduces an element which by no means makes for an attitude of historical detachment. It is only natural, therefore, that side by side with matter-of-fact, non-controversial works such as General Edmond's first volume of the "British Official History" and General Montgomery's "Story of the Fourth Army" (books which mark the beginning of thorough and authentic history of military operations on the Allied side), the past year has added fresh fuel to the controversial and partisan discussion of general war policy. The same contrast seems to hold true in Germany.

Mr. Dewar and Colonel Amery, General Bliss and General Maurice all contribute new facts of decided importance; but at the same time each restates familiar matter from the perspective of a particular standpoint. Each of these standpoints represents, no doubt, one facet of the truth; but taken together they are irreconcilable.

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General Bliss expresses vigorously the Versailles viewpoint toward the events preceding the March offensive. He does not take up certain essential factors in the equation: the Palestine offensive, for one, or the critical shortage of British effectives in France; but his very precise evidence gives us a far clearer knowledge of the proposed interallied reserve. The texts quoted show, for instance, that the reserve was not put under the command of Foch but directly under the authority of the Executive Committee; Foch's authority was that of a chairman of a committee which could act only by unanimous agreement. From these texts, too, it is clear that this committee of sharply limited scope was directly opposite in principle to Foch's proposal for a board with powers amounting to a real central command—which was vetoed by Mr. Lloyd George. According to Sir William Robertson, Foch's proposal was based on the conviction that control over the strategical reserves could not be separated from control over operations as a whole, in which feeling he himself, Haig and Pétain concurred. General Bliss also clears away the rather fantastic allegation that the arrangement between Pétain and Haig for mutual support was kept secret from the authorities at Versailles.

Col. Amery's eulogy of Sir Henry Wilson points out that it was he who conceived and worked out the idea of the Supreme War Council, and also, later on, the projects for the interallied reserve in France coupled with a decisive offensive in Palestine. Sir Henry Wilson's rôle is still the most elusive factor in the whole problem of Lloyd George's war administration, but Col. Amery goes far to make it clearer. We learn for one thing that in disregarding as "wooden and pedantic" the urgent recommendations of Robertson and Haig to concentrate the British forces upon the western front ready against the 1918 enemy campaign, Mr. Lloyd George was acting in accord with Sir Henry Wilson's advice.

The anonymous author of "The Pomp of Power" offers somewhat dubious indications of Sir Henry Wilson's attitude; but in general his two or three chapters are a confused echo of the controversy rather than a contribution to it. In a confidential whisper he reveals to us fragments of almost everything that has appeared in print upon the subject. Through the thin glaze of his "inside," "first personal" manner we recognize almost the very text of Mermeix, de Civrieux, Abel Ferry, and other writers whose industry gathered so much historical material out of the

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official washing of dirty linen following the Painlevé-Nivelle fiasco. Adroitly misinterpreted and distorted, seasoned by innuendo, rumor and insinuation, this material may fairly claim the distinction of being the most disingenuous commentary upon the war which has yet appeared in print. Nevertheless these chapters have a place in a survey of the whole discussion. However flimsy in substance, their tone and spirit reflect well enough the general attitude of the critics and detractors of Haig and the British Command.

Of the different attitudes, three are alike in that they adopt a similar perspective and follow a more or less common line of argument. The followers of Mr. Lloyd George, the French in general, and those whom we may term "Versaillais," all join in presenting the formation of the Supreme War Council as a decisive turning point in the conduct of the war. Their whole position rests upon the premise stated in Mr. Lloyd George's summons to the Rapallo Conference, *i.e.*, that the unsatisfactory record of the Allies in the past "lay entirely in the lack of real unity in the conduct of military operations." From this derives the proposition that Versailles changed this scattered and divergent effort into a united policy, which led as its direct and logical result to unity of military command under Foch. In this adoption of a united policy and a common strategy, 1918 is held out as a complete contrast to previous years. Finally, unity of command is presented as a victory of Mr. Lloyd George over the supposedly obstructive and "separatist" attitude of Sir Douglas Haig, and the successful turn of the 1918 campaign is ascribed solely to the peculiar virtues of Foch's strategy.

This general interpretation, moreover, is by no means confined to the special angles of opinion noted above; on the contrary, it corresponds fairly closely to the generally accepted view. The world at large has followed the natural instinct to personify in Foch the whole achievement of 1918 (rightly, perhaps, but far too exclusively). It has also fallen into the natural error of judging by results rather than by causes; it has drawn the conclusion that the hard struggle of the earlier years was a futile effort, and that the sudden turn of the tide in 1918 was due to different leadership and to new strategical conceptions. In short, we have fallen into what may be termed a distorted 1918 view of the whole course of the war.

This whole position is challenged by General Maurice and

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Mr. Dewar. General Maurice's pamphlet is primarily an indictment of Mr. Lloyd George's conduct of the war, and stresses two main points: first, that his policy in 1917 and again in 1918 was based on a complete error of judgment as to the military situation; next, that in each of these years it was he who determined the strategy to be followed, and that he deliberately over-rode or played off one against another his own military advisers and his allies, with the object of keeping the actual direction of things always in his own hands. It seems clear that this is what actually happened, but whether it was a consistent, deliberate policy is a much more complicated question. General Maurice's argument is plausible, but it is decidedly partisan and presents only one side of a problem which was anything but simple.

The two volumes by Mr. Dewar and his assistant, Col. Boraston, are a far more substantial and important contribution. But they too have given us a partisan argument rather than an historical narrative. Their book is above all a reaction against the contentions of Mr. Lloyd George on the one hand, and of French semi-official propaganda historians such as Recouly and Madelin on the other. It is a very confused statement as to form, and the evidence is offered in roundabout paraphrases rather than in specific terms, and with little reference to sources and authorities. The authors, moreover, indulge in interpretations which are decidedly personal and sometimes exaggerated. But in essential matters of fact the book seems to rest on a substantial basis, and presents (incompletely and imperfectly) a side of the case which had been neglected heretofore: that of the British army. For one thing, it throws a new light on the strategical decisions of the 1918 campaign and on the actual status of Foch's authority over his subordinate Commanders-in-Chief. Above all, for our present purpose, it corrects the distorted standpoint just referred to, and sets 1918 in its place in the general perspective of the war. Also, it brings out, in rather confused fashion, what Sir William Robertson showed more clearly and concisely two years ago: that as strategy is the expression of policy, the course of the war is to be understood primarily in the light of the policies followed by the Allied Governments in the war's successive stages. Although this principle is in no way new, in practice we disregard it almost entirely and form general conclusions as to the conduct of the war upon the results of operations in the field.

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General Aston notes the true starting point in a survey of British military policy. Even in 1915 Joffre and French had drawn up a plan for a combined attack. This, he writes, "was approved by the British Cabinet in January but was cancelled on account of the diversion of troops and material to the Dardanelles, a cause beyond Sir John French's control. The shortage of munitions, which affected so seriously all his operations, was largely attributable to this same strategical divergence." Thus at the very start we find the two main lines of cleavage of British military policy—the east versus the west—and the conflict between political and military authorities in determining strategy.

In 1915, the gradual (and perhaps unintentional) extension of the operations in the Dardanelles, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and finally at Saloniki stunted the growth of the army in France and prevented any unity in the conduct of operations on the western front. And in 1915 appears the fatal precedent of the government determining strategy as well as policy. This came, perhaps, not from deliberate purpose but simply from not keeping the two things distinct. The result was, nevertheless, that the political authorities decided highly technical military and naval problems against the judgment of their responsible professional advisers, following the curious procedure of calling in the support of a "weighty minority" of professional opinion (Lord Crewe's striking euphemism is not to be forgotten). 1915 was, in short, the real period of patchwork strategy.

This situation was reversed in 1916 when Kitchener brought Sir William Robertson back from France as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Taking lessons from the experience of the past year, Kitchener and Robertson together reorganized the whole conduct of the war. They brought the undertakings in the east into relation to the main effort on the western front, and established a coherent military policy for the whole Empire with a clearly defined strategic mission in each field.[1] Relatively speaking, there seems now to have been realized, in the second phase of Mr. Asquith's "weak and wobbling" régime, the proper basis of authority in the conduct of war—the government, (*i.e.*, the much abused politicians) determining general policy but following the advice of responsible military authorities as to the strategy for carrying it out. One thing at least is certain,

[1]Saloniki always excepted.

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1916 saw the greatest degree of unity in the British conduct of the war. Never before or afterward was there as much mutual confidence and support and such close agreement of views between the successive echelons of authority as then prevailed between Asquith, Kitchener, Robertson, and Haig.

This definite and coherent basis of policy made possible in 1916 that period of close cooperation on the western front for which Mr. Dewar makes the claim: "In all but name unity of command existed as fully in 1916 as it did in 1918; and in 1918 its limitations were the same as in 1916." Although this challenges the very basis of our conceptions there is evidently a good deal to be said for it. In any case, Haig's whole conduct of operations was based on the principle of acting in union with the French. He and Joffre planned the campaign as a single operation of the two armies in unison, and even Verdun did not disrupt their cooperation or prevent the Somme offensive being carried out at the time and place originally fixed. Haig and Joffre often disagreed but always came to an agreement, which seems to have been the exact basis upon which Foch exercised the Single Command in 1918.

The Somme, moreover, was but one part of a concerted strategical effort determined by a formal agreement between the Allied Governments at the beginning of the year. It was answered by Brusiloff's offensive in the east and by Cadorna's most successful effort on the Italian front. This converging pressure on all sides brought the Central Powers to the greatest point of tension they had yet reached, threw them for the first time on the defensive, and drove Falkenhayn from command. Never again were the Allies to make so powerful an effort in unison; in 1918 even the Supreme Command was unable to bring the Italian effort into line. Finally, at the end of 1916, Joffre and Haig again planned a common operation for the next year—the famous Chantilly plan which was cast aside by Nivelle's appointment. The agreement outlining this plan again comprised a general Allied effort, and was signed not only by Joffre and Haig but by the military representatives of Russia, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania. Even discounting the minor powers, this compares pretty well with Versailles.

Looking back on the whole record of 1916, we may suggest that the faults on the Allied side were faults of execution rather than of design. There were serious gaps in the Allied effort as a

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whole, but in such matters unity is a very relative term at best, and on comparing this with other years it hardly appears that lack of unity was the reason for the Allies not achieving victory in 1916. Perhaps the main reason was the strength and fighting power of the German army.

1917 ushered in a political overturn in both England and France which reversed the relations between the governments and their military leaders and advisers. In both countries the new War Cabinets went, so to speak, into direct opposition to the military; they took into their own hands the initiative and the decision as to the strategical methods to be followed, and made the decision contrary to responsible military opinion. Briand dismissed Joffre, shelved Foch and passed over Castelnau and Pétain in order to try out, not Nivelle himself but Nivelle's plan of campaign—which General Mangin (one of its few faithful supporters) accurately defines as "la formule nouvelle que réclamait l'opinion parlementaire." The British Government in turn promptly imposed this Parliamentary strategy upon its own command. Nivelle was summoned to London for personal conference with the War Cabinet, which then and there accepted his plan—over the heads of Robertson and Haig and in spite of their disapproval. Following this, Mr. Lloyd George offered privately to put the British army directly under the orders of the French. Without informing Robertson or Haig of his intention, this decision he shortly afterward carried out, thus realizing at last "le principe français du commandement unique."

Thus in spite of the sudden change in strategy and in political authority at the beginning of 1917 the net result was to maintain the unity of policy arrived at in 1916. As before, the main effort was to be made on the western front and according to a single plan of campaign; while Nivelle's new authority set the seal on the most extreme form of unity in the actual conduct of operations. Although Haig disapproved of this no less than of Nivelle's plan, he accepted the decision of his government in both matters, and loyally carried out his share of the combined operation. As a matter of fact, Haig supported Nivelle more loyally than did the latter's own subordinates, and vigorously rallied to his side when Painlevé lost his nerve and began abandoning the attack. Finally, when the collapse came, we find the British army called upon to carry out a final funereal phase of this unified strategy; it was at the urgent appeal of the French

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that Haig carried on the offensive alone for the rest of the year, in order to withdraw German pressure while Pétain built up the French army again.

It was at the close of this campaign that Mr. Lloyd George put forward his diagnosis that the disappointments of the Allies were due to "the lack of real unity in the conduct of military operations." However justifiable as a campaign cry, it was a wholly misleading interpretation of the actual course of things in the past. Caporetto, the immediate occasion for the Rapallo Conference, was an Italian military disaster pure and simple—a consequence of the failure of Cadorna's Bainsizza offensive; only by arguing in a hypothetical circle can the blame be laid on Allied policy. The unsatisfactory situation on the western front arose not from a lack of unity in the conduct of operations but from the failure of the strategical project which Mr. Lloyd George had himself chosen and imposed upon his own army—and, incidentally, from the breakdown of unity of command in its most drastic form.

Even more misleading is the idea that the Supreme War Council, the offspring of the Rapallo Conference, brought about greater unity than before or led the Allies to agree upon a common policy in preparation for the 1918 campaign. Here above all the question of motives and intentions has obscured the record of actual facts. The Council no doubt represented a sincere effort to achieve unity, and offered a more organized, methodical means to that end. But it was only a means to an end, and the habit of centering attention on the mere course of procedure at Versailles has led to ignoring the substance of the matter. As a matter of fact, each government had a different military policy and a different conception of unity, and in both matters each maintained steadfastly its own position. From beginning to end, Italian eyes were fixed on the Piave and Monte Grappa. The British and French reached compromises on secondary points, but on the fundamental issue of the military policy to be pursued on the western front these two governments were in direct opposition—and remained so until March 21st. This underlying opposition wrecked all the efforts of the Versailles Council and reduced its proceedings to a mere working at cross-purposes. The confusion was increased still more by the fact that Lloyd George was in direct conflict with his own responsible military advisers, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in

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London and the Commander-in-Chief in France. Sir Henry Wilson, the British representative at Versailles, represented not the Imperial Staff or the army in France, but a military opposition (*i.e.*, himself) enjoying the personal support of the Prime Minister.

The question of the policy to be followed in 1918 was first taken up, not at Versailles in January, but at a conference between the two Chiefs of Staff and the two Commanders-in-Chief in the summer of 1917. Foch and Robertson, Pétain and Haig then agreed that the release of German divisions from Russia would throw the Allies on the defensive in the coming year, and that all possible strength should therefore be concentrated on the western front; and on this main principle the two armies remained in complete agreement from that time forward. In conformity with this decision, the Army Council pressed the government to stiffen the draft, in order to maintain the army in France up to strength; and the Chief of Staff advised standing on the defensive on all eastern fronts in order to bring British troops back to France. In this last the Admiralty concurred. The 1,200,000 troops then on distant fronts absorbed roughly six times the amount of tonnage required for a similar number in France, at a time when shipping could not be provided for the transport of American troops to France.

By the end of the year the necessity of strengthening the western front was still more critical. The accumulation of German reserves was an accomplished fact; the heavy casualties of the autumn campaigns had left the British army far below strength; and ten British and French divisions had been sent off to Italy. The draft had given 400,000 men less than the year before; and both Robertson and Haig redoubled their efforts to bring home to the government the urgent necessity of finding replacements for Haig's empty ranks. In this they were vigorously supported by Foch and Clemenceau.

The British Government, in the meantime, had not introduced the draft legislation called for by the Army Council, and in January informed Parliament that no extension of the age for military service would be necessary. The divisions sent off to Italy were not replaced, and in January Haig was ordered to take over twenty-eight miles of front from the French without being given new troops for that purpose. No troops were brought back from the east, nor were the troops then in England drawn upon to make good the shortage left by 1917. This was

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increased still further during the winter by the normal wastage of trench warfare (between December 31 and March 21 Haig's rifle strength dropped from 612,000 to 582,000—a loss equivalent to far more than three divisions). Finally, at the session of the War Council on January 30, Mr. Lloyd George forced through the plan for a "knockout" offensive in Palestine.

This whole course was directly opposite to the policy of concentrating upon the western front, which was the policy of the French Government (*i.e.*, Clemenceau) and upon which the staffs and armies of both countries were agreed. Whatever the reasoning or the judgments of the situation upon which this course was based, in actual fact the British Government left the western front to its own resources, let the British front in France grow steadily weaker, and turned to a decision in the east. It was, in short, a return to 1915—in policy, in strategy, and in political methods—the government again making the decision on military questions and acting as before on the "weighty minority" principle of professional advice, personified in Sir Henry Wilson.

At this same session of the Council, little more than a month before the expected date of the enemy offensive, was brought up and adopted the proposal for the Interallied Reserve. Mr. Lloyd George vigorously supported this at the time, although Haig pointed out that the dwindling strength of his army would make it impossible to hold his own line in proper force—to say nothing of detaching divisions for the Reserve. Under these circumstances the Reserve could be no more than a substitute for British troops in the flesh. Instead of sending Haig the troops which would have made the new scheme possible, the Army Council had to order him to cut down the total battalion strength of his army from 741 to 600. In February, while the new Committee was drawing up its plans for the general reserve, Haig was carrying out this discouraging order, and had just completed the process of reduction when the Committee's requisition for seven British divisions reached him. The enemy offensive on the British front was now certain and imminent, and the War Cabinet, at last face to face with the reality, reversed its position; instead of ordering Haig to comply, it ratified his refusal.

When the blow fell, a fortnight later, the government pressed the new draft law through Parliament, rushed across the Channel 355,000 troops then in England, hurried back to France every

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possible British unit from Italy and the east, and set free every available ship for the Americans. They carried out, in other words, exactly the policy which Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig (as well as Foch and Pétain) had been urging in vain for the past six months.

It was this complete reversal of the War Cabinet's recent policy which brought about at last the long invoked unity between the Allies on the western front, and which in turn made unity of command a possible reality instead of a contradiction in terms. Up to March 21, a Generalissimo would have been an umpire in a conflict of policy, an impotent arbiter between governments facing in opposite directions. By the concentration of forces on the western front Foch became a Commander-in-Chief instead of a deviser of expedients and compromises, and, once in command, he turned his back completely upon the Versailles' conception of an Interallied Staff and an organized Interallied Reserve.

Furthermore, we are in no way belittling Foch's achievement in pointing out that he helped the British to stem the tide in the spring, not by strategic advice but by providing troops—Pétain's troops, who during the immediate crisis took the place of British divisions which should have been in France ready to meet it. During the next four months the striking power of the German army was worn down and the tide of battle thereby turned, not by means of new strategical ideas but by a stand-up fight, by a *guerre d'usure* on the largest scale the war had yet seen. Foch's leadership and the agency of the Central Command played an essential—an inestimable—part in the whole result, but in regard to the British his main effort and influence is to be found in the skilful determination with which he pressed the Cabinet into providing at any cost the men for the battle. There is now clear evidence that the strategy followed out on the British front was laid down by Haig rather than by Foch; and, above all, it was by the arrival of replacements, by having at last the men necessary for the task, that Haig's army was able in August to strike the decisive opening blow of the Allied offensive, and thenceforward to carry through the heaviest, most sustained and all in all the most effective part in the Hundred Days advance to victory.

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

By Harry Elmer Barnes

General International Relations

WAR: ITS NATURE, CAUSES AND CURE. By G. Lowes Dickinson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1923, 155 pp.

An admirable presentation of the thesis that the future of civilization depends on the elimination of war.

OLD DIPLOMACY AND NEW, 1876–1922. By A. L. Kennedy. London: Murray, 1922, 414 pp.

A journalistic exposition and critique of British foreign policy since Disraeli, with special emphasis on the Balkans and Poland.

MONETARY RECONSTRUCTION. By R. G. Hawtrey. London: Longmans, 1923, 147 pp.

Valuable essays on currency problems from 1915–1922 by one of the world's leading authorities.

FOREIGN TRADE MARKETS AND METHODS. By C. S. Cooper. New York: Appleton, 1922, 440 pp.

Interesting and timely, though somewhat superficial.

THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE BALANCE. By T. H. Boggs. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 221 pp.

A technical study of the nature and significance of the balance of trade in world commerce.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. By W. Kirkconnell. London: Allen and Unwin, 1923, 218 pp.

An analysis of the reaction of international relations upon economic prosperity.

HET PERMANENTE HOF VAN INTERNATIONALE JUSTITIE TE 'S-GRAVENHAGE. By H. Ch. G. J. Van der Mandere. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1922, 328 pp.

A comprehensive historical study of courts of arbitration, with special attention to that at The Hague.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE MOVEMENT. By A. L. Guérard. New York: Boni, 1922, 268 pp.

An account of the efforts to establish an international language, indicating the important bearing of the attempt on modern international relations.

Foreign Relations of the United States

THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE. By T. H. Dickinson. New York: Dutton, 1923, 151 pp.

An enthusiastic argument for American entry into the League of Nations, ignoring fundamental non-diplomatic causes of international disputes.

THE McKINLEY AND ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATIONS, 1897–1909. By James Ford Rhodes. New York: Macmillan, 1922, 418 pp.

Contains a full and generally impartial review of the foreign policy of the United States during this period.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND ADDRESSES OF WOODROW WILSON, MARCH, 1917, to MARCH, 1921. By Howard S. Leach. Princeton: Library of Princeton University, 1922, 73 pp.

A continuation of the bibliographies by Mr. Clemons and Mr. Brown, listing the books, addresses, messages, notes, and state papers written during Mr. Wilson's second administration.

Europe

HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE, 1878–1919. By G. P. Gooch. London: Cassell, 1923, 736 pp.

An excellent detailed history of diplomacy and international relations. Designed as a continuation of Fyffe's *History of Modern Europe*.

MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION. By H. G. Plum and G. G. Benjamin. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1923, 413 pp.

An unusually sane and succinct manual, stressing social and economic factors and the rise of modern nationalism.

PROBLÈMES FINANCIERS D'APRÈS-GUERRE. By A. D'Aubigny, A. Celéier, A. Delatour et al. Paris: Alcan, 1922, 244 pp.

An important series of lectures delivered by distinguished authorities before L'Ecole des Sciences Politiques.

THE MAKING OF RURAL EUROPE. By H. D. Irvine. London: Allen and Unwin, 1923, 224 pp.

A valuable historical survey, including an important summary of changes in rural Europe since 1914.

THE IDEALS OF FRANCE. By Ch. Cestre. New York: Abingdon, 1922, 325 pp.

An historical interpretation in a somewhat mystical and idealistic vein.

LE STUPIDE XIX^{e} SIÈCLE. By León Daudet. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1922, 312 pp.

The Royalist and Catholic leader's fierce attack on the development of democracy and critical thought in France since 1789.

JAURÈS ET LE PARTI DE LA GUERRE. By F. Gouttenoire de Toury. Paris: Éditions des Cahiers Internationaux, 1922, 234 pp.

A lucid account of Jaurès' struggle against French militarism and imperialism and the Franco-Russian Alliance by a leading French radical.

EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON FRENCH ECONOMIC LIFE. Edited by Charles Gide. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923, 197 pp.

A comprehensive account in the form of a collection of five monographs by leading authorities.

LA POLITIQUE DU CHARBON, 1914–1921. By M. Olivier. Paris: Alcan, 1922, 301 pp.

A realistic study of the relations of the supply and consumption of coal to the political and diplomatic history of England and France since 1914.

L'ITALIE D'APRÈS GUERRE, 1914–1921. By E. Lémonon. Paris: Alcan, 1922, 259 pp.

An admirable work by a distinguished authority on modern Italian history.

I DISCORSI DELLA RIVOLUZIONE. By Benito Mussolini. Milan: Casa Editrice del Partito Nazionale Fascista, 1923, 61 pp.

Representative speeches of the leader of the Fascisti.

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THE GERMAN REVOLUTION OF 1918–19. By R. H. Lutz. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1922, 186 pp.

The first authoritative account in English.

L'ALLEMAGNE NOUVELLE. By Victor Cambon. Paris: Roger et Cie, 1923.

One of the best French works on contemporary Germany by an experienced observer.

LA CONSTITUTION PRUSSIENNE DU NOVEMBRE 1920. By M. Aubry. Paris: Éditions de "La Vie Universitaire," 1922, 216 pp.

A thorough analysis, reprinting the text of the Constitution.

ENGLAND UND DEUTSCHLAND. By G. von Schulze-Gaevernitz. Charlottenburg: Beuholz und Weiswange, 1922.

A new edition of a notable work surveying Anglo-German relations in the past and advocating an understanding between these states.

NOS ILLUSIONS SUR L'EUROPE CENTRALE. By W. d'Ormesson. Paris: Plon, 1923.

A survey of contemporary conditions in Central Europe, with a convincing plea for a more moderate and constructive international policy towards that area.

KRIEGFÜHRUNG UND POLITIK. By Erich Ludendorff. Berlin: Mittler, 1922, 342 pp.

More of the General's perennial allegation that Germany lost the war because of political treachery behind the lines.

LES PLANS SECRETS DE LA POLITIQUE ALLEMANDE EN ALSACE-LORRAINE, 1915–1917. By Ch. Schmidt. Paris: Payot, 1922, 263 pp.

A documentary revelation of German plans for the absorption and Germanization of Alsace and Lorraine in the event of a German victory.

THE RIDDLE OF THE RHINE. By V. Lefebure. New York: Dutton, 1923, 282 pp.

An analysis of the military and economic significance of the Rhine district during the World War and today. The emphasis is on the German chemical industry, chemical warfare, and the danger from Germany to France residing therein.

KOMMENTAR ZUM FRIEDENS-VERTRAGE. Edited by Walter Schücking et al. Berlin: Engelmann, 1920–1922, five volumes.

The standard German analysis and critique of the Treaty of Versailles.

DIE LIQUIDATION DES VERSAILLER FRIEDENS. By Karl Radek. Moscow: Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1922, 72 pp.

A noted Bolshevik argues brilliantly that Russia can wait while the Peace of Versailles is torn up and a new grouping of powers is constructed.

LA RUHR ET L'ALLEMAGNE. By L. Coupaye. Paris: Dunod, 1923.

A good study of the importance of the Ruhr in contemporary German industrial life.

THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By A. Rasin. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923, 160 pp.

A technical analysis appearing as a volume in the Carnegie Endowment's Social and Economic History of the World War.

THE EVOLUTION OF HUNGARY AND ITS PLACE IN EUROPEAN POLITICS. By Count Paul Teleki. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 312 pp.

A rather uninteresting but moderate pro-Magyar exposition of Hungarian history and economic problems, with the emphasis on the period since 1867. It has many maps and a bibliography.

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THE NEW POLAND. By Charles Phillips. London: Allen and Unwin, 1922, 383 pp.

An impressionistic sketch of the new Polish state, based on personal experiences.

VOSPOMINONIA. By General Loukowski. Berlin: Kirchner, 1922.

One of the more valuable Russian memoirs relative to the World War and the Russian revolution.

SIBIR, SOYUZNIKI I KOLCHAK. By G. K. Guins. Harbin: League of Regeneration Press, 1922, two volumes.

A well documented work on the anti-Bolshevik campaigns in Siberia favorable to the anti-Bolshevik leaders.

LA RUSSIE NOUVELLE. By Edouard Herriot. Paris: Ferenczi, 1923.

A survey by a competent French observer, deputy from Lyons.

DER NEUE KURS IN RUSSLAND: WIRTSCHAFTSGESETZE DER SOWJETREGIERUNG. By W. Hahn and A. Lilienfeld-Toal. Jena: Fischer, 1923, 108 pp.

A brief documentary study of modifications of the thoroughgoing Communism of the early Bolshevik régime.

British Empire

IF BRITAIN IS TO LIVE. By Norman Angell. London: Nisbet, 1923, 128 pp.

A summary argument for the development of internationalism and the elimination of armaments, customs barriers and political boundaries.

OUR RULING CLASS. By F. Francis. London: Humphreys, 1923, 289 pp.

A bitter arraignment of the Treaty of Versailles and of democratic trends in contemporary Europe from the standpoint of a "bitter-ender" and believer in autocratic ideals.

ENGLAND TODAY. By G. A. Greenwood. London: Allen and Unwin, 1922.

An indictment of social waste, idleness and ostentation. A critique of the theory and practice of "the leisure class."

THE PATH OF FREEDOM. By Michael Collins. London: Fisher Unwin, 1923, 153 pp.

Notes by the late leader of the Irish Free State dealing with the history and nature of the treaty with England.

THE IRISH CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED. By D. Figgis. Dublin: Mellifont, 1922, 100 pp.

A clear exposition.

THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA. By W. P. M. Kennedy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923, 519 pp.

The standard work in the English language.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN INDIA, 1858–1914. By M. P. Cross. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922, 248 pp.

A thorough historical survey.

YOUNG INDIA, 1919–1922. By Mahatma Gandhi et al. Madras: Ganesan, 1923.

The authoritative exposition by the leader of the non-coöperation movement and his associates.

HUMAN AUSTRALASIA. By C. F. Thwing. New York: Macmillan, 1923, 270 pp.

A sociological survey in popular form.

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The Near East

THE BALKANS. By Wm. Miller. London: Fisher Unwin, 1923, 538 pp.
A new edition of a standard work covering the period to 1922.

THE BIRTH OF YUGO-SLAVIA. By H. Baerlein. London: Parsons, 1922, two volumes, 308, 418 pp.
Pro-Jugoslav and voluminous.

LA ROUMAINIE NOUVELLE. By M. Gillard. Paris: Alcan, 1922, 216 pp.
A useful survey of post-war Rumania.

GREECE AND THE ALLIES. By G. F. Abbott. London: Methuen, 1922, 242 pp.
A critical analysis of the nationalistic aspirations of Venizelos. A valuable corrective of the conventional view of Greek politics and international relations since 1914.

THE TURKISH EMPIRE: ITS GROWTH AND DECAY. By Lord Eversley and Sir Valentine Chirol. London: Fisher Unwin, 1923, 456 pp.
The second part, by Chirol, covers the period 1914–1922.

ANGORA: L'AUBE DE LA TURQUIE NOUVELLE, 1919–1922. By J. Schlicklin. Paris: Berger-Leurault, 1923.
An excellent account of the Turkish revival, based in part upon a personal visit to the Near East.

LE BOLCHEVISME ET L'ISLAM. By La Mission Scientifique du Maroc. Paris: Leroux, 1922, two volumes.
A valuable, though somewhat prejudiced, analysis of the relations between Bolshevik Russia and the Turks.

THE MARTYRDOM OF SMYRNA AND EASTERN CHRISTENDOM. By L. Oeconomos. London: Allen and Unwin, 1923, 237 pp.
A Greek scholar's vigorous indictment of Turkish activities in Asia Minor, assigning responsibility in part to Allied diplomacy.

COMMENT LA FRANCE S'EST INSTALLÉE EN SYRIE, 1918–1919. By R. de Gontaut-Biron. Paris: Plon, 1922.
Strongly anti-English in tone, but very valuable as a history and interpretation of the French post-war policy in the Near East.

PALESTINE AND THE WORLD. By F. G. Jannaway. London: Sampson Low, 1922, 272 pp.
An historical and descriptive work, favorable to the Zionist program.

THE INS AND OUTS OF MESOPOTAMIA. By Thomas Lyell. London: Philpot, 1923, 237 pp.
The most satisfactory analysis of the Mesopotamian question as yet available in English, though somewhat unfair to Islamic ideals.

Africa

EGYPT OLD AND NEW. By P. F. Martin. London: Allen and Unwin, 1922, 224 pp.
A superior type of descriptive work, treating of the geography, history and the social, economic and political life of contemporary Egypt.

L'AFRIQUE LATINE: MAROC, ALGÉRIE, TUNISIE. By André Fribourg. Paris: Plon, 1922.
A survey of the French colonial realm in northern Africa.

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Latin America

PRESIDENT OBREGÓN—A WORLD REFORMER. By E. J. Dillon. Boston: Small, Maynard, 1923, 350 pp.

An effort to present the case for the President of Mexico as a statesman of a new moral order. Over-exuberant, but a book which should be read widely by citizens of the United States.

SOUTH AMERICA: AN INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL FIELD. By W. Koebel. London: Fisher Unwin, 1923, 360 pp.

A new edition of a useful work.

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An interesting philosophy of history and critique of western civilization which, curiously enough, ends in a eulogy of those influences which have brought Western culture to the brink of ruin—autocracy, militarism and nationalism.

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The coal fields are outlined in green and the iron ore fields are outlined in red.

The production of iron ore, pig iron and steel, and the consumption of iron ore and coal are shown for each of the principal fields.

The generalized movements of coal and iron ore are indicated. Each red line represents annual shipment of one million tons of iron ore. Each green line represents annual shipment of one million tons of coal.

Movements of coal to outside districts are only partly shown, and movements of iron ore from outside districts are not shown at all.

The figures are those of the last pre-war year, 1913.



WESTPHALIA (RUHR)

IRON ORE PRODUCED	[illegible],000
IRON ORE CONSUMED	17,000,000
COAL PRODUCED	114,487,000
COAL CONSUMED	12,610,000
PIG IRON PRODUCED	8,214,157
STEEL PRODUCED	10,112,042

PAS DE CALAIS

IRON ORE CONSUMED	2,731,000
COAL PRODUCED	27,389,307
COAL CONSUMED	1,494,000
PIG IRON PRODUCED	933,089
STEEL PRODUCED	1,128,448

BELGIUM

IRON ORE PRODUCED	167,370
IRON ORE CONSUMED	7,321,000
COAL PRODUCED	22,841,000
COAL CONSUMED	3,700,000
PIG IRON PRODUCED	2,466,700
STEEL PRODUCED	2,100,000

LUXEMBOURG

IRON ORE PRODUCED	6,534,000
IRON ORE CONSUMED	8,514,000
COAL CONSUMED	2,800,000
PIG IRON PRODUCED	2,547,849
STEEL PRODUCED	1,336,263

SAAR PALATINATE

IRON ORE CONSUMED	3,384,000
COAL PRODUCED	15,313,000
COAL CONSUMED	3,540,000
PIG IRON PRODUCED	1,374,534
STEEL PRODUCED	2,078,025

FRENCH LORRAINE

19,396,000	IRON ORE CONSUMED
10,485,000	COAL PRODUCED
5,250,000	COAL CONSUMED
3,492,726	PIG IRON PRODUCED
1,059,167	STEEL PRODUCED

LORRAINE ANNEXÉE

IRON ORE PRODUCED	21,136,000
IRON ORE CONSUMED	12,172,000
COAL CONSUMED	5,870,000
PIG IRON PRODUCED	3,869,366
STEEL PRODUCED	2,286,354

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THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF THE COAL, IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY OF WESTERN EUROPE

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